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Rule of law in some form may be traced back to Aristotle, and has been championed by Roman 
jurists, medieval natural law thinkers, Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and the American founders, by German philosophers Kant, Hegel, and 
the nineteenth century advocates of the rechtsstaat, and in this century by such ideologically 
diverse figures as Hayek, Rawls, Scalia, Jiang Zemin and Lee Kuan Yew.2  Until recently, 
however, the human rights movement paid relatively little attention to the relationship between 
rule of law and human rights.3 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions rule of law 
only in passing in the preamble, suggesting in typically cryptic fashion that “human rights should 
be protected by the rule of law.”4  Neither the ICCPR nor ICESCR, the other two main pillars of 
the “international bill of rights,” mentions rule of law.5  Nor do most other early rights treaties, 
general assembly statements or committee reports or comments appeal to rule of law.
In contrast, references to rule of law now regularly appear in general assembly 
resolutions, committee reports, regional workshop platforms and other human rights instruments.6
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 The Western literature on rule of law is vast.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE 
OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1988); THE RULE OF LAW (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 1994); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM, IN MODERN SOCIETY 77 (1986); Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule 
of Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1449 (1990); Richard Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept 
in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).    For a discussion of rule of law in 
Asian countries, see the essays in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S.A.(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) [hereinafter ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW]. There 
are many different ways of understanding and conceptualizing rule of law. Given the many 
possible conceptions of rule of law, I avoid reference to “the rule of law”, which suggests that 
there is a single type or concept of rule of law, and a fortiori quasi-religious references to 
“The Rule of Law,” whose capitalization is presumably meant to capture Eternal Truths about 
The Good and Justice. 
3 See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: 
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS 1488 (2d ed. 2000). The Index of Topics in 
Steiner and Alston’s mammoth 1361-page book (excluding the annex on documents, annex 
on citations, index of topics and index of authors) lists just one page on which “rule of law” is 
discussed. 
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2004). 
5 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI) (1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm ; and 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. 
6 See, e.g., Conclusions of the Eleventh Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, Islamabad, Pakistan, Feb. 27-28, 
2003, art.  61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/109, annex I (“recogniz[ing] that good governance 
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Rule of law is central to the European Convention, and one of the requirements to join the E.U.7
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, limited by their charters from directly 
intervening in domestic political affairs, have emphasized rule of law and good governance.8  In 
2002, the late U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Sergio Vieira de Mello made rule of law the 
centerpiece of his brief tenure in office.9
This article considers several explanations for the international rights movement’s sudden 
heightened attention to rule of law.  The human rights movement has increasingly encountered 
conceptual, normative and political challenges.  In particular, the movement’s claim to 
universality has been shattered by critiques that take issue with the secular, individualistic, liberal 
commitments of the movement.10  In contrast, rule of law appears to be widely accepted by 
people of different ideological persuasions. Christians, Buddhists and Muslims; Libertarians, 
Liberals, and Confucian Communitarians; democrats, soft authoritarians, even socialists and neo-
Marxists11 – all find value in rule of law.  Rule of law then may provide one way to shore up the 
shaky foundation of the human rights movement. Perhaps, as de Mello suggested, rule of law will 
be a “fruitful principle to guide us toward agreement and results,” and “a touchstone for us in 
spreading the culture of human rights.”12
Whatever the human rights movement’s conceptual and normative shortcomings, the 
movement’s biggest failure has been to make good on the promise of a better life enjoyed by all 
and the rule of law at the national level assist all States in the promotion and protection of 
rights, including the right to development.”).
7 See European Convention on Human Rights, preamble. The so-called Copenhagen Criteria for 
admission include a market economy, democracy, rule of law and the protection of human 
rights.  See  EU Enlargement - A Historic Opportunity at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#Accession%20criteria (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2004).   
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 Many no longer find the international rights movement’s attempts to cloak contested and 
contingent norms in universal garb helpful. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Beyond 
Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about Values in Asia, 14 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1 (2003); Richard A. Wilson, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND 
CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997) (noting that 
the distinction between universalism and relativism is too totalizing in its conception); Yash 
Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating 
Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2000) (concluding that the universal 
versus relativism debate has already proved sterile and unproductive and may be damaging); 
Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Developing A Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 391 (2001) (arguing that the political rhetoric surrounding the tired debate over 
cultural relativism has obscured the deeper issues that global diversity presents for the 
international human rights system and suggesting that more attention be paid to just how 
much diversity, pluralism, self-governance and autonomy should be allowed).
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CHINA’S LONG MARCH]; John Gillespie, Concept of Law in Vietnam: Transforming Statist 
Socialism, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 146. See also E.P. 
Thompson, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975) (a Marxist, 
Thompson describes the ideal of rule of law as an unqualified good).  But see Morton J. 
Horowitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?,  86 Yale L. J. 561, 566 (1977) (allowing that rule of law may create a useful formal equality but claiming that it promotes 
substantive inequality and “enables the shrewd, the calculating and the wealthy to manipulate 
its forms to their own advantage”).
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in accordance with the utopian ideals contained in the ever-swelling list of human rights.  Despite 
the movement’s successes, we still live in a world where widespread human rights violations are 
the norm rather than the exception. Rule of law is seen as directly integral to the implementation 
of rights.  Without rule of law, rights remain lifeless paper promises rather than the reality for 
many throughout the world.
 Rule of law may also be indirectly related to better rights protection in that rule of law is 
associated with economic development, democracy and political stability, which are key 
determinants in rights performance. A long line of economists, legal scholars and development 
agencies from Max Weber to Douglas North to the World Bank have argued that rule of law is 
necessary for sustained economic growth.  Rule of law protects property rights and provides the 
necessary predictability and certainty to do business.  With ¼ of the world’s population living 
below the international poverty line of $581/year per capita, 790 million people lacking adequate 
nourishment, one billion without safe water to drink, two billion suffering from inadequate 
sanitation, and 880 million lacking access to basic health, economic growth is essential to the 
alleviation of some of the worst human suffering.13
Rule of law is integral to and necessary for democracy and good governance.  Attempts 
to democratize without a functional legal system in place have resulted in social disorder, as in 
Russia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the collapse of democratic regimes 
and their replacement by more authoritarian regimes in Indonesia in 1957, the Philippines in 
1972, South Korea in the 1970s, and numerous former Soviet Republics.14
Rule of law is said to facilitate geopolitical stability and global peace.15 According to 
some, it may help prevent wars from occurring in the first place.16 It also provides guidelines for 
how war is carried out, limiting some of the worst atrocities associated with military conflicts; it 
offers the possibility of holding accountable those who commit acts of aggression and violate 
humanitarian laws of war; and it is central to the establishment of a rights-respecting post-conflict 
regime.
Post 9-11 concerns over terrorism have also focused attention on rule of law as a means 
to hold terrorists accountable and to legitimize their capture and punishment, often through the 
promulgation of national defense and anti-terrorist laws. 17   The war on terrorism has been 
characterized as a war on “our” way of life - on democracy, human rights and rule of law – and 
ergo on civilization itself.  Kofi Anan claimed that the terrorist attacks on the U.S. “struck at 
everything [the United Nations] stands for; peace, freedom, tolerance, human rights, … the very 
idea of a united human family[,]…all our efforts to create a true international society, based on 
13
 Thomas W. Pogge, Priorities of Global Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 6, 7 (Thomas W. Pogge 
ed., 2001).
14
 Ani Sarkissian, Democratization in the Post-Communist World: Initial Conditions and Policy 
Choices, available at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/049/049007Sarkissian.htm (noting that many former soviet republics elected former communist parties or reverted to 
authoritarianism) (last visited Aug. 15, 2004); Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, The Bill 
of Rights and the Emerging Democracies, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 251 (2002) (finding in 
a large study of post-communist states that once free, citizens did not put so much importance 
on free speech and association; and that when democratization led to social disorder, the 
emphasis shifted toward social stability, law and order, and economic growth).
15
 U.S. Institute of Peace, Building the Rule of Law and Creating Stability through Justice, at
http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/about.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2004) (quoting Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1990: "Societies based on...the rule of law are 
prerequisites for...the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation.").
16
 Sergio Vieira de Mello, Message of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on Human 
Rights Day, Dec. 10, 2002.
17See infra notes 378-379. 
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the rule of law.”18 Conversely, rule of law plays a crucial role in ensuring that civil liberties are 
not encroached upon in the zeal to crack down on suspected terrorists, and has been invoked to 
protest, for instance, the so-called Patriot Act in the U.S.19
In addition, the upsurge of U.S. unilateralism and American-style cultural relativism has 
challenged the universality of human rights, exposed the soft underbelly of the international order 
and its vulnerability to power politics, and threatened to undermine the foundation of the 
international legal order upon which the edifice of international human rights rests.20  Rule of law 
provides a rhetorical basis for challenging the world’s sole reigning superpower.
Taking each of these factors in turn, I critically analyze the relationship between rule of 
law and human rights.  The relationship is complex and defies easy summary across such a broad 
range of issues.  Nevertheless, a provisional summary that highlights some of the key findings 
and conclusions may be helpful.  First, on the whole, rule of law is desirable.  However, it is 
clearly no panacea for any of these problems.  There is a great danger of claiming too much for 
rule of law, and in the process sowing conceptual confusion and planting the seeds for a reaction 
against rule of law once unrealistic high hopes are dashed, as they inevitably will be when rule of 
law is elided with justice and all things good and wonderful.
Second, rule of law is more useful in addressing some concerns than others.  Appealing 
to rule of law will do little to resolve the conceptual and normative difficulties at the core of the 
human rights agenda.  We are not, never have been, and most likely never will be, one big united 
family.  On the contrary, the failure to acknowledge that the liberal democratic conception of rule 
of law is but one possible variant of rule of law presents the grave danger that the international 
community, pushed by a liberal-leaning human rights movement, will attempt to export and 
impose an overly narrow, normatively contested conception of rule of law and way of life that 
does not fit the local circumstances.  So doing is likely to cause the same sort of system failures 
that occur when heart transplant patients reject incompatible tissue.  Liberal democratic reformers 
may end up undermining support for rule of law or miss opportunities to carry out meaningful 
legal reforms by clinging to too particularistic a conception of the good.  At the same time, all 
legal systems must meet certain minimal requirements.  This thinner conception of rule of law 
may provide the basis for meaningful reforms even where there is deep disagreement over 
democracy and rights issues.
Third, the empirical evidence to support the assertion that rule of law leads to more rights 
and wellbeing is limited, and subject to doubts about causality.  Rule of law is closely related to 
economic development, which in turn is closely associated with better performance on human 
18
 Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Urges Assembly to Respond to 11 September 
Attacks by Reaffirming Rule of Law (Sept. 24, 2000) (U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7965), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm/7965.doc.htm. See also Harold Hongju Koh, 
The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23, 25-26 (2002) (“September 11 was an attack 
… on the very spirit of international law…. The terrorists sought to jeopardize not just 
American security but the entire postwar system of free global transport, communications, 
markets, and self-government… At stake is the ‘positive face of globalization’…”).
19 See, e.g., Laura Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military 
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002).
20 See, e.g., RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICIES AND 
ACTIONS REGARDING SECURITY-RELATED TREATIES (Nicole Deller et al. eds., 2003); Johan 
D. van der Vyver, Universality and Relativity of Human Rights: American Relativism, 4 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43, 71-72 (1998); T. Jeremy Gunn, American Exceptionalism and 
Globalist Double Standards: A More Balanced Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
137 (2002); Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of 
Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (2002) (criticizing U.S. human rights policy with respect to religion for being unilateral, punitive, 
aggressive and failing to cooperate sufficiently with multilateral organizations, including the 
U.N.); UNILATERALISM & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (David M. 
Malone & Yuen Foong Khong, eds. 2003).
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rights measures and other indicators of wellbeing.  There is good reason to believe that wealth 
rather than rule of law is mainly responsible for better rights performance, although rule of law 
may also have some independent impact.  Given the importance of economic development to 
human rights and other aspects of wellbeing, the emphasis of the human rights movement should 
be on promoting development.  However, since rule of law is also one of the prerequisites for 
sustainable growth, promoting economic development entails promoting rule of law as well.  
Unfortunately, how to promote rule of law or economic development is far from straightforward, 
and depends on a wide variety of contingent circumstances in each country.  
Moreover, while “our” way of life takes seriously violations of civil and political rights, 
even legitimating for some people humanitarian intervention and perhaps regime change to make 
democracy possible,21 our way of life fails to take seriously extreme poverty as a violation of 
human dignity, and thus we do not treat economic “rights” and the “right” to development as 
legally enforceable entitlements on par with civil and political rights, much less as an adequate 
reason for humanitarian intervention and regime change.22 The failure to attend adequately to the 
systemic economic causes of rights violations and human suffering deprives the human rights 
movement of its radically critical edge.  Rather than leading to calls for a rethinking of global 
justice and how to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources as part of the solution to 
avoid humanitarian crises in the first place, episodic humanitarian interventions during times of 
extreme crisis are followed by a retreat into studied indifference of the ways in which the 
international economic order contributes to humanitarian crises, the wide disparities between rich 
and poor countries and the all-too-familiar toll of crushing poverty on human wellbeing.  
Similarly, the emphasis on a narrower political agenda of civil and political rights and the 
21
 Humanitarian intervention exists along a continuum from temporary emergency relief without 
any attempt to address the underlying political and economic causes (the U.S. mission as 
originally conceived in Somalia), including attempts to negotiate a cease fire agreement and 
peacekeeping operations (currently being discussed for Sudan); disaster relief plus attempts to 
impose political order by securing in power a leader acceptable to the international 
community or the intervening state (Haiti, Grenada, Panama); and nation-building and 
reconstruction as a liberal democratic state that implements rule of law and protects human 
rights (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq).  Of course, doing nothing is another option.  
See James Kurth, Models of Humanitarian Intervention: Assessing the Past and Discerning 
the Future, 9 FPRI WIRE no. 6 (Foreign Pol’y Res. Inst., Phila., PA), Aug. 2001, available at
http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0906.200108.kurth.humanitarianintervention.html (noting eight 
humanitarian crises in the past decade that resulted in 100,000 deaths or more than one 
million refugees which failed to elicit a military response from the U.S. or the U.N.). 
22
 Even in Sudan, the focus has been on allegations of genocide and ethnic cleansing committed 
by the government and government-sponsored militia against non-Arab ethnic groups.  
Although the conflict has been ongoing for years, the violence has increased since 2003 when 
rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, began 
demanding a greater share of resources and power-sharing with the Arab dominated Sudan 
state.  See generally, Physicians for Human Rights, PHR Calls for Intervention to Save Lives 
in Sudan: Field Team Compiles Indicators of Genocide, June 23, 2004, at
http://www.phrusa.org/research/sudan/pdf/sudan_genocide_report.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 
2004).  See also Alex de Waal, Editorial, Darfur’s deep grievances defy all hope for easy 
solution, THE OBSERVER, July 25, 2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,14658,1268773,00.html (noting that to characterize 
the conflict as between Arab and Africans obscures a more complex reality).  The 
international community was not prepared to intervene in years past despite wars and famine 
that led to more than two million deaths and over four million people being displaced since 
1983. See The World Factbook 2004, at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html (last updated May 11, 2004).  
Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world.  While war has had a negative impact on 
economic development, Sudan has also been burdened with a huge foreign debt.   See World 
Bank Country Brief, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXT
N/0,,menuPK:375432~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:375422,00.html (last 
updated Sep. 2003).
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technical project of implementing rule of law to facilitate democratization and economic growth 
within the parameters of the existing international economic regime allows the international 
community to take comfort in their well-intentioned efforts to do something for the less fortunate 
while ignoring the systemic causes of suffering that result from a grossly unbalanced distribution 
of global wealth.  Thus, while rule of law is necessary for sustained economic growth in most 
countries, and economic growth is likely lead to the enjoyment of more rights and a higher level 
of wellbeing, efforts to implement rule of law will not be sufficient to promote growth or the 
enjoyment of more rights and wellbeing globally in the absence of reforms that address the 
structural impediments to development and result in fundamental changes in the nature of the 
international economic order, which continues to contribute to a wide, if not growing, gap 
between rich and poor countries.
Fourth, although rule of law and liberal democracy generally go hand in hand, they need 
not.  Rule of law is possible in non-democratic states, and in democratic but non-liberal states.  
As rule of law is a matter of degree, rather than a dichotomous variable,23 significant legal 
reforms that enhance rule of law are possible in non-democratic states.  Rule of law may proceed, 
and is generally a precondition for, democratic consolidation.  Furthermore, the transition to 
democracy need not result in more protection of rights and indeed frequently results in serious 
rights violations in the short term.  Significant improvement on rights occurs only when 
democracy is consolidated, toward the end of the democratization process. The failure of many 
democratic states that have reverted to authoritarian regimes in recent years demonstrates the 
dangers of premature democratization.  A premature transition to democracy may undermine rule 
of law and protection of rights, particularly but not only in states that degenerate into social chaos 
and civil war. Accordingly, the knee-jerk reaction to promote democracy as the best solution 
everywhere anytime should be resisted, especially when used as a rationale to justify military 
intervention and regime change.
Fifth, we should not put too much faith in the ability of rule of law to prevent war, limit 
atrocities during war, or rein in a superpower bent on going its own way.  Nor should we expect 
that fragile legal systems in failed states will have the capacity to meet even the minimal 
requirements of a thin rule of law.  Historical, economic or institutional constraints will often 
limit the extent to which a legal system will be able to comply with the requirements of rule of 
law.  Regime change, civil wars, political restraints, and geopolitical power-plays will also 
undermine rule of law or present challenges to basic rule of law principles.  Accordingly, we must 
adopt a more realistic and pragmatic approach, and be wary of the tendency to allow normative 
beliefs to get the better of common sense.  Attempts to impose univocal solutions are likely to be 
counterproductive, for example by demanding “no impunity” for past offenders, banning 
amnesties or insisting that defendants in failed states with weak legal systems be afforded all the 
due process rights afforded defendants in politically stable states with well-established legal 
systems including limited detention periods, speedy trials and prison conditions that meet 
international standards.  The expectations for rule of law and the standards for human rights in 
transitional states cannot be simply the same as in other states.
Finally, rule of law is only one component of a just society.  In some cases, the values 
served by rule of law will need to give way to other values.  Invoking rule of law in most cases 
signals the beginning of normative and political debate, not the end of it.
I. Bolstering the Shaky Foundations of the Human Rights Movement: Conceptual Issues
23
 For a discussion of different approaches to defining the minimal conditions for rule of law and 
measuring rule of law, see CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11, at 130-141.
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In the past, support for the human rights movement was relatively costless for states given 
doctrinal limitations in the corpus of international rights law; the relatively undeveloped state of 
multilateral, governmental and non-governmental institutions for monitoring human rights 
violations; and the weakness of enforcement mechanisms. In recent years, the human rights 
movement has become an increasingly powerful force capable of affecting governmental policies 
and actions to one degree or another in many if not all countries.  
Not surprisingly, the international human rights regime has become the subject of more 
critical scrutiny as it has become more powerful.  As a result, there is now a greater awareness of 
a number of conceptual, normative, political and practical weaknesses in the human rights 
framework.24  Despite the considerable efforts of philosophers, the concept of a right remains 
notoriously contested and incoherent.25 There is no accepted understanding of what a right is;26
whether collective or group rights and nonjusticiable social, economic and cultural rights are 
really rights;27 of how rights relate to duties; or whether a discourse of rights is complementary or 
antithetical to, or better or worse than, a discourse of needs or capabilities.28  Nor is there an 
accepted ranking of the different rights that make up the wish list of goodies included in the ever 
proliferating set of human rights instruments and customary international law.29  Attempts to 
justify many of these allegedly universal rights have ended up demonstrating the lack of a firm 
foundation for them, and highlighted how different traditions may be at odds with some rights 
while justifying other rights in different ways.30
Acknowledging the impossibility of coming up with a justification of rights persuasive to 
all, some rights proponents have sought comfort in a pragmatic consensus on human rights issues 
24 See generally, David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002).
25 THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights, China 
and Cross Cultural Inquiry: Philosophy, History and Power Politics, 55:2 PHIL. E. & W.(forthcoming 2005) (discussing some of the philosophical difficulties that arise in even trying 
to determine whether one is using similar or different concepts of rights).
26 See Pierre Schlag, Rights in the Postmodern Condition, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 263 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) (noting 
that rights are treated as concepts, as argumentative trumps, as factors of production, as 
preconditions to bargaining, as bearer-enabling entitlements, as bearer-disabling entitlements, 
as totems, as sources of social solidarity, as legitimation devices and so on).
27 See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989) (arguing 
that rights only belong to individuals and that there are no group or collective rights); see also
Jeremy Waldron, Can communal goods be rights?, in JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: 
COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981-1991 339 (1993) (arguing that communal goods cannot be the 
subject matter of rights but that it is intelligible and useful to speak of group rights).  Social 
and economic rights continue to be either non-justiciable or only partially justiciable in most 
countries.
28
 For a useful discussion of rights and needs, see Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth 
of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 26 at 87-109. For capabilities, see Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, (Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds., 1993); and Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.  273 (1997).
29 See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY(1980). 
30 See Abdullahi An Naim, The Cultural Mediation of Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) (arguing that Islam is 
compatible with some contemporary rights but not all); Joseph Chan, A Confucian 
Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, at 212(arguing that a Confucian justification and interpretation of free 
speech would place less emphasis on autonomy and allow for greater restrictions than liberal justifications). 
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or held out hope for the emergence of an overlapping consensus. 31   But the pragmatic or 
overlapping consensus quickly breaks down once one moves beyond feel-good discussions about 
the desirability of the broad wish-list of abstract rights contained in human rights documents to 
the difficult issues of the justifications for such rights and how they are to be interpreted and 
implemented in practice.32
Many human rights issues implicate deep moral commitments, including religious views, 
traditional gender roles, different notions of freedom and autonomy and fundamental beliefs 
about the relationship of the individual to the state and other members of society.  Because human 
rights issues raise these deep commitments, and because the international human rights 
movement’s pretense of universalism leads to particular outcomes that may be defensible on 
liberal principles but are at odds with the principles and commitments of other traditions and 
normative systems, the human rights movement has been accused of bias, arrogance and 
imperialism.33  Given differences in fundamental commitments, the human rights movement is 
now seen by many as the new religion, the latest crusade, a modern day inquisition, while others 
31
 The frequency with which rights advocates optimistically appeal to Rawls’ notion of an 
overlapping consensus is somewhat bewildering given that it has not even proved possible to 
achieve on a wide range of rights issues in its place of origin, the United States. For the 
concept of an overlapping consensus with respect to justice in a liberal democracy such as the 
U.S., see John Rawls, The Idea of the Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1 (1987).  For Rawls’ attempt to work out an international political conception of rights and justice, see his THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999)
32
 Randall P. Peerenboom, The Limits of Irony:  Rorty and the China Challenge, 50:1 Phil. E. & 
W. 56 (2000).  See also Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human 
Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30.  Taylor 
suggests that it might be possible to achieve at least some agreement on certain norms of 
conduct such as genocide, murder, torture and slavery.  However, he is less confident about 
reaching an overlapping consensus on the underlying values that justify such norms. 
MICHAEL INGATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (Amy Guttman 
ed., 2001) (discussing need for thin though more universally accepted human rights agenda 
rather than a thicker but more contested agenda, but ultimately still endorsing the liberal 
agenda with its emphasis on individual agency, civil and political rights and restrictions on 
religion in the public sphere).
33 Leon Trakman, Native Cultures in a Rights Empire: Ending the Dominion, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 
189, 191 (1997) (liberal conception of rights “affronts people who adhere to different 
conceptions of freedom”); Nikhil Aziz, The Human Rights Debate in an Era of 
Globalization: Hegemony of Discourse, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS 
FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 32 (Peter Van Ness ed., 1999) (criticizing hegemony of 
liberal discourse); Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L. L. 589 (discussing liberal biases of human rights regime); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, 
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC 
TRANSITION 339 (1995); Amy Bartholomew, Human Rights and Post-Imperialism: Arguing for a Deliberative Legitimation of Human Rights, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25 (2003) (attempting to overcome the imperialism in the current human rights movement by extending 
the principles of Habermasian deliberative democracy to the international arena to secure the 
legitimacy of human rights).  
It should be noted that citizens and government officials in liberal democracies also often 
condemn human rights bodies for being arrogant and attempting to impose their views on 
others.  In response to a report by U.N. Special Rapporteur describing capital punishment in 
the U.S. as arbitrary and racially discriminatory, U.S. legislators declared such monitoring 
constituted U.N. harassment.  Betsy Pisik, Human Rights Probes Irk U.S., WASH. TIMES, 
June 29, 1998, at A1.  I have noticed in teaching human rights law over the years that 
students react very differently to ICCPR Committee reports criticizing certain U.S. practices 
and recommending changes than they do to criticism of other countries.   When it comes to 
the U.S., they are much quicker to raise concerns about distant, unelected rights organs telling 
the U.S. what to do.  The different reaction cannot be attributed completely to the sense that 
other countries have more serious rights problems and thus the ICCPR’s criticisms are more
legitimate as they do not react as strongly to ICCPR criticisms of similar practices in 
European countries.
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criticize the movement as a well-intentioned if benighted hegemony at best, or malicious strong-
arm politics and cultural genocide at worst.34
Several of the main fault lines may be quickly summarized.35  With Marxism and leftist 
critiques marginalized,36  Islamic fundamentalism constitutes the most radical theoretical and 
practical challenge to the international human rights regime.37  Despite Herculean efforts to 
reconcile Islam with contemporary human rights through a variety of interpretive techniques, 
tensions remain, 38  including Sharia-based punishments that the international rights regime 
condemns as cruel and inhumane such as cutting off the hands of thieves or stoning to death 
adulteresses; the status and treatment of women with respect to divorce, property rights and 
political participation; and most fundamentally the clash between theocracy and (liberal) 
democracy.
Religion more generally remains a major source of contention, in part because of the 
inevitable tension between the freedom to practice one’s religion and the freedom of others to 
practice their religion or to enjoy other freedoms, and in part because of the liberal bias of the 
human rights movement, which has resulted in the human rights movement incorporating the 
34 See, e.g, Makau wa Mutua, Savages, Victims and Saviors:  The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, n. 6 (2001) (claiming human rights INGOs share a fundamental 
commitment to the proselytization of Western liberal values, and that people in economically 
undeveloped, non-Western societies are portrayed as ignorant savages victimized by 
malicious government leaders, whose duty it is for enlightened Western rights activists to 
save); David Smolin, Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of Cultural 
Genocide? The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender, 12 J. L. 
& RELIGION 143 (1995/1996).
35
 The following list is not meant to be exhaustive.  One could also note the weakness of the right 
of self-determination in the face of strong state support for territorial integrity.  Similarly, 
refugee law and the rights of immigrants remain a major trouble spot.  In addition, sexual 
orientation has been a major source of controversy and led to rifts within the international 
rights community and NGOs such as Amnesty International.  See Rhoda E. Howard-
Hassmann, Gay Rights and the Right to a Family: Conflicts between Liberal and Illiberal 
Belief Systems, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 73 (2001) (noting that gay rights have been a tough sell for 
many reasons, including (i) unlike other minorities, gays are seen by some as innately 
dishonorable because of their sexual practices; (ii) there are heavy religious and moral 
overtones to the issue of gay rights; (iii) gay rights such as the right to marry and adopt 
present challenges to the fundamental social institution of the family; (iv) gay rights are 
frequently justified by appeal to secular liberal ideas of autonomy, choice, individualism and 
privacy; (v) and, ironically, because past efforts of the West to impose its preferred morality 
at the time were all too successful: Western missionaries prosyletized religious beliefs that 
taught “primitive” societies which permitted gay sexual activity that they were wrong, while 
colonial governments passed laws criminalizing homosexual behavior; having now been 
enlightened, Western rights activists take other societies to task for being homophobic).
36
 Marxism may still be useful as critique even if it is no longer credible as a positive alternative 
to liberalism. Nancy Love, What’s left of Marx, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
HABERMAS 46 (Stephen K. White ed., 1995).
37 See the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, reprinted in U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18, and available at
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/getdoc.asp?id=134&cat=030407 (declaring that while fundamental 
rights and universal freedoms are an integral part of the Islamic religion, the Shariah is the 
only source for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of the Declaration).
38 See An-Naim, supra note 30; Norani Othman, Grounding Human Rights Arguments in Non-
Western Culture: Shari’a and the Citizenship Rights of Women in a Modern Islamic Nation-
state, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30 at 171 (arguing 
for a creative and historically sensitive interpretation that distinguished between the text of 
the Koran, which is the divine word of Allah, and the interpretations of scholars and jurists, 
which are distinctly human products, and that deals with negative passages in the text and 
commentaries by placing them in their historical context and then demonstrating that changes 
in the contemporary context justify a new interpretation).  See also Khaled Abou el Fadl, 
Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 4 (2003).
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conflicts and tensions over religion within liberalism.39 These tensions are most evident in the 
Rawlsian attempt to exclude private religious views from the public sphere as the price for being
able to generate an overlapping consensus.40  The parallel at the international level occurs when 
rights bodies view with suspicion or dismiss attempts to justify particular practices based on 
religious reasons or by appeal to authoritative religious sources such as the Koran.41  More 
generally, critics of various religious persuasions have argued for a broader based conception of 
rights, not founded on secular liberalism, which builds on a more inclusive spiritual and moral 
worldview drawn from the world’s great religions including Buddhism, Islam and Daoism.42
One of the most direct threats to the movement to date came when increasingly assertive 
Asian governments, buoyed by years of economic growth, issued the 1993 Bangkok Declaration 
challenging the universalism of human rights and criticizing the international human rights 
movement for being Western-biased.  Although not denying outright the universality of all rights, 
the Bangkok Declaration asserted that human rights must reflect the particular economic, social, 
political, legal and historical circumstances of particular countries at a particular time.43 The 
39
 Some of the more pressing issues include how to distinguish between abnormal and normal 
religious practices, as reflected in regulations banning or restricting cults; how to define and 
control religious extremism and fanaticism without unduly restricting freedom of religious 
belief and practice; how to ensure free speech while restricting hate speech, and how to 
prevent the abuse of defamation suits against those who allegedly engage in religious 
stereotyping or who incite religious hatred by spreading malicious untruths about a particular 
religious group from undermining freedom of the press while still allowing legitimate suits.  
Religious education is another contested area, with countries divided on whether religious 
education should be allowed at all, whether the government should fund religious schools, 
whether religious schools must meet minimal curricular requirements and when limitations 
are justified on the teaching of religious beliefs that may incite demands for self-
determination, challenge the ruling regime or upset public order. 
40 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).  For a similar approach that imposes
“conversational restraints” in the public sphere, Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue, 86 J. OF 
PHIL. 5, 16-17 (1989) (noting that he bases his argument not on some general feature of the 
moral life but on the distinctive way liberals conceive of the problem of the public order).  
For a nuanced critical response from within the liberal tradition, see KENT GREENAWALT, 
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995).
41 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/, art 5: “States Parties 
shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct 
of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and 
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” Others have argued in a similar vein 
that culture ought to be contained as much as possible in international relations.
42
 Chandra Muzaffar, From Human Rights to Human Dignity, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA, supra note 33 at 25-31.  See also
Michael Perry, Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious, in LEGAL RIGHTS: 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 205, 252 (arguing that 
there is no intelligible secular version of the idea of human rights and that the idea is 
necessarily religious).  The historical, conceptual and normative relationships between human 
rights and the world’s religions are by no means straightforward or unequivocally mutually 
supportive. Id. at 226.  Clearly some contemporary international rights are at odds with the 
precepts and practices of some, perhaps most of the world’s great religions.  Conversely, 
“[T]he great religious ages were notable for their indifference to human rights in the 
contemporary sense.  They were notorious not only for acquiescence in poverty, inequality, 
exploitation and oppression but for enthusiastic justifications of slavery, persecution, 
abandonment of small children, torture and genocide.”  Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Opening 
of the American Mind, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 23, 1989, at 26.
43
 Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok 
Declaration, U.N. World Conference on Human Rights (1993), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm. [hereinafter, Bangkok Declaration]. See also Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The 
Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291 (2000) (claiming “the 
debate over the Bangkok Declaration seems almost outdated.  The argument for context has 
prevailed.”).
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ensuing debates over “Asian values” or its more recent politically correct offspring “values in 
Asia” raised a wide range of issues. 44   Some of the main points of contention were the 
compatibility of Confucianism, Buddhism and Islam with liberal democracy and human rights; 
the relationship between rights, responsibilities and duties; and how to weigh rights against 
competing interests, including other rights claims, and balance the needs of individuals against 
the interests of the group and society.  Demonstrating the need to avoid simplistic constructs of 
“the West” as well as “the East” or “Asia”, many of the communitarian criticisms of the liberal 
biases of the human rights movement and the privileging of personal freedom and autonomy over 
social solidarity and stability paralleled communitarian critiques in the West.45
Another major area of dispute centers on economic issues. The increasing gap between 
the rich and poor both within countries and among states has produced a fault line that runs along 
the North-South, developed-developing country axis.  Emphasizing the right to development, the 
Bangkok Declaration called for international cooperation to narrow the income gap and eliminate 
poverty, which it rightly declared to be major obstacles to the full enjoyment of human rights.46
The Vienna Declaration was even more explicit: “The World Conference on Human Rights 
reaffirms that least developed countries committed to the process of democratization and 
economic reforms, many of which are in Africa, should be supported by the international 
community in order to succeed in their transition to democracy and economic development.”47
Within both developed and developing countries,48 growing income disparities have led to a 
44
 The literature on Asian values is vast.  For an overview, see Peerenboom, supra note 10 (distinguishing between three rounds of the debates and assessing the major issues raised in 
each round).  Supporters of universal human rights have sought to discredit the notion of 
Asian values by pointing to the tremendous diversity within the region.  However, if such 
diversity precludes the possibility of common values within the Asian region, then it also 
precludes a fortiori the possibility of universal values.  Alternatively, one could claim that 
there are common values within the Asian region but they are not distinctive.  However, what 
common values do exist are so abstract and so “thin” that they lead to widely divergent 
outcomes on specific issues, many of which are not consistent with current human standards 
as interpreted by the ICCPR human rights committee and liberal rights activists.  Moreover, 
large multiple country empirical studies have consistently identified statistically regional 
differences in values, in rights performance and in the impact of differences in values on 
rights performance.  Further, both regional studies and more specific studies suggest that the 
liberalism that provides the thicker ideological basis for the human rights movement today is 
not widely accepted within Asian countries.  See Randall Peerenboom, Show Me the Money: 
The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights Performance in Asia (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Show Me the Money].
45 See Kenneth E. Morris, Western Defensiveness and the Defense of Rights: A Communitarian 
Alternative, in NEGOTIATING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Lynda S. Bell et al. eds., 2001) (pointing out that many of the arguments of advocates of Asian values have their Western 
counterparts).  This is not to say that there are no differences.  On the whole, Western 
communitarians tend to accept more of the normative and institutional framework of 
liberalism than Asian communitarians, who tend to be more conservative.  
46
 Bangkok Declaration, supra note 43. 
47
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. World Conference on Human Rights U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument
48
 Using various methodologies to measure inequality, seven of eight studies by leading 
economists found that global income inequality has increased.  Joel R. Paul, Do International 
Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L.
285, 310 (2003).  Moreover, rapid growth in China and India account for much of the growth 
in developing states. Id., at 312.  See also infra notes 153-161.  On the rise of intracountry 
inequality, see Xavier Sala-i-Martin, The Disturbing ‘Rise’ of Global Income Inequality, 
2002 COLUM. U. DEP’T. ECON. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES #01022-44, 29-30, available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/papers/GlobalIncomeInequality.htm. In the U.S., the real 
income of the top one-fifth rose by 30% while the real income of the poorest one-fifth fell by 
21% between 1980 and 1995.  See Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy: A Political 
History of American Rich 127-29, 427 (2002).
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revaluation of the international rights movement’s privileging of civil and political rights over 
economic rights and challenges to the distinction between negative and positive rights. 49
Meanwhile, the success of non-democratic and/or non-liberal Asian states highlighted the issues 
of whether authoritarian or democratic regimes are better able to achieve sustained economic 
growth, and whether certain Asian versions of capitalism are superior to the varieties of 
capitalism found in Western liberal democracies.50
Still another fault line runs along gender lines.  Feminists claim that international law in 
general and the human rights movement in particular is male-centric and discounts the needs and
interests of women.51  To further complicate matters, there are also significant divisions within 
feminist ranks.  Women rights activists in non-Western countries have accused Western rights 
activists of ethnocentricism, paternalism and racism.52  For instance, in the heavily politicized 
debates over female circumcision, the Association of African Women for Research and 
Development have complained that Western rights activists are “totally unconscious of the latent 
racism” in their campaign and that they have forgotten that solidarity with women of different 
races and difference cultures can only occur if there is mutual respect.53  Women’s rights have 
been among the most contentious of all human rights issues, as evidenced by the number of 
reservations to key causes to CEDAW.54  Women’s rights have encountered serious difficulties in 
implementation for a variety of reasons.  Sociological explanations emphasize that U.N. bodies 
and other international rights organizations are dominated by men who presumably will be less 
49
 Amnesty International and other INGOs have traditionally excluded economic rights from their 
mandate.  See Mutua, supra note 33, at n. 70 (noting that while Human Rights Watch was the 
only major NGO to pay some attention to economic and social rights, it only devoted five 
pages in a book of 517 pages to such rights).  Although human rights organizations have now 
begun to pay more attention to economic issues, much of the reporting of the major 
organization continues to focus on civil and political rights violations. 
50 See CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11 (assessing the theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence concerning the relationship between regime type and economic growth).  See also
Daniel A. Bell, East Asian Capitalism: Towards a Normative Framework, 30:3 GLOBAL 
ECON. REV. 73 (2001); K.S. Jomo, Rethinking the Role of Government Policy in Southeast 
Asia, in RETHINKING THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE 461 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & Shahid Yusuf 
eds., 2001).
51 See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Critiques of International Law and their Critics, 1994-1995 
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1994) (arguing that the under-representation of women in 
the evolution of international human rights has caused “a lop-sided canon of human rights 
law that rests on, and reinforces, a gendered distinction between public and private worlds”). 
See generally, RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda G. 
Dallmeyer ed., Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 25, 1993). 
52 See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the 
Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 483 (2002).  She notes that while 
“the feminist movement has always seen itself as an ally of third world societies and minority 
groups in their fight for equality and struggle against discrimination and prejudice”, the 
movement has also emphasized the liberal values of personal choice and sought to maximize 
individual freedom and creativity even at the expense of the group, thus raising the dilemma 
of how to fight for women’s rights without being complicit in the racism and prejudice that 
characterize Northern attitudes toward Southern countries.  The compromise reached by 
colonial rulers was to impose their values and insist on changes in cultural practices on issues 
that involved violence such as Sati (widow immolation) and female infanticide, and thus 
challenged the colonial power’s monopoly on force and life and death issues, but to allow 
non-violent discriminatory practices on issues of equality that involved the stability of the 
local order and whose reform would have undermined collaboration with local elites.  Id. at 
486-87.
53
 Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD), A Statement on 
Genital Mutilation, in THIRD WORLD – SECOND SEX: WOMEN’S STRUGGLES AND NATIONAL 
LIBERATION: THIRD WORLD WOMEN SPEAK OUT 217-18 (Miranda Davies, ed., 1983).
54
 United Nations, Division for the Advancement of Women, State Parties to CEDAW, at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm.
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sensitive to or concerned with issues such as sexual discrimination or harassment, domestic 
violence or wartime rape.55  Another explanation places the blame on the liberal distinction 
between the public and private spheres and the emphasis on civil and political rights over 
economic, social and cultural rights.  While these explanations all have merit, the main obstacle is 
that gender issues are deeply embedded in a society’s traditions and lifeforms, and thus require a 
holistic approach involving fundamental changes in social norms and structural changes in the 
economic, political and legal orders.  
These and other fault lines have become readily apparent as the human rights movement 
has gained in power and attempted to enforce increasingly specific interpretations of rights. The 
growing power of the international human rights movement has led to a backlash as countries 
have begun to feel the movement’s bite. Whereas in the past, powerful Western countries raised 
little objection to the human rights movement as long as the movement concentrated on exporting 
liberal values and neo-liberal economic policies to developing countries, even powerful countries 
such as the U.S. now worry that the human rights movement is encroaching too far on state 
sovereignty. 56   In response, some member states, again including the U.S., regularly make 
reservations when acceding to rights treaties that undermine key provisions or prevent the treaty 
from having much if any domestic impact.57  In other cases, they simply refuse to sign or ratify 
important treaties.58  Some states have taken the dramatic and unprecedented step of withdrawing 
from rights treaties rather than conform their policies to what they consider to be the 
unreasonable demands of international rights bodies out to impose one-size-fits-all solutions on 
countries whose contingent national circumstances render compliance impossible.59
Rule of law may seem to provide a bridge across the various fault lines. Islamic states 
from Egypt to Malaysia have endorsed rule of law.60 Asian governments including the socialist 
regimes in China and Vietnam that regularly object to the strong-arm politics of the international 
human rights regime have welcomed technical assistance aimed at improving the legal system 
and implementing rule of law.61  Communitarians and liberals alike can find much of value in rule 
of law.  Developing states that emphasize the right to development see rule of law as integral to 
development.  Feminists in the U.S. and elsewhere have taken advantage of the legal system to 
push for enforcement of their rights, however they are interpreted.  Perhaps then there is 
something to be gained from focusing on the common ground provided by rule of law as a way of 
restoring goodwill and recapturing the forward momentum lost in recent years by the increasingly 
contentious debates that have split the international rights community.
55
 Charlesworth, supra note 51.  See also Patricia H. Davis, The Politics of Prosecuting Rape as a 
War Crime, 34 INT'L LAW. 1223 (2000).
56 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 
1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 327 (2000).
57 See infra note 393. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and 
the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
60 See NATHAN BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE 
GULF (1997).  For a discussion of rule of law in Malaysia, see H.P. Lee, Competing 
Conceptions of Rule of Law in Malaysia, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 
2. 
61 See CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11. Carol V. Rose, The New Law and Development 
Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 L. & Soc’y Rev. 93 (1998).
14 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
Closer scrutiny reveals both good news and bad news.  A thin rule of law is universally –
or nearly universally62 – valued, and may be useful in protecting rights.  However, a thin rule of 
law is consistent with considerable injustice and the abuse of human rights, and allows such wide 
variations in institutions and outcomes that appealing to the requirements of a thin rule of law 
will not provide useful guidance on many important issues.  On the other hand, disputes over 
competing thick conceptions of rule of law give rise to many of the theoretical, normative and 
political conflicts just discussed and thus undermine hopes that rule of law will provide a robust 
normative basis for bridging substantive differences on rights issues. 
Rule of Law to the Rescue?  The Contested Nature of Rule of Law
Despite its nearly universal appeal, rule of law, like human rights, is an essentially contested 
concept.  It means different things to different people, and has served a wide variety of political 
agendas from Hayekian libertarianism63 to Rawlsian social welfare liberalism64 to Lee Kuan 
Yew’s soft authoritarianism 65  to Jiang Zemin’s statist socialism 66  to a Sharia-based Islamic 
state.67  That is both its strength and its weakness.  That people of vastly different political 
persuasions all want to take advantage of the rhetorical power of rule of law keeps it alive in 
public discourse,68 but it also leads to the worry that it has become a meaningless slogan devoid 
of any determinative content.69
62
 Rule of law has its critics. Critical Legal Studies scholars (CRITS) have claimed that law is a 
mask for oppression and serves the interests of the ruling elite, or that the indeterminacy of 
law undermines the predictability and certainty promised by rule of law. Meanwhile, liberal 
reformers worry that in the absence of democracy and pluralistic forms of political 
participation, implementing rule of law will serve authoritarian ends.  Other critics question 
whether rule of law is necessary for economic development.  Some critics in Asian countries 
fear that implementing a liberal democratic rule of law will disrupt the existing social order 
and hence may be too costly.  Still others see rule of law as incompatible with a modern 
regulatory state.  There are also a number of conceptual and theoretical issues, some of which 
raise the fundamental issue of what is law.  For a discussion of these and other critiques, see
CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11, at 126-187; see also Randall Peerenboom, Varieties 
of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, [herinafter 
Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law]  at 34-38.  
63 See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
64 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
65
 Thio Li-ann, Lex Rex or Lex Rex? Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in Singapore, [hereinafter Thio, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law] in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 2; Kanishka Jayasuriya, Corporatism and Judicial Independence Within 
Statist Legal Institutions in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE 
OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
66 CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11.
67 See BROWN, supra note 60; Abou el Fadl, supra note 38, at 28-34.
68
 Although rule of law is invoked everywhere nowadays, rule of law discourse is much more 
vibrant and hotly contested in some countries than in others.  The value of even a thin rule of 
law is seen most clearly in countries where the fundamental principle of legality is still 
contested, as in Vietnam or Myanmar, or in failed states, such as Rwanda or Iraq.  Thin 
conceptions of rule of law are most useful as a benchmark for states that are still in the 
process of establishing a modern, functional legal system.  In such countries, much of the 
discussion is about which reforms are required to bring the system into compliance with the 
requirements of a thin theory.  In more mature legal systems, the discussion is more likely to 
focus on thick conceptions of rule of law or, in the absence of deep conflicts about thick 
conceptions of rule of law, on particular issues often involving constitutional law, judicial 
interpretation, human rights and the separation and balance of powers.  In countries where 
social, economic and political cleavages give rise to sharply contested political positions and 
in turn competing thick conceptions of rule of law such as Singapore, China, and Malaysia, 
much of the attention is on articulating and comparing the different conceptions, and arguing 
for the superiority of one over the other(s).  Untethered by the more limited conception of a 
thin rule of law, parties invoke rule of law in the name of widely disparate political causes.  
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At its most basic, rule of law refers to a system in which law is able to impose 
meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the ruling elite, as captured in the 
rhetorically powerful if overly simplistic notions of a government of laws, the supremacy of the 
law and equality of all before the law.  Beyond these threshold requirements, conceptions of rule 
of law can be divided into two general types, thin and thick.  A thin conception stresses the 
formal or instrumental aspects of rule of law—those features that any legal system must possess 
to function effectively as a system of laws, regardless of whether the legal system is part of a 
democratic or non-democratic society, capitalist or socialist, liberal or theocratic.70 Thus, laws 
must be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, 
impartially applied and enforced.71 Moreover, laws must be reasonably acceptable to a majority 
of the populace or people affected (or at least the key groups affected) by the laws.72
That laws be reasonably acceptable to the majority of those affected by them does not 
mean that the laws are necessarily “good laws” in the sense of normatively justified.  The 
majority may very well support immoral laws. Even in countries known for rule of law, rule of 
law has existed side by side with great injustice, including slavery, racism, apartheid, patriarchy, 
colonialism, capitalist exploitation and callous disregard for the suffering of others, not to 
mention unspeakable cruelty to animals and environmental policies that leave future generations 
to clean up the mess created by today’s consumers. Because a thin rule of law is consistent with 
great evil, many scholars and rights activists argue that rule of law requires "good laws." On this 
view, rule of law requires laws that are grounded in some normative foundation that transcends 
the legal system itself.  In the past, divine law or natural law provided the foundation; today, the 
more secular ideology of democracy and human rights provides the foundation for many people. 
The attempt to remedy the normative shortcomings of thin theories by incorporating particular 
conceptions of rights and other features of political morality transforms thin conceptions of rule 
of law into thick ones.
Countries in the process of consolidating democracy such as the Philippines, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia are all struggling with central constitutional issues involving 
the delineation and balancing of the powers of the various branches, as well as fundamental 
rights.  At the same time, in most of these countries the legal system remains weak, falling 
short of basic thin rule of law requirements.  
In politically stable democracies with well-developed legal systems, such as Japan, the U.S. or 
France, rule of law discourse varies.  In Japan, there are many calls to radically reform the 
legal system, overhaul legal education, reconfigure the administrative law regime and so on.  
But rule of law is not often invoked.  In France, rule of law discourse has centered on issues 
of constitutional review, and more recently the idea of a constitution for the E.U.  In the U.S., 
parties of every political persuasion continue to invoke rule of law, notwithstanding an 
extensive critical literature that calls into question its meaning and value.  Such extensive 
criticism has led to fears that the public’s faith in the legal system will be undermined.  As a 
result, a retrenchment is taking place where rule of law is defended by making it less 
ambitious.  See generally, Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, supra note 62.
69
 Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR 
IDEOLOGY? 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan eds., 1987) (rule of law “may well 
have become just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the 
public utterances of Anglo-American politicians”). 
70 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY (Joseph Raz ed., 1979); Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of Rule 
of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127 (1993). 
71
 This list is from LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1977).  As these requirements may be 
partially met, legal systems may be rule of law compliant to different degrees.  Id. at 122.  
Indeed, no legal system ever fully complies with the ideal.  Nor would it be desirable to.  For 
instance, some laws could not be passed without legislative compromises that deliberately 
paper over differences by using vague language.
72
 For more extended discussion, including of the purposes served by thin rule of law and of the 
institutions required to implement it, see CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11, at 65-67.
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Thick conceptions begin with the basic elements of a thin conception but then incorporate 
elements of political morality such as particular economic arrangements (free-market capitalism, 
central planning, Asian developmental state or other varieties of capitalism), forms of government 
(democratic, socialist, soft authoritarian, theocratic) or conceptions of human rights (libertarian, 
classical liberal, social welfare liberal, communitarian, “Asian values,” Buddhist, Islamic, etc.).
Thus, a liberal democratic version of rule of law incorporates free market capitalism 
(subject to qualifications that would allow various degrees of "legitimate" government regulation 
of the market), multiparty democracy in which citizens may choose their representatives at all 
levels of government, and a liberal interpretation of human rights that generally gives priority to 
civil and political rights over economic, social, cultural, and collective or group rights.  Liberal 
democratic rule of law may be further subdivided along the main political fault lines in Europe 
and America: a libertarian version that emphasizes liberty and property rights, a classical liberal 
position, a social welfare liberal version, and so on.
The wide variety of political beliefs and conceptions of a just socio-political order around 
the world gives rise to multiple, competing thick conceptions of rule of law. In China, for 
example, there is currently support for four dominant models: statist socialist, neo-authoritarian, 
communitarian and liberal democratic.73  Statist socialists endorse a state-centered socialist rule 
of law defined by, inter alia, a non-democratic system in which the Chinese Communist Party 
plays a leading role; and an interpretation of rights that emphasizes stability, collective rights as 
well as if not over individual rights, and subsistence as the basic right rather than civil and 
political rights.
There is also support for various forms of rule of law that fall between the statist 
socialism type and the liberal democratic version.  For example, there is some support for a 
democratic but non-liberal (New Confucian) communitarian variant built on market capitalism, 
perhaps with a somewhat greater degree of government intervention than in the liberal version; 
some genuine form of multiparty democracy in which citizens choose their representatives at all 
levels of government; plus an "Asian values" or communitarian interpretation of rights that 
attaches relatively greater weight to the interests of the majority and collective rights as opposed 
to the civil and political rights of individuals.74
Another variant is a neo-authoritarian or soft authoritarian form of rule of law that, like 
the communitarian version, rejects a liberal interpretation of rights but, unlike its communitarian 
cousin, also rejects democracy.  Whereas communitarians adopt a genuine multiparty democracy 
in which citizens choose their representatives at all levels of government, neo-authoritarians 
permit democracy only at lower levels of government or not at all. For instance, one prominent 
PRC political scientist has advocated a “consultative rule of law” that eschews democracy in 
favor of single party rule, albeit with a redefined role for the Party, and more extensive, but still 
limited, freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association.75
73
 A full elaboration of these types requires a much more detailed account of the purposes or goals 
each type is intended to serve and institutions, practices, rules and outcomes in particular 
cases.  See id. at 55-109.
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 Supporters of communitarian versions of rule of law can also be found in Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and arguably Taiwan, Japan and South Korea as well.  See
Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, supra note 62. See also, VIDHU VERMA, MALAYSIA: 
STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TRANSITION (2002) (distinguishing between Mahathir's 
nationalist or statist, Asian-values perspective; a less state-oriented communitarianism that 
shares some of the nationalist disenchantment with Western liberalism; and an anti-liberal 
Islamic fundamentalism).
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 Pan Wei, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, 12:34 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 3 (2003). There are also supporters of soft authoritarian variants of rule of law in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.  See Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, supra note 62.
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There is also support in India, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines for what might be 
called a developmental, redistributive justice model of rule of law. This form, with different 
variants in each of the countries, emerges out of a fundamental difference between these countries 
and economically advanced countries: the brutal reality of crushing poverty combined with severe 
disparities in income.76  Observing that nearly sixty per cent of the nation’s material resources are 
in the hands of some twenty per cent of the population in Thailand, Vitit Muntarbhorn warns that 
this lack of equity “has dire consequences for the Rule of Law and human rights, precisely 
because the inequity may breed violence, if not disrespect for the law.”77 He asks, somewhat 
plaintively, “How can the Rule of Law help to foster equity and social justice?”
Substantively, the developmental-redistributive model of rule of law has two main 
planks.  The first is an international dimension that highlights the radical disparity between North 
and South and emphasizes the right of development, debt forgiveness and the obligation of the 
North/developed countries to aid the South/developing countries.  The second plank is a domestic 
one and reflects the particular circumstances of each state, though all are united in emphasizing 
social and economic rights and the need to do more to protect the most vulnerable members in 
society.
In Thailand, concerns for redistributive social justice are found in the government’s 
policies to achieve sustainable development, including rural development.  Thus, the government 
has adopted a series of populist policies, including a universal health care scheme, a development 
fund for each village, and debt moratorium for farmers. 78   In the Philippines, one catches 
glimpses of the alternative redistributive conception in the way rule of law is frequently linked to 
social and political philosophies that promise justice, social welfare and People Power based 
democracy.  Whereas Western countries on the whole have been reluctant to assume obligations 
to allocate sufficient resources to satisfy economic, social and cultural rights,79 the 1987 Filipino 
constitution contained a long list of open-ended “directive principles” that reflect the tendency of 
the activist drafters of the Constitution to codify “new” rights to education, food, environment 
and health.80
As in the Philippines, the Indian constitution codifies both civil and political rights and 
social and economic rights.  However, whereas the former are considered fundamental and 
justiciable, the latter are considered progressive.  Nevertheless, aggressively activist Indian courts 
have favored interpretations that foster social and economic rights, giving them an “indirect 
justiciability.”81  The Indian constitution also seeks to redress historical imbalances that have led 
76
 For a discussion of rule of law in Indonesia, see Tim Lindsey, Indonesia: Devaluing Asian 
Values, Rewriting Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 386.
77
 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Rule of Law and Aspects of Human Rights in Thailand: From 
Conceptualization to Implementation, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, 
at 346.  
78 Id.
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 While welfare liberals in the West are also concerned about the plight of the least well off, their 
ability to articulate a compelling story is hampered by a strong current in liberal (and 
libertarian) thought from Locke to Hayek to Nozick that emphasizes property rights and the 
right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor, and which fosters possessive individualism and a 
materialistic, acquisitive capitalism.  In contrast, activists in some Asian countries seeking a 
more egalitarian distribution of wealth may be able to draw on indigenous traditions such as 
the Islamic principle of zakat that requires one to contribute part of one’s wealth to help the 
poor. Or they may appeal to Buddhist principles of kindness and consideration for one’s 
neighbors to support a humane response to those in need. 
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 Raul Pangalangan, The Philippine “People Power” Constitution, Rule of Law, and the Limits 
of Liberal Constitutionalism, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 371.
81
 Upendra Baxi, Rule of Law in India: Theory and Practice, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 2, at 331.
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to the subjugation of some groups, reaching beyond the state to private groups and social 
practices.  It thus outlaws in the name of equality caste-based practices of untouchability. A 
system of reservations or quotas ensures some representation for disadvantaged groups including 
the poor.  In addition, the constitution enshrines a policy of affirmative action that creates a two-
track system obligating the state “to specifically reform the ‘dominant’/‘majoritarian’ ‘Hindu’ 
religious traditions in a fast forward mode, while leaving the reform of ‘minority’ 
communitarian/religious traditions to slow motion, minuscule change.”82  To ensure that these 
polices are implemented, the constitution creates a number of federal agencies to protect and 
promote the rights of disadvantaged minorities.
Rights activists generally prefer thick conceptions of rule of law to thin ones.  In 
authoritarian and repressive regimes, thick theories allow reformers to discuss certain 
controversial political issues under the seemingly more neutral guise of a technical discussion of 
rule of law.  For instance, in China, legal reformers have used a broad conception of rule of law 
as a means of discussing democracy, separation of powers and various human rights issues from 
free speech to arbitrary detention.83  More generally, rights activists prefer thick theories because 
they provide rhetorical support for their particular political agenda.  The unfortunate result, 
however, is that all too often parties appeal to rule of law, implicitly if not explicitly invoking a 
particular thick conception of rule of law, to criticize whatever law, practice or outcome does not 
coincide with their own political or normative beliefs.  For example, in Singapore, where the legal 
system is regularly ranked as one of the world’s best in terms of rule of law,84 liberal critics of the 
government’s communitarian policies have invoked rule of law to object to the lack of (in their 
view) adequate workers’ rights legislation, limitations on the right of peaceful demonstration, and 
a regulatory framework that restricts the freedom of the local press.85
Contrast such complaints with the following.  Two government agencies issue conflicting 
regulations, and there is no effective legal mechanism to sort out the conflict.  A suspect is 
entitled to a lawyer according to law, but in practice the authorities refuse to allow him to contact 
his lawyer.  Your dispute with your insurance company regarding payment for hospital bills 
incurred as a result of a car accident remains pending in court after seven years due to judicial 
inefficiency.  The rich and powerful are regularly exempted from prosecution of certain laws 
whereas others are prosecuted in similar circumstances.
The second set of issues invokes thin rule of law concerns.  In contrast, the first set 
involves substantive issues that divide adherents of competing political philosophies and define 
different political factions. Articulating different thick conceptions makes it possible to relate 
political and economic problems to law, legal institutions and particular conceptions of a legal 
system.  Moreover, by highlighting differences in viewpoints across a range of issues, thick 
theories bring out more clearly what is really at stake in many disputes.  However, using a 
particular thick conception of rule of law to malign others who do not share one’s political 
philosophy and hence thick conception of rule of law leads to the debasement of rule of law and 
the view that it is just a meaningless slogan devoid of content.
Proponents of thin theories protest that because thick theories are based on more 
comprehensive social and political philosophies, rule of law loses its distinctiveness and gets 
swallowed up in the larger normative merits or demerits of the particular social and political 
philosophy.  As Joseph Raz observes, "If rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its 
nature is to propound a complete social philosophy.  But if so the term lacks any useful function. 
82 Id. at 333.
83 See, CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11. 
84 See infra note 173. 
85
 Thio, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law, supra note 65.   
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We have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to believe that good should 
triumph. A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, of extensive 
poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle, 
conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more 
enlightened Western democracies."86
Limiting the concept of rule of law to the requirements of a thin theory makes it possible 
to avoid getting mired in never-ending debates about the superiority of the various political 
theories all contending for the throne of justice. Conversely, by incorporating particular 
conceptions of the economy, political order or human rights into rule of law, thick conceptions 
decrease the likelihood that an overlapping consensus will emerge as to its meaning.  Thick 
conceptions that require laws be good laws must specify what the good is.  However, given the 
fact of pluralism,87 thick conceptions must confront the issue of whose good and whose justice? 
Liberals, Socialists, Communitarians, Neo-authoritarians, Soft Authoritarians, New 
Conservatives, Old Conservatives, Buddhists, Daoists, Neo-Confucians, New Confucians and 
Muslims all differ in their visions of the good life and on what is considered just, and hence what 
rule of law requires.  These categories are themselves exceedingly broad.  There is considerable 
diversity on many issues within each one.
In short, appealing to thick conceptions of rule of law that draw on particular conceptions 
of the economy, political order, gender roles, social justice and human rights brings the disputes 
that divide the human rights community under the umbrella of rule of law.  Predictably enough, 
nonliberals have accused proponents of a liberal democratic conception of rule of law of the same 
kind of ethnocentricism, arrogance and imperialism that they see in the human rights movement.88
The tendency to equate rule of law with liberal democratic rule of law has led some 
commentators to portray the attempts of Western governments and international organizations 
such as the World Bank and IMF to promote rule of law countries as a form of economic, 
cultural, political and legal hegemony. 89  Critics claim that liberal democratic rule of law is 
excessively individualist in its orientation and privileges individual autonomy and rights over 
duties and obligations to others, the interests of society, social solidarity and harmony.90  In Asia, 
this line of criticism tracks the heavily politicized debates about “Asian values,” and whether 
democratic or authoritarian regimes are more likely to ensure social stability and economic 
growth discussed earlier. It also taps into broader post-colonial discourses and conflicts between 
developed and developing states, and within developing states between the haves and have-nots 
over issues of distributive justice.91  In Islamic countries, the debate takes the form of disputes 
over the role of religion, Sharia-law, the rights of women and a host of other specific rights 
issues. 
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 Raz, supra note 70, at 211. 
87 See RAWLS, supra note 40.
88 See supra note 33-34 and infra notes 
89 See Rose, supra note 61; Barry Hager, The Rule of Law: Defining It and Defending It in the 
Asian Context, in, THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM (Mansfield Ctr. 
for Pac. Affairs ed., 2000), [hereinafter Mansfield Center, RULE OF LAW], available at 
http://www.mcpa.org/programs/rol_perspectives.htm  (summarizing complaints of critics).
90 See Takashi Oshimura, In Defense of Asian Colors, in, Mansfield Center, RULE OF LAW, supra
note 89, at 141(claiming that the individualist orientation of [liberal democratic] rule of law is 
at odds with Confucianism and “the communitarian philosophy in Asia”).  See also, Joon-
Hyung Hong, The Rule of Law and Its Acceptance in Asia: a View From Korea, in Mansfield 
Center, RULE OF LAW, supra note 89, at 149 (noting the need to define rule of law in a way 
that is acceptable to those who believe in “Asian values"). 
91 See Baxi, supra note 81, at 326-328.
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The Inability of Rule of Law to Provide Effective Guidance on Specific Issues 
For all of its rhetorical appeal, rule of law, whether thick or thin, cannot provide much guidance 
with respect to many crucial issues that affect human rights. Appeals to rule of law alone will not 
shed much light on such substantive issues as what is a proper time, place and manner restriction 
on free speech, when a particular restriction of freedom of assembly is necessary for democratic 
order, or whether the 9-11 attacks on the U.S. constituted a threat “to the life of the nation” under 
Article 4 of the ICCPR.92
The minimal requirements of a thin rule of law are compatible with considerable 
diversity in institutions, rules and practices.  For example, the way powers are distributed and 
balanced between the executive, legislature and judiciary varies widely in countries known for 
rule of law.93  Constitutional review is conducted by a variety of entities that enjoy different 
powers.94  The nature and degree of judicial independence, as well as the manner in which it is 
achieved, also vary.  In some cases judges are appointed (through a variety of mechanisms) and in 
some cases they are elected.  Nor will appeals to rule of law alone put an end to debates about 
what type of theory of adjudication is best - strict interpretation, purposive, or Dworkin’s make-
law-the-best-it-can-be approach.95
Institutional choices are often highly path-dependent: the initial choice of institutions and 
the way they operate and evolve over time is influenced to a large extent by a host of contingent, 
context-specific factors.  Seemingly similar institutions, sometimes transplanted from one system 
to another, are likely to function differently from place to place. Thus, to assess the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of institutions requires an evaluation of their results in the 
particular context. For instance, all states preclude some political and administrative acts from 
judicial review.  Such decisions often include certain decisions by police as to whom to arrest and 
prosecutors regarding whom to prosecute; decisions regarding national defense, war and covert 
operations; and some highly technical issues left to administrative agencies.  Rule of law 
therefore cannot require that every decision be subject to judicial review or else no country’s 
legal system would merit the rule of law label.  Nevertheless, rule of law does require some limits 
on discretion and arguably the ability to challenge most government decisions in some way, 
whether through judicial review, internal administrative mechanisms or the electoral process 
whereby citizens can vote governments that misuse their power out of office.  But exactly what is 
required is far from clear.
Singapore, for instance, has a number of laws that allow for the restriction of individual 
liberties without judicial review.  The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act “allows the 
92
 While the U.K. declared a state of public emergency and notified the Secretary-General of the 
U.N. as contemplated under ICCPR article 4(3), the U.S. did not. 
93 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES (2003). 
94
 Id; Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 707 (2001).
95 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).  A more “purposive” interpretive approach is often 
considered to be more friendly to human rights.  See also Thio Li-ann, An ‘i’ for an ‘I’: 
Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 27 H.K. L.J. 152 (1997) [hereinafter Thio, An ‘i’ for an ‘I’] (objecting to the deferential, positivist/textualist approach 
of the judiciary for failing to produce a "robust constitutional jurisprudence respectful of 
individual rights and human dignity").  Thio’s point may be true in some countries where the 
laws provide for restrictions on rights or are to the disadvantage of particular groups.  
However, there is nothing inherent in a purposive approach that ensures outcomes consistent 
with the liberal preferences of rights activists.  Courts could adopt a purposive approach 
based on conservative or religious principles that leads to outcomes not favored by liberal 
rights groups or the underprivileged in society.
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minister to issue pre-emptive ‘restraining orders’ to ‘gag’ politicians or religionists thought to be 
mixing a volatile cocktail of religion and extremist politics, which could escalate racial-religious 
tensions.”96  The government argues that given the sensitive nature of religion in multiethnic 
Singapore, issues involving religious harmony are crucial for the survival of the nation, and better 
left to the executive than to the judiciary or the legislature.  The executive’s decision is subject to 
review by the Elected President, and advisory councils composed of bureaucrats or religious and 
civic leaders are sometimes consulted to further diminish the dangers of a concentration of 
unchecked powers in the executive’s hands.  Nevertheless, liberal critics contend such 
justifications and mechanisms are inadequate, and call for a more robust judicial review that 
places more emphasis on the rights of individuals to speak and practice their religion freely.97
Cases involving the declaration of national emergency and derogation of rights raise 
equally difficult issues.  While the danger of abuse of power is apparent, advocates of different 
thick conceptions are likely to disagree over when national emergencies should be declared, who 
has the right to declare them and what type of review, if any, there should be. In Malaysia, the 
King, the titular head of the executive, acts on the advice of the Cabinet in deciding whether a 
state of emergency exists.98  Parliament, not the judiciary, has the power to review the decision 
and overturn it.  In the U.S., the President has claimed broad powers for the executive in deciding 
how best to deal with terrorists and enemy noncombatants, much to the dismay of civil 
libertarians who want a greater role for the legislature and the courts in checking and reviewing 
executive decision-making powers.99
Appealing to rule of law will not suffice to sort out these issues. Both sides can appeal to 
their own particular thick conceptions, and a thin conception does not require all important 
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 H.P. Lee, Competing conceptions of rule of law in Malaysia, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE 
OF LAW, supra note 2, at 225.
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 Laurence H. Tribe and Neal K. Katyal, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2000).  But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (the majority of the Court rejected “the Government's assertion that separation of 
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts … in such 
circumstances.  Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the 
individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot 
be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to 
condense power into a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's 
citizens.”).  In an interesting twist, Justice Scalia argued that absent a congressional 
suspension of the habeas corpus right, a U.S. citizen detained during times of war when 
regular courts are functioning is entitled to a criminal trial or a judicial decree for his release.  
Scalia however would have the Court defer to the Congress as to whether the terrorist attacks 
constituted or continue to constitute an “invasion”, and if Congress decides a suspension is 
warranted, what if any due process rights a detainee might have.   While a congressional 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus “could, of course, lay down conditions for continued 
detention… there is a world of difference between the people's representatives' determining 
the need for that suspension (and prescribing the conditions for it), and [the Supreme Court’s] 
doing so.”  Id. at 2671 (Thomas, J. dissenting).  Justice Thomas, who concluded that the 
detention was legal and that Hamdi received all the due process he was due, was equally 
deferential to Congress:  “I do not think that the Federal Government's war powers can be 
balanced away by this Court. Arguably, Congress could provide for additional procedural 
protections, but until it does, we have no right to insist upon them…. The plurality utterly 
fails to account for the Government's compelling interests and for our own institutional 
inability to weigh competing concerns correctly.”  Id. at 2674-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
He was however even more deferential to the Executive: “the Executive's decision that a 
detention is necessary to protect the public need not and should not be subjected to judicial 
second-guessing. Indeed, at least in the context of enemy-combatant determinations, this 
would defeat the unity, secrecy, and dispatch that the Founders believed to be so important to 
the warmaking function.”  Id. at 2682. 
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decisions to be left ultimately to the courts or that the court adopt a particular interpretive 
practice.  In any event, concluding that a practice or decision is consistent or inconsistent with a 
thin rule of law or a particular thick conception of rule of law is not the end of normative debate.  
Rule of law is only one of many social values, and only part of a comprehensive political 
philosophy.  Thus, in some cases the values served by compliance with rule of law may be 
overridden by other important social values.  This is most notable in recent discussions that the 
rule of law does not pertain to emergency situations.100  However, it arises in many other contexts 
involving resistance to narrowly legal but massively unjust laws and regimes. As the heroic 
struggles of Muhammad Ali, Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and 
countless less famous individuals show, the rule of law virtues of predictability and certainty may 
at times need to give way to higher moral principles and considerations of equity, justified civil 
disobedience or even mass illegalities and populist movements that seek to overthrow the 
political system.
Ritualistic invocation of rule of law then will not put an end to the conceptual and 
normative debates that have undermined the universality of the human rights movement.  
Notwithstanding debates over these deep issues, perhaps rule of law may still be useful in 
practice.  We must therefore still consider the extent to which the renewed attention to rule of law 
will help address the current serious shortcomings with respect to implementation of human 
rights.  
II. The Implementation of Human Rights and the Practical Limitations of Rule of Law: 
Empirical Issues
Quantitative studies have shown that the protection of rights is influenced by, among other things, 
and in roughly descending order of importance: economic development, with a higher level of 
development associated with better protection of rights; international or civil wars, with war 
leading to more violations of rights; political regime type, with democracies protecting rights 
better than authoritarian or military regimes; regional effects, with Northern Europe and North 
America outperforming other regions, and with “region” often serving as a proxy for religion and 
culture and correlated with economic development and regime type; population size, with larger 
populations leading to higher rates of violation; and colonial history, with British colonialism 
linked to better rights protection.101 Interestingly, ratification of treaties does not translate into 
better protection for human rights, and may even have a negative effect, at least in the short 
term.102
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112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
101 See generally, Steven Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity 
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291 (1999); Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are They More than Mere 'Window Dressing?,' 55 POL. RES. Q. 111 (2002) [hereinafter Keith, Constitutional Provisions]. The relative importance of the factors varies 
depending on the right in question.  In particular, wealth is less important with respect to 
personal integrity rights than other rights.  
102
 Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Oona 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941, 1978 (2002). Nevertheless, a country’s ratification of a human rights treaty generally strengthens 
the hand of domestic and international rights advocates and may therefore contribute to norm 
change over time. Thus in the long term, the human rights situation may improve.
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Only recently have empirical studies begun to test the relationship between “rule of law” 
or other legal system features and the protection of different types of rights.103  The neglect of law 
may reflect the skeptical view that human rights law in particular and international law more 
generally is mere window dressing. However, as the human rights movement has become more 
powerful, scholars have become more interested in testing the impact of law.  The few studies 
available provide some limited general support for the thesis that rule of law and judicial 
independence help protect human rights.104
However, the studies raise a number of concerns regarding the definition and 
measurement of rule of law, the range of rights tested, the ability to control for other factors and 
sort out direct and indirect effects, and the usefulness in identifying specific features of the legal 
system that are most important for rights protection.  What appears to be the only study to date to 
test directly the relationship between “rule of law” and rights relied on a rule of law index that 
drew on subjective perceptions of the legal system.105  The index is constructed from sixteen 
different sources that measure a variety of factors: trust in, and the legitimacy of, the legal 
system; crime, including violent crime, kidnapping of foreigners, organized crime, financial 
crime, money laundering, and insider trading; property rights, including the enforceability of 
government contracts and private contracts, the enforceability of judgments, and the protection of 
intellectual property rights; institutional factors such as the independence of the judiciary 
(influence of government, citizens and firms on the courts), an effective administrative law 
regime whereby parties can challenge government decisions; and the quality of the legal system, 
including the fairness, speediness, affordability of the judicial process, the honesty of judges and 
the quality of the police. 
Relying on subjective responses to questionnaires by different people in different 
countries gives rise to concerns about consistency and ideological bias.106  A more fundamental 
issue is whether the criteria that form the subject matter of the various surveys adequately capture 
rule of law.  On the whole, the indicators in the World Bank index reflect many of the procedural 
103
 Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
87, 93 (1999) (noting that researchers have focused on such factors as national wealth and 
civil unrest as keys to human rights but have largely ignored the role of law and legal 
institutions).
104 Id. Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection Around the 
World, 85 JUDICATURE 195, 199-200 (2002) [hereinafter Keith, Judicial Independence] (finding that constitutional provisions to provide judicial independence were associated with 
civil rights, but noting the need for further research to control for other factors known to 
affect rights, and to move beyond measures of formal provisions of judicial independence in 
constitutions to measures of actual judicial independence); Clair Apodaca, The Rule of Law 
and Human Rights, 87 JUDICATURE 292 (2004) (finding that rule of law and judicial 
independence were instrumental in securing both economic and physical integrity rights, 
although rule of law frequently gives way even in rich countries with well-developed legal 
systems during times of international or domestic conflict). 
105
 Apodaca, supra note 104. The index is part of the World Bank’s Good Governance Indicators. 
Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002, (June 2003), at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf. According 
to the authors, the rule of law index measures the extent to which people have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, how fair and predictable the rules are, and how well 
property rights are protected. The indicators include perceptions of incidence of crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.  
Interestingly, the authors “cautiously conclude” that there is no evidence of “any significant 
improvement in governance worldwide, and if anything the evidence is suggestive of a 
deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions such as rule of law, control of corruption, 
political stability and government effectiveness.”  Id. at 32.
106
 Kaufman et al. discuss the advantages and disadvantages of relying on subjective responses, 
provide an analysis of the affects of ideological bias, and test their results for consistency 
with various objective measures.  See id. 
24 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
and institutional aspects of a thin rule of law. To be sure, perceptions about property rights, 
including intellectual property rights, or the independence of the courts may be influenced by 
one’s ideological beliefs and may be tied to political and economic beliefs that form the basis for 
thick conceptions of rule of law.  However, the index for the most part avoids the circularity 
problems that would arise if one incorporated into the index democracy and particular 
interpretations of contested economic, political or rights issues that define thick conceptions of 
rule of law.
One major disadvantage with such a broad index however is that it obscures which legal 
system features are related to better human rights performance.  The utility of such aggregate rule 
of law studies for policymakers is therefore limited because the studies do not shed light on the 
particular institutional arrangements, laws or legal practices that are necessary or beneficial for 
the protection of human rights. 
Some studies have tried to focus on more specific issues such as particular constitutional 
provisions or institutions, with mixed results.107  One study relying on data from just 39 countries 
from 1948-1982 found that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and provisions 
regarding a state of emergency were associated with less censorship and restrictions on civil and 
political rights, while a constitutional restriction on free press produced the opposite result.108
However, a larger study found that constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly, association, 
religion and the press as well as of the right to strike were not associated with better protection of 
personal integrity rights, although a constitutional protection of freedom of the press was 
associated with fewer violations during times of civil war. Surprisingly, a ban on torture and the 
provision of a habeas corpus right were statistically significant but associated with more 
violations.  In contrast, provisions for public and fair trials were statistically significant and 
associated with fewer violations.109  However, public and fair trials were not nearly as important 
as the impact of a large population, domestic and international war or democracy.
A third study sheds some light on these apparent inconsistencies by distinguishing 
between levels of threat.  The study found that at low political threat levels, constitutional 
provisions regulating the declaration of a state of emergency and derogation of civil and political 
rights had no effect. However, at mid to high levels, such provisions may actually be harmful 
because they provide the regime with a legitimate basis for declaring an emergency and 
derogating from rights. On the other hand, such prohibitions are likely to lead to fewer violations 
during extreme cases of civil war.110
Still another study adopted a more institutional approach, testing the affects of 
codification of a right in the constitution, judicial independence, federalism, separation of powers 
and the relative number of lawyers on the protection of political rights and the right against search 
and seizure.111  The study found that judicial independence is significant with respect to the 
107
 Early studies either found little correlation between constitutional provisions or reached the 
counter-intuitive result that more constitutional protections were associated with more rights 
violations. Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 101, at 115-116  (summarizing 
results of previous studies). 
108
 Christian A. Davenport, 'Constitutional Promises' and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National 
Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are Suppressed, 58 J. Pol. 627 (1996).  
109
 Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 101.
110
 Linda Camp Keith & Steven Poe, Personal Integrity Abuse during Domestic Crises, paper 
presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 
29-September 1, 2002, at
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/046/046004PoeSteven0.pdf.
111
 Cross, supra note 103.  Cross’ study is limited to a small number of countries and relies on 
subjective measures of judicial independence and search and seizure from Humana.  See
Keith, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 101, at 116.
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protection of political rights and search and seizure even after controlling for wealth and other 
factors.  The number of lawyers was significantly associated with greater protection of political 
rights, though not significant with respect to protection against search and seizure.  However, 
federalism, separation of powers and constitutional provisions on search and seizure were not 
significant.
While the attempt to disaggregate rule of law to test which elements are most important 
in what circumstances to the protection of which rights is a worthwhile endeavor, the approach is 
likely to produce weak and inconsistent results because of the wide variation among countries on 
key legal institutions and practices such as separation of powers, constitutional review, judicial 
review of executive power, judicial independence, the way judges are appointed, the tenure and 
qualifications of judges, and so on. 112 A cursory glance around the globe is sufficient to 
demonstrate that countries known for rule of law differ dramatically in each of these areas, and 
that what works in one place may not work in another. 
Another problem with most of the legal system studies so far is that they have focused on 
physical integrity rights or relatively easy to monitor rights such as search and seizure.  However, 
the relationship between rule of law and other “rights” is likely to be more difficult to measure 
and to explain.  Cultural rights such as the right of minority groups to use their own language or 
affirmative action policies for members of particular groups are difficult to quantify. The 
theoretical link between rule of law and such rights is also murky.  For example, whether a 
country should set aside a quota of commercial contracts or seats in parliament for a particular 
minority group is heavily dependent on the particular circumstances of the country.113  Appeal to 
thin rule of law principles will rarely if ever be determinative.
Economic and social rights are generally not justiciable or are only partially justiciable in 
most countries. To be sure, governments might provide a variety of welfare benefits, including 
food and shelter, medical care and access to education.  But citizens generally do not have the 
right to sue the government for such benefits in court.114  It is possible that an equity-minded 
judiciary might help alleviate extreme poverty and promote social justice by overturning unjust 
laws that favor the rich or that impose undue hardships on the poor. Thin rule of law principles 
however would require in most cases that judges apply the laws passed by the legislature and set 
out in the constitution, even if the judges themselves believe the laws are inequitable. Arguments 
about how activist the judiciary should be and the proper method and principles of constitutional 
112 See, e.g., Keith, Judicial Independence, supra note 104, at 199-200.  Keith found that 
provisions for guaranteed terms for judges, “separation of powers,” bans on military courts 
and other exceptional courts, and fiscal autonomy were associated with better protection of 
civil rights, although a provision for exclusive authority of the courts to determine their own 
competence, a provision enabling courts to issue final decisions not subject to review other 
than by appeal in accordance with law, and a provision enumerating qualifications to be a judge were not significant. The various factors were coded on a scale of 0-2.  However, many 
of the variables are vague or subject to wide variation in different systems.   Consider the 
wide range of differences with respect to the key issue of separation of powers.  Similarly, 
guaranteed terms of office encompass systems that provide life tenure and systems where judges are employed for a period of years, with the number of years varying from country to 
country.
113 See Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 44.
114 But see Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 
TEXAS INT’L. L.J. 763 (discussing a limited range of cases in which South Africa courts have 
given effect to constitutional provisions regarding social and economic rights).  For a 
discussion of the social and economic rights in Asia, see THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, THE U.S. 
AND FRANCE (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., forthcoming 2005).
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interpretation cannot be settled by appealing to the requirements of a thin rule of law alone, and 
will turn in part on one’s belief about judicial competence.115
Quantitative studies have yet to make much headway in the complicated task of sorting 
out the direct and indirect effects of rule on law. Rule of law and economic development are 
closely related,116 as are economic development and human rights performance.117  Indeed, as the 
following chart graphically depicts, wealth is highly correlated with social and economic rights 
(r=.92),118 women’s rights as measured by the Gender Developmental Index (r=.93),119 good 
governance indicators such as government effectiveness (r=.77), 120  rule of law (r=.82), and 
control of corruption (r=.76),121 civil and political rights (r=.62),122 and even physical integrity 
rights though to a lower degree (r= -.40).  As countries become wealthier, they generally protect 
all rights better.  Thus, to compare the performance of a high income country such as the U.S. to a 
lower middle income country such as China or a low income country such as Sudan makes about 
as much sense as comparing a piano to a duck.
115
 Attempts by activist judiciaries to address social inequities by interpreting economic rights 
provisions broadly have led to complaints that rule of law is being undermined in India and 
the Philippines.  While such disputes also occur in the context of interpreting broad clauses 
regarding civil and political rights, they often give rise to additional concerns about judicial 
competence in that they involve resource allocation decisions arguably best left to the 
legislature and executive branches.  See Pangalangan, supra note 80; Jamie Cassels, Judicial 
Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 495, 498 (1989).
116 See infra Table 2. Apodaca, supra note 104 (even after excluding Western nations and limiting 
the study to 154 developing and transitional countries, Apodaca found that GDP and rule of 
law were so closely correlated (r=.81) that that she was forced to drop GDP per capita from 
the model).
117
 William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 Hum. 
Rts. Q. 368 (1996) (GNP biggest contributor to civil, political, social and economic rights); 
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251 (2nd ed. 2001) (wealth was 
the main factor affecting rights compliance, although individualism mattered in rich 
countries); Neil J. Mitchell and James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations 
of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476, 497 (1988) (higher levels of economic 
wellbeing associated with better physical integrity rights records); Steven C. Poe et al., The 
Abuse of Personal Integrity in the Eighties: Regional Perspectives, (presented to the Annual 
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 14, 1994) (same); 
Steven Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global 
Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291, 310 (1999) (same); Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women’s Economic and Social Rights Achievement, 20 
HUM. RTS. Q. 139 (1998) (higher GDP associated with better performance on women’s 
rights); Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 44.
118
 The table is based on UNDP rankings for social and economic rights in 2002 as measured by 
the Human Development Index. The HDI measures the average achievement in a country in 
three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life based on life expectancy at birth; education 
and knowledge measured by adult literacy and combined primary, second and tertiary 
enrollments; and a decent standard of living as measured by GDP per capita ($PPP).
119
 The UNDP’s Gender Development Index (GDI) index is also highly correlated with the HDI 
index (r=.999), suggesting that they capture largely the same phenomena.  Accordingly, I 
have not produced a separate scatterplot for GDI as the graph is virtually identical to the HDI 
graph.
120
  “Government effectiveness” measures the provision of public services, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence and independence of civil servants and the credibility of the 
government’s policy commitments. Kaufmann et al., supra note 105.  
121
 “Control of corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, the effects of corruption on 
business, and “grand corruption” in the political arena.  Kaufmann et al., supra note 105.
122
 Voice and accountability incorporates a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties and political rights, including the right to participate in the 
selection of government and the independence of the media.  See Kaufmann et al., supra note 
105. 
Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship? 27
Table 1.  Wealth Effect (GDP) on Rights Performance
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Table 2.   Correlation of Wealth and Measures of Development123
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Human 
development 
index (HDI) 
2001 0.92** 0.88** 0.93** 0.97** 0.86** 0.97** 0.88** 0.93** 0.94**
Gender-related 
development 
index (GDI) 
2001 0.93** 0.87** 0.92** 0.98* 0.89* 0.97** 0.90** 0.92** 0.83**
Rule of Law 0.82** 0.58** 0.91** 0.95** 0.90** 0.81** 0.64** 0.89** 0.92**
Government 
Effectiveness 0.77** 0.49** 0.90** 0.98** 0.92** 0.85** 0.69** 0.78** 0.91**
Control of 
Corruption 0.76** 0.55** 0.88** 0.96** 0.81** 0.83** 0.67** 0.77** 0.86**
Voice and 
Accountability 0.62** 0.29 0.50* 0.94** 0.75* 0.73** 0.34 0.18 0.85**
PTS 2002 
(AI & State)
-
0.40** -0.22 -0.42 -0.74 -0.71* -0.21 0.10 -0.25 -0.48*
N 174 41 19 6 10 20 20 15 23
Cell entries are Pearson’s R coefficients.  Dependent variable is natural log of GDP per capita
*p < .05, **p < .01
The high correlation between wealth and rule of law, and between wealth and virtually 
every type of right and indicator of wellbeing, suggests that wealth rather than rule of law is the 
more important factor in rights performance. While this has yet to be demonstrated statistically, it 
makes intuitive sense in that it is much easier to come up with plausible explanations of how 
wealth leads to better rights performance than it is to explain how rule of law leads to better rights 
protection, particularly for non-justiciable social and economic rights.  Wealthier countries can 
afford better medical care, better education, and better sanitation systems. Affluence reduces the 
intensity of distributional conflicts by increasing the resources available for redistribution and 
decreasing the number of people at or below the poverty line.  Development increases the ranks 
123
 Table 10.1 illustrates the relationship between per capita GDP and various measures of 
development, across all countries and within regions.  Across all countries the relationship is 
highly significant (p < .01), but the strength of the correlation varies.  The UNDP Human 
Development Index (HDI) is correlated strongly with per capita GDP (r = .92), but physical 
integrity (PTS) bears a relatively weak correlation (r = -.40).  If we square these coefficients 
to compute r-square (as in regression), we can say that per capita GDP explains 85% of the 
variance in HDI across countries, but only 16% of the variance in physical integrity.  The 
same calculation can be made for the other measures of development, which are ranked in 
declining order for all countries.  Analysis of these variables within regions indicates 
variation in the relationship between wealth and development, but the same pattern is still 
largely evident.  Where no relationship exists (e.g., Voice and Accountability in the Middle 
East) it is due to the lack of variance within the region.
Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship? 29
of middle class who seek to protect their growing property rights through political channels, 
including the electoral process, thus leading to stronger civil and political rights.  Citizens of rich 
states are less likely to take to the streets to protest government policies, thus decreasing the 
threat to governments that result in physical integrity violations or curtailments of civil and 
political liberties.
However, even assuming wealth is the more important factor in explaining rights 
performance, rule of law may have some independent direct positive affect as well.124  Moreover, 
because rule of law appears necessary though not sufficient for sustainable growth, efforts should 
also be made to promote rule of law as an indirect way of improving rights protection. 
To be sure, wealth is not the only factor that affects rights performance or even the most 
determinative factor for all rights in all cases. The relationship between personal integrity rights 
and GDP is weaker than for other rights because of continued police violence and other acts 
classified as torture even in rich countries, and because rich countries also react to war, terrorism 
and political stability by limiting civil and political rights and detaining and interrogating suspects 
in ways that are considered arbitrary detention or torture under international human rights 
standards (or at least may be so perceived by survey respondents).  Moreover, some countries 
exceed expectations relative to their income level while others fall far short.125 Distribution of 
wealth also matters: some countries are more egalitarian than others, with serious consequences 
especially for the most vulnerable in society. 126   There is also some regional variation, 
particularly on voice and accountability, reflecting different political regimes and value 
structures, and in physical integrity rights, reflecting more wars and political instability in some 
regions.127   The rights performance of reasonably wealthy countries may deteriorate rapidly 
because of war, economic stagnation, natural disasters or problems like HIV/AIDS.
Despite such qualifications, while money may not be able to buy happiness, it does seem 
to buy a longer life, better education, more health care, better governance, more gender equality 
and even more civil and political rights.
III. Rule of Law, Economic Growth and Human Rights: The Limits of Altruism and Other 
Obstacles 
124
 Apodaca, supra note 104 (finding that rule of law has a direct statistically significant effect on 
infant mortality rates).  See also, Kaufmann et al., supra note 105 (suggesting a causal link 
between the rule of law and infant mortality rates).
125
 United Nations Development Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/hdr_2000_back1.pdf (of 174 countries in the 
UNDP study, 97 scored higher on the Human Development Index than their GDP ranking, 
while 69 scored lower).  
126
 Inequality has led to violent uprisings and undermined rule of law and democratic regimes in 
Latin America.  See Juan Forero, Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience With 
Democracy, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2004, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/international/americas/24PERU.html?ex=1089065297&
ei=1&en=7f452d7bbb6ecb14. 
127 See Table 1.1.  David Reilly, Diffusing Human Rights, paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31, 2003, at 
http://archive.allacademic.com/publication/browse.php?PHPSESSID=9d439a2eca932ca51d8
ac1576440c90c.   All references to APSA papers for 2003 are available at this cite, 
hereinafter APSA 2003.  See also Apodaca, supra note 117 (finding that regional coefficients 
play a larger role than GNP in the achievement of women’s economic and social rights, 
although the regional identification of Asian and African explains less variation than the 
Middle East regional designation; and noting that various literatures suggest that the 
explanation lies in “culturally specific attitudes towards women’s status, developed under 
differing historical and economic conditions.”)
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One of the main motivating forces behind the turn toward rule of law has been the belief that 
legal reforms are necessary for economic development.  A 1997 World Bank report, for instance, 
claimed that "countries with stable government, predictable methods of changing laws, secure 
property rights, and a strong judiciary saw higher investment and growth than countries lacking 
these institutions."128
Notwithstanding theoretical arguments for and against the claim that rule of law 
contributes to economic development,129 the empirical evidence is surprisingly consistent and 
supportive of the claim that implementation of rule of law is necessary though by no means 
sufficient for sustained economic development. A number of long-term, multiple-country 
empirical studies have shown rule of law to be positively correlated with growth.  Robert Barro 
analyzed data from 85 countries for the periods 1965-75, 1975-85 and 1985-90.130  He tested the 
impact of a number of independent variables, including rule of law.131  His rule of law index was 
based on International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) survey data compiled from the subjective 
responses of businesspersons regarding law and order.  The law subcomponent assesses the 
strength and impartiality of the legality system and the order subcomponent assesses the popular 
observance of law.  Higher scores indicate sound political institutions, a strong court system, and 
provisions for an orderly succession of power.  Lower scores indicate a tradition of dependence 
on physical force or illegal means to settle claims.  Barro’s regression analysis found that an 
improvement in one rank in the 0 to 6 rule of law index raised growth rates by 0.5%.132
Other studies have found that clear and enforceable property rights are positively 
correlated with growth. 133  Knack and Keefer relied on both the ICRG and the Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) surveys.  The BERI survey does not directly ask about 
rule of law but includes questions about contract enforceability, the likelihood of nationalization, 
infrastructure and bureaucratic delays. Knack and Keefer conclude that institutions that protect 
property rights are crucial to economic growth and investment and the effect of such institutions 
continues to exist even after controlling for investment.
In a somewhat broader study, Clague, Knack, Keefer and Olson tested growth rates 
against the BERI standards; the contract-intensive money ratio (CIM), which is the ratio of non-
currency money to total money supply;134 and the aggregate ICRG index, which is a composite of 
the indexes for the quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, 
128 THE WORLD BANK, ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
1999/200023 (1999), (citing THE WORD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD: WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997 (1997)).
129
 I summarize the main theoretical arguments for the relationship between rule of law and 
economic development as well as the critiques elsewhere and will not repeat them here.  See
CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 11, at 451-458.
130
 Robert Barro, Democracy: A Recipe for Growth?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE (M.G. Quibria & J. Malcolm Dowling eds., 1996). 
131
 Other variables included were GDP, the rate of male higher and secondary schooling, life 
expectancy, the fertility rate, the government consumption ratio, a democracy index, the 
inflation rate and the growth rate in the ratio of export to import prices.  The rule of law index 
was for data from the early 1980s. 
132 ROBERT BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 28 (1997).
133
 Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests 
Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995). 
134 The idea is that in societies where property rights are secure and contracts can be reliably 
enforced, parties have little reason to use cash for large transactions or to maintain large cash 
holdings. C.P. Clague et al. Institutions and Economic Performance: Property Rights and 
Contract Enforcement, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND 
GOVERNANCE IN LESS-DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 70, 76  (C. P.  Clague 
ed., 1997).
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expropriation risk, and the risk of government repudiation of contracts.  Higher ICGR, CIM and 
BERI scores were associated with higher annual per capita growth rates, even in less developed 
countries.135
Another study based on the ICGR showed that rule of law is an important factor in 
determining the size of capital markets (both debt and equity) and that improvements in rule of 
law are associated with more domestically listed firms and initial public offerings per capita, a 
greater ratio of private sector debt to GNP, and a higher amount of outsider participation in a 
country’s capital markets.136  In a similar vein, Ross Levine found that countries that give a high 
priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their claims in bankruptcy or corporate 
reorganizations and in which the legal system effectively enforces contracts generally have more 
developed financial intermediaries and higher growth rates.137  Moving a country from the lowest 
quartile of countries with respect to the legal protection of creditors to the next quartile translates 
into a 29% rise in financial development, which increases growth by almost one percentage point 
a year.
Still another study of seventy countries found that the "efficiency and integrity of the 
legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms" was positively and 
significantly correlated with economic growth, even controlling for GDP per capita.  It also found 
that, contrary to the speculations of some theoreticians that corruption might increase economic 
growth, corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing growth rates.138
Country and regional studies add further support. In Russia, privatization in the absence 
of rule of law led to widespread looting and diversion of state assets into private hands.139  In 
retrospect it is clear that Russian institutions were insufficiently developed to carry out massive 
privatization and ensure the smooth operation of capital markets.  Economic reforms were 
undermined not only by weak courts but by weak supporting institutions.  Russia’s credit rating 
services, securities regulators, accountants and legal profession were simply not up to the 
demands of a modern economy.140
Asia is often considered to be an exception to the general rule requiring rule of law for 
sustained economic growth.  However, the role of law in economic development in Asia is often 
135
 Id. at 80 (arguing that secure property rights and effective contract enforcement mechanisms 
are not in themselves inegalitarian institutions but rather have powerful equality-promoting 
effects).
136 RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL.,LEGAL DETERMINANTS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5879, 1997); Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Vojislav 
Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. OF FIN. 2107 (1998).(companies are 
more likely to fund growth through external financing in countries that score high on the 
ICRG index for Law and Order). See also, Robert Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects 
and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L REV. 277 (2003).
137
 Ross Levine, Law, Finance and Economic Growth, 8 J. OF F. INTERMEDIATION 8, 36 (1999).
138
 Paulo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. OF ECON. 681 (1995). A World Bank Study 
of 4000 businesspersons in 69 countries supports the Mauro study’s conclusion that 
corruption inhibits investment and thus leads to lower growth rates.  Corruption was cited as 
one of the three most important obstacles to growth in less developed countries though not in 
Asian countries and one other region dominated by transition economies. See Brunetti, 
AYMO, GREGORY KISUNKO, & BEATRICE WEDER, HOW BUSINESSES SEE GOVERNMENT(IFC, Discussion Paper No. 33, 1998). 
139
 Jeffrey Sachs & Katharina Pistor, Introduction: Progress, Pitfalls, Scenarios and Lost 
Opportunities to THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA (Jeffrey Sachs & 
Katharina Pistor eds., West View Press 1997).
140
 Cheryl Gray & Kathryn Hendley, Developing Commercial Law in Transition Economies: 
Examples from Hungary and Russia in THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN 
RUSSIA (Jeffrey Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., 1997).
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underestimated because of the tendency to elide rule of law with democracy and a liberal version 
of rights that emphasizes civil and political rights.141 Although the political regimes may not have 
been democratic and the legal systems may not have provided much protection for civil and 
political rights in some cases, the Asian countries that experienced economic growth generally 
scored high with respect to the legal protection of economic interests. A survey of economic 
freedoms in 102 countries between 1993 and 1995 found that seven of the top twenty countries 
were in Asia.142 Economic freedoms include protection of the value of money, free exchange of 
property, a fair judiciary, few trade restrictions, labor market freedoms and freedom from 
economic coercion by political opponents. Six states — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and China— experienced sustained growth over 5% for the period from 1965 until 
1995. 143  The legal systems of these countries measure up favorably in terms of economic 
freedoms and rule of law, with the possible exception of China.  However, even in China, the 
legal system has improved significantly in the last twenty-five years, particularly in the 
commercial area, to where it now ranks in the 51% percentile of law legal systems.144 In contrast, 
the legal systems of most of the low growth countries are among the weakest in the region.  The 
following table presents a percentile ranking of Asia legal system based on the World Bank’s rule 
of law index discussed above for the years 1996 and 2002.145  Countries with better legal systems 
tend to have higher growth.  As noted in Table 2, the relationship between GDP and rule of law is 
strong in the Asian region (r=.91), compared to r=.81 for all countries.
Table 3.  World Bank Rule of Law Rankings
County 2002 1996
Singapore 93.9 99.4
Japan 88.7 88.0
Hong Kong 86.6 90.4
Taiwan 80.9 84.3
South Korea 77.8 81.9
Malaysia 69.6 82.5
Mongolia 64.9 70.5
Thailand 62.9 71.1
China 51.5 37.3
Vietnam 44.8 34.9
Philippines 38.1 54.8
Indonesia 23.1 39.8
Cambodia 20.1 16.9
North Korea 14.7 13.9
141
 For the argument that law played a greater role than normally suggested, see KATHARINA 
PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 (1999). 
142
 Henry Rowen, The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia, in BEHIND EAST 
ASIAN GROWTH: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROSPERITY  (Henry Rowen 
ed., 1998).
143 Id. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia grew more slowly, at around 3.5% per year.  Seven 
countries, including North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines and 
Myanmar, averaged less than 2% growth.  
144
 For a more thorough discussion of the role of the legal system in China’s economic 
development, see China’s Long March, supra note 11, at 462-498.  As the chart indicates, in 
2002 China’s legal system ranked in the 51st percentile on the World Bank’s rule of law 
index, having risen from the 37th percentile in 1996.
145 See Daniel Kaufman et al., supra note 105.
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Laos 12.9 4.8
Myanmar 2.1 5.4
Despite such consistent and seemingly overwhelming evidence, there are still good 
reasons to be cautious in reaching broad conclusions about the relationship between rule of law 
and economic growth,146 and between economic growth and better protection of human rights.  
As discussed above, defining and measuring rule of law remains an issue. Several of the empirical 
studies relied on subjective measures from two sources, the ICRG and BERI surveys. 
Significantly, most studies to date do not purport to show that rule of law causes development, 
only that rule of law is positively correlated with economic development.147
Although in general a legal system that complies with the requirements of a thin rule of 
law appears to be necessary to sustain long-term economic growth, rule of law may not be 
necessary or as significant where a country is very poor and the economy is largely rural-based. A 
formal legal system that meets the standards of rule of law is costly to establish and operate. In 
some cases, norms of generalized morality, social trust, self-enforcing market mechanisms and 
informal substitutes for formal law may provide the necessary predictability and certainty 
required by economic actors for a fraction of the cost.
Formal and informal law, public ordering and private ordering are complementary in 
many ways. Family businesses, networks of personal relationships, private orderings exist in all 
legal systems, although the cultural, economic, political and economic context may vary from one 
country to the next, leading to differences in the degree of importance or variations in particular 
practices.148  Since they are not perfect substitutes, each can support and help overcome the 
weaknesses of the other. In general however, relationships and social networks, clientelism, 
corporatism and informal mechanisms for resolving disputes, raising capital and securing 
contracts are at best imperfect substitutes that themselves often depend on formal legal 
institutions that meet the standards of a thin rule of law.  Moreover, although these mechanisms 
are to some extent compatible with rule of law, some are also incompatible in certain ways with 
rule of law.  In addition, once a country reaches a certain level of economic development, the 
146
 Notwithstanding the clear correlation between wealth and good governance, at least one study 
has found that cultural values are more predictive of rule of law, accountability and controls 
on corruption than GDP.  Amir Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, and Shalom Schwartz, Culture 
Rules: The Foundations of Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance (draft on file with 
author June 9, 2002). The study found that countries that emphasized autonomy and 
egalitarianism had higher levels of rule of law, accountability and less corruption, whereas 
countries that emphasized embeddedness and hierarchy had a lower level of rule of law, 
accountability, and worse corruption.  In short, English-speaking and Western Europe scored 
significantly higher than other regions.  The authors suggest that cultural orientation in East 
Asia may make it more difficult to implement rule of law, restrict corruption and increase 
accountability or that “good governance” in Asia may differ in some respects from “good 
governance” in Western liberal democracies.  Good governance in Asian countries no doubt 
differs in significant respects from good governance in rich, liberal democratic Western 
countries once one examines in more detail the broad variables of rule of law, accountability 
and corruption.  Nevertheless, Asian states have outperformed other regions in terms of rule 
of law on the same World Bank good governance scales used by the Licht et al., suggesting 
that culture may not be as important at least in Asia as the authors suggest.  More generally, 
the study suffers from a relatively small number of countries (N=45 to 53), the dubious 
reliance on urban school teachers and IBM employees as the source of cultural values for the 
nation, and dated data, with some of the data from 1968 to 1972 and the rest from 1993 to 
1998.
147 But see Ross Levine, supra  note 137. 
148 See Randall Peerenboom, Social Networks, Rule of Law and Economic Growth in China: The 
Elusive Pursuit of the Right Combination of Public and Private Ordering, 31:2 Global Econ. 
Rev. 1, 1-20 (2002).
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costs of a formal legal system are easier to bear.  Indeed, as we have seen, the rule of law is 
closely correlated with GDP.
Rule of law is therefore to some extent a function of demand.  Economic reforms and 
development enhance the demand for rule of law, while legal reforms and rule of law contribute 
to economic development.   There is both a push and a pull aspect to the process. 
Demand, however, will vary in a society. Most segments of society will benefit directly 
or indirectly from rule of law, both in economic and non-economic issues.  However, some 
groups, companies or individuals—particularly those that rely on government connections—will 
be worse off if rule of law is implemented, and may oppose reforms. 
One reason citizens who are not involved in complex economic transactions will benefit 
from efforts to establish rule of law for commercial purposes is that development of commercial
law is likely to have important spillover effects into non-commercial areas.  Improving 
commercial law requires institution-building. A more independent and competent judiciary, a 
more highly trained legal profession, and a more disciplined administration are of benefit to all. 
Further, institutional development is self-reinforcing.  The successful resolution of cases, whether 
commercial or not, demonstrates the improvements in the legal system, resulting in increased 
trust in the judiciary and greater demand for the courts to resolve all manner of disputes. 
Of course, implementing rule of law and achieving economic growth are complicated 
tasks.  Even those at the center of the so-called new law and development movement 
acknowledge the persistent difficulty in operationalizing the relation between law and 
development, and the inability to specify with any reasonable degree of certainty precisely what 
is required for economic development.149   Chastened by fifty years of failed predictions by 
leading development pundits and international organizations, the World Bank unveiled a 
Comprehensive Development Framework that declares that everything matters: economic 
policies; political and legal institutions, including rule of law, property rights regimes and 
security market regulatory mechanisms; human resources; physical resources; geography; and 
culture.  The Bank is also careful to point out that this holistic approach is difficult to 
operationalize and meant as a pragmatic guideline rather than a detailed blueprint.  Hedging its 
bets still further, the Bank takes pains to add that the "mixed record of development programs in 
the past suggests the need for both caution in application and realism about expected results."150
Nevertheless, these difficulties should not blind us to some important lessons that can be 
drawn from the experiments in stimulating economic growth during the last several decades. Not 
surprisingly, economic growth requires good economic policies, including sound macroeconomic 
policies that keep inflation down and avoid recessions, as well as policies that encourage high 
savings, provide strong returns to investment, reduce corruption, increase competition, and 
promote education.151  The free flow of information, capital and technology are also important.  
Political processes that are open, participatory and inclusive are beneficial, as demonstrated by 
the Asian financial crisis, the looting of state-owned assets in Russia, the problems with crony 
capitalism in Indonesia, and the difficulties in achieving equitable growth in South American 
countries.  Efficient markets depend on a variety of institutions and professions to disseminate 
information and reduce the costs of doing business and the likelihood of ending up in disputes.  A 
professional corps of accountants, appraisers, credit rating services, securities companies and 
regulatory systems are all needed.  As the empirical studies show, a legal system capable of 
enforcing contracts, maintaining competition, upholding property rights and protecting investors 
149
 On the old and new law and development movements,  see China’s Long March, supra note 
11, at 148-153. 
150
 The World Bank, supra note at 21. 
151 Id. at 17.
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against excessively predatory governments is also useful. Social capital is also important, 
including informal mechanisms for resolving disputes as well as cultural norms that allow 
cooperation and encourage trust, and thus reduce transactions costs.  As with rule of law, 
however, economic reforms are path-dependent and interdependent.  Even well-intentioned 
government leaders will not always be able to translate these broad principles into a coherent 
reform plan that is feasible given the local conditions and circumstances.152
While international efforts to stimulate growth through the export of neoliberal policies 
have been successful in some cases, we must face the unpleasant reality that there remains a wide 
gap between rich and poor countries, with devastating consequences for the rights and wellbeing 
of billions of people in poor countries.  Every year, more than 10 million children die of 
preventable diseases, some 30,000 a day.153 In some countries, one-third of children will not live 
to the age of five.154  Fifty-four countries were poorer in 2000 than in 1990; in twenty-one 
countries, human development levels decreased, in thirty-four, life expectancy declined, and in 
twelve, primary school enrollment dropped in the last decade.155  Excluding China, the number of 
poor people actually increased by 28 million in the 1990s.156  Although measures of global 
income equality raise a number of contentious issues, there is a general consensus that the 
difference between rich and poor countries is so grotesque as to shock the conscience: global 
income inequality is greater than the gap between rich and poor even in the most inegalitarian 
countries.157  The income of the richest 1% of the people is greater than the income of 57% of the 
rest of the people in the world, while the income of the 25 million richest Americans exceeds that 
of two billion people.158  Despite such gross inequality, aid from developed countries actually fell 
in the 1990s.  Even with pledges to increase aid by $16 billion by 1990, aid from the 22 members 
of the OECD will account for only 0.26% of their gross national income.159  Yet agricultural 
subsidies in rich countries amount to more than $300 billion, some six times the total amount of 
official developmental assistance.160
 Many failed states, racked by poverty, war and oftentimes poor governance, are simply 
incapable of implementing rule of law or following sound economic policies. But even functional 
developing states continue to be frustrated by the lack of concrete efforts to breathe life into the 
right to development, and the structural impediments to growth in the current international 
economic order.  Economic growth, rule of law and better protection of rights across the board 
will be difficult to achieve without greater redistribution of assets, a reduction in agricultural 
152 See DANI RODRIK, GROWTH STRATEGIES (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10050, 2003) (noting that although the general principles are relatively clear - market 
reforms, sound monetary policies, fiscal solvency, enforceable property rights – the wide 
institutional variation in achieving them limits policy guidance because policymakers cannot 
be sure what specifically to do in any given context).
153 UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, MILLENIUM GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG 
NATIONS TO END HUMAN POVERTY 8, available at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_overview.pdf.
154 Id. at 44.
155 Id. at 1. 
156 Id. at 5.  Overall, however, the number of people living on less than $1 per day dropped by at 
least 200 million to 1.2 billion in 1998, mainly because China was successful at lifting 150 
million people out of poverty between 1990 and 1999, id. at 2.
157 Id. at 39 (citing Gini coefficients of 0.66 globally compared to 0.61 for Brazil).
158 Id. The average income in the twenty richest countries is thirty-seven times that of the poorest 
twenty countries.  The gap doubled in the last forty years, id. at 2.
159 Id. at 11.
160 Id. at 12.
36 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
subsidies, debt relief, and changes in the international trade regime, including the intellectual 
property regime, that provide less developed countries a better chance to compete with wealthier 
states and afford human rights and legal systems that are rule of law compliant.161
To be sure, providing more aid or redistributing global resources alone will not ensure 
economic growth, bring about an end to war and human suffering, or necessarily lead to the 
realization of rule of law.  In some cases states, resources are likely to be squandered by 
government leaders, misappropriated for personal use or used to wage war on government 
enemies.  Setting right persistently failed states would seem to require regime change, which 
gives rise to complicated legal, political and practical issues about humanitarian intervention,162
as well as concerns about a global state.163
161 Id. See also Joel Paul, supra note 48 (discussing negative affects on global equality from 
subsidies, safeguard provisions, preferential tariff concessions for countries within same 
customs union or free-trade zone, overly protective intellectual property rights and 
antidumping rules).
162 NICHOLAS WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000). See also HUMAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Koehane eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION]. 
For a critical reading of humanitarian intervention that raises the specter of Western powers 
recapitulating 19th century imperialist patterns of military invasion to impose a particular 
lifeform on other states, this time thinly cloaked in the garb of allegedly universal values of 
liberal democracy bolstered by neoliberal economic policies, see ANNE ORFORD, READING 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2003).  Orford joins cause with Mutua in arguing that the 
metaphors of savages, victims and saviors continue to underwrite the narrative of the human 
rights movement.  Id., chapter 5.  See also Mutua, supra note 34.  To be sure, the particular 
recipe for salvation differs from the classical narrative of 19th century colonialism where 
enlightened members of civilized societies felt compelled to save the savages without much 
concern for rights of democratic participation or other liberal entitlements enjoyed back 
home, in exchange of course for the lion’s share of the country’s natural resources.  The 
growth of the human rights movement, the successful struggles to oust colonial powers, and 
evolving economic policies within Western developed states have produced a contemporary 
narrative of self-determination, liberal democracy, small governments and free trade.  
However, as these plot elements reflect the latest thinking of the enlightened intellectual elite 
in Western powers, we are still exporting the results of our palace wars.  See Bryant G. Garth, 
Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries Through the New Law and Development: 
Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing Results, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 395-96 (2002).  Nor is there any doubt that foreign countries and 
investors benefit from the free trade principles, intellectual property laws and other reforms 
that are part of the international relief package for post-crisis nation-building. 
The key issue, however, and what remains to be seen, is whether the results will be any different 
this time around.  Orford provides a useful cautionary tale that foregrounds the extent to 
which neoliberal economic policies and the international trade regime are responsible for 
creating and legitimating the disparities in global wealth that often contribute to the dramatic 
telegenic humanitarian crises that attract the attention of the international media and the 
foreign community, while at the same time the slower but equally deadly insults to dignity 
caused by grinding poverty recede into the shadowy background of collective indifference.  
She also notes that reliance on foreign advisors and international institutions such as the IMF 
and World Bank produces its own kind of dependency, with a corresponding reduction in 
sovereignty.  Ironically, the language of rights, which promises the moral authority to resist 
power, may be undermining local agency and legitimating a new imperialism backed by 
coercive humanitarian interventions from powerful states that determine the rules for the 
international community.  Nevertheless, in the end, she allows that there may be specific 
instances of justified humanitarian intervention to rescue citizens of failed states from the 
Hobbesian brutality of ethnic violence or to protect citizens in tyrannical states from the 
appalling suffering caused by widespread and systemic violations of basic rights.  It may still 
be possible, as in the case of intervention in East Timor, to stand in solidarity with East 
Timorese as comrades rather than imperial saviors.  
While there are no doubt some cases in which intervention is morally justified, only time will tell 
whether the current prescription for post-crisis recovery and nation-building will prove 
beneficial to people in developing and failed states, or turn out to be more snake oil.  There is 
good reason to be concerned that attempts to force-feed others an unvarying diet rich in 
liberal democracy, liberal rights and liberal democratic rule of law may in some cases 
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The well-off citizens of rich and powerful countries do not appear to have the stomach 
for such radical interventions, or even to support significant redistribution of global resources. 
Despite globalization and the ready availability of 24-hour news programs that feed us images of 
massive human rights violations around the clock, we define ourselves not in universal terms as 
featherless bipeds but in terms of more particular identities that distinguish between us and them. 
Notwithstanding all of the self-congratulatory talk of moral progress and the universality of 
human rights, most of us still stand idly by while much of the world’s population lives in abject 
poverty, all too willing to work in unsafe conditions for a fraction of the wages made by their 
counterparts in developed countries – and yet even then workers in developed countries begrudge 
them the jobs.164  Our altruism has limits.165  We still want our lattes from Starbucks and our nice 
produce indigestion and heartburn.  See infra notes 289-96.  The imperialism lies therefore 
not in the morally justified intervention to prevent mass starvation or genocidal slaughters, 
but in the failure to envision and tolerate alternative paths to nation-building.  At minimum, 
the general template of democracy, rule of law, rights and neoliberal economic policies must 
be adapted to local circumstances to be feasible, and to gain the support of the local 
communities, even allowing the general desirability of the constituent elements of the 
template.  The contrast between the havoc wreaked by “shock therapy” in Eastern Europe and 
the success of more incremental economic reforms in China, the ways in which IMF policies 
contributed to the Asian Financial Crisis, and the manner in which neoliberal economic 
policies contributed to the crises in Rwanda and Yugoslavia all demonstrate that blindly 
following a model that works in one place may lead to disasterous results in other places.  See 
generally, JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS (2002); ORFORD, at 110-123 (describing role of neoliberal economic policies in Rwandan and Yugslovian crisis).
163 Edward Foley, The Elusive Quest for Global Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 249-271 (1997).  Several of the essays in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 162, 
contemplate a more expanded scope of humanitarian intervention that includes nation-
building, in some cases in contexts where sovereignty is compromised under forms of 
protectorate or trusteeships.  The authors however have reservations about when such 
trusteeships are justified, the willingness and the capacity of the international community to 
establish effective trusteeships, and the likelihood of their success given deeply embedded 
ethnic hostilities, interfering neighbors with their own agendas and interests, and the 
sometimes ambiguous affects and unintended consequences of aiding failed states.  Farer 
suggests that the silver lining to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 might be that developed 
countries will come to appreciate the many ways in which centers of disorder can undermine 
centers of order in the world. Global order may require the establishment of trusteeships to 
ensure good governance, the production of essential public goods and rule of law.  This much
broader intervention will require political and technical advisers with financial and coercive 
resources at their call. Whereas humanitarian intervention prior to 9/11 was “a band-aid on a 
few suppurating wounds in a radically diseased body,” treating the disease requires a new 
scheme of international cooperation.  However, Farer suggests that there is little in the 
biographies of “the parochial, narrowly compassionate figures who predominate in the 
councils of leading states” that provides grounds for hoping that “they will face the 9/11 
challenge with imagination and generosity no less than fire and sword.”  Tom Farer, 
Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: legality and legitimacy, in id. at 53, 88-89.  
See also Robert Keohane, Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty, in 
id., at 275 (arguing that effective post-intervention measures requires limitations on 
sovereignty, and that states in “bad neighborhoods” might have to go through a process of 
nominal sovereignty where authority over domestic affairs rests with UN or some outside 
authority, limited sovereignty where the UN or outside authority has veto power over key 
decisions by local actors, and then integrated sovereignty where nationals make their own 
decisions subject to a supranational court); Michael Ingatieff, State failure and nation-
building, in id., at 299 (discussing whether states that have failed because of ethnic conflict 
should be maintained intact, and whether the international community should intervene at all 
in places like Somalia or just walk away given that periodic aid may exacerbate conflicts as 
factions fight over the bounty, and the international community often lacks the political will 
and resources for the kind of sustained occupation that ultimately is required to turn the state 
around).
164
 The recent uproar in the U.S. over “outsourcing” to China, India and other poor countries 
appears to be based on the faulty normative premise that Americans are entitled to high 
paying jobs while Chinese, Indians and others are forced to live in squalid conditions, without 
potable water, adequate food and access to basic medical care.  Some 46% of people live in 
China live on less than $2/day. It seems that people in poor countries should be able to 
choose whether they want jobs or higher labor standards, better environmental protection and 
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houses with plasma televisions while others are starving and living impoverished lives, not only 
in other countries but right in our own communities.166
On the rare occasion the international community does respond to a humanitarian crisis, 
the public’s attention fades once the immediate emergency is over.  In the need for an immediate 
response, there is little time to reflect on the structural issues that produce failed states and the 
extent to which the international economic order is a contributing factor to the crisis.  After the 
crisis passes, life in the developed world returns to normal, while those in the failed state continue 
to struggle along often only to experience another crisis several years later.  People in developed 
countries are able to seek solace in their efforts to address the crisis, while blaming further 
problems in failed states on ethnic conflict, tribal warfare, rapacious tyrants, ruthless dictators, 
religious fanatics, rogue states or the lack of requsite cultural resources to support democracy, 
rule of law and liberalism.  Placing the blame on others provides the psychological distant needed 
to justify washing one’s hands of the problems, and diverts attention from one’s complicity in the 
international economic order, while at the same time reaffirming one’s own identity, the 
difference between oneself and the other, and the superiority of one’s own way of life.
IV. Rule of Law, Democracy and Human Rights: All Good Things Need Not Go Together
so on.  Of course, efforts should be made to provide workers in poor countries as much 
protection as possible consistent with remaining competitive in a global market. 
165 See Pogge, supra note 13, at 14. A number of normative arguments have been advanced to justify limits on transfer of wealth.  One argument is that while we are obligated to look after 
our family members and members of our community or country to some extent, we simply do 
not owe strangers, especially in far off lands, much if anything, absent conditions that would 
create some more particular relationship.  Some ethical systems, such as Confucianism, 
explicitly acknowledge gradients of obligations that become more attenuated as one moves 
from family to friends to members of the same community or nation to foreigners. There is 
still some degree of concern owed others, although it may not be enough to justify transfer of 
wealth from one country to another.  In any event, some people would go further and simply 
deny any obligation to transfer wealth to others, especially given poverty and resource-related 
problems in one’s own society.  For the argument that a special relationship exists based on 
historical events that have contributed to global inequality, our shared dependence on a single 
natural resource base, and the existence of a single global economy which has tended to serve 
the interests of wealthy states at the expense of the poor.  
A second argument is the Lockean/Nozickean one that we are entitled to the fruits of our labor.  
This line of argument has been criticized for failing to account for inequality in initial 
conditions and moral luck, such as being born smart or gifted or, given the importance of 
wealth, an American or Western European.
  A third argument is based on fairness.  Differences in levels of wealth are often the result of 
choices: some people work hard and save while others opt for leisure and immediate 
gratification; some countries adopt austerity policies while others opt for more consumption, 
less saving, less emphasis on education, larger populations and so on.  Redistribution would 
penalize those who did not indulge in immediate gratification, and turn the U.S. and Germany 
into slave colonies for those who lack the same level of industriousness or who prefer larger 
populations.  See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF THE PEOPLES 108-114 (1999).
 A fourth argument is that the lack of a practical or effective means to alleviate poverty or the 
adverse consequences of establishing an international order that would be necessary to 
eliminate poverty either prevents an obligation from arising on some version of the “ought 
implies can” argument or provides an excuse for non-performance.  Such adverse 
consequences might include the need for a global government or at least significantly greater 
intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.  If wealthy countries are to provide financial 
support to developing states, they may demand a greater say in policy-making or require a 
change in the nature of the regime or in state leaders.  
166
 Ole Hosti, Public Opinion on Human Rights in American Foreign Policy, in THE UNITED 
STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 131-174 (David Forsythe ed., 2000) (Despite a moral streak in 
American political culture, there is little public support for a moral crusade abroad in the 
name of human rights. The protection of human rights trails protecting U.S. jobs, protecting 
interests of U.S. businesses abroad, securing adequate supplies of energy, and defending 
allies’ security.  Most Americans do not consider spreading of democracy very important.). 
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The relationship between rule of law, democracy and human rights is difficult to sort out 
conceptually because of the contested meanings and interpretations of each and to test empirically 
because of problems in operationalizing and measuring them. The following may serve as a 
provisional working definition of democracy.167  A genuine democracy requires at minimum 
open, competitive elections, under universal franchise, of those in posts where actual policy 
decisions are made (the electoral dimension).  It also requires sufficient freedom of association, 
assembly, speech and press to ensure that candidates are able to make their views known and 
compete effectively in the elections, and so that citizens are able to participate with reasonable 
effectiveness in the electoral process (the participatory process dimension). In addition, it 
requires the legal institutions to ensure that these freedoms are in fact realized and the election is 
carried out fairly (the rule of law dimension).168 Elections are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for democracy.  Moreover, democratization is a process, which can occur even within a 
single party state, even though full realization of genuine democracy is not possible in such a 
state.  Further, and most important for present purposes, while democracy implies a thin rule of 
law, the opposite is not necessarily the case.
Many commentators who adopt thick conceptions of rule of law incorporate democracy 
into the concept of rule of law.  Still others would accept that democracy is conceptually distinct 
from rule of law, but maintain that rule of law is not (fully) realizable except in democracies.  The 
existence of nondemocratic states that enjoy a thin rule of law would disprove the second claim or 
at least require qualifications. Yet some non-democratic states seem to have had or to now have 
legal systems that meet the requirements of a thin rule of law (at least as well as other democratic 
countries known for rule of law).169
Singapore for example has been described as a semi-democracy, pseudo-democracy, 
illiberal democracy, limited democracy, mandatory democracy, a "decent, non-democratic 
regime," a soft authoritarian state, and a despotic state controlled by Lee Kuan Yew.170  Critics 
167 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1943). Schumpeter 
emphasized the first two dimensions in his influential conception of democracy.  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights do not expressly require democracy in their operative clauses regarding political 
participation (though both restrict limitations on certain rights to those necessary in a 
democratic society).  Rather ICCPR, art. 25, provides: “Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without 
unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of the will of the electors.”  These provisions are vague in several respects.  
They do not explicitly require contested elections at all levels of government between 
multiple parties.  Nor do they define what is required by way of political participation beyond 
elections, if anything.  For attempts to operationalize democracy, see Gerardo Munck & Jay 
Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 
COMP. POL. STUD. 5, 5-34 (2002); James Raymond Vreeland, A Continuous Schumpeterian 
Conception of Democracy, APSA 2003, supra note 127.
168
 This conception of democracy obviously will not be useful for empirical studies that attempt to 
test the relation between democracy as the dependent variable and as the independent rule of 
law.  For such studies, the dependent variable democracy would have to exclude the rule of 
law dimension.
169 See Minxin Pei, Political Institutions, Democracy and Development, in DEMOCRACY, 
MARKET ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT 31 (Farrukh Iqbal & Jong-Il You eds., 2001) (citing as examples on non-democratic rule of law states Kaiser Germany, pre-1945 Japan, 
Pinochet’s Chile, Franco’s Spain and “nearly all Western European countries before they 
became democratic in the mid-1800s.”). Robert Barro, supra note 132 (noting that there is 
little empirical evidence that rule of law promotes political freedom). 
170
 Eugene KB Tan, ‘'WE' v 'I': Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 AUSTL. J. OF ASIAN L. 
1 (2002). 
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note that elections are dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP) and opposition is tamed 
through the use of defamation suits against political opponents, manipulation of voting 
procedures, gerrymandering, and short campaign times. Given the dominance of the PAP, 
accountability in Singapore is achieved not so much through elections as through other means 
such as allocating limited participation rights to the opposition, inviting members of the public to 
comment on legislation, and the use of shadow cabinets where PAP members are asked to play an 
opposition role.
The primary role of law in Singapore is to strengthen the state, ensure stability and 
facilitate economic growth.171  Many decisions are left to the state and political actors, primarily 
the Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister.  Civil society is limited, and characterized by 
corporatist relationships between the state, businesses, labor unions and society.  Administrative 
law tends to emphasize government efficiency rather than protection of individual rights.  While 
individual rights are constitutionally guaranteed, they are not interpreted along liberal lines. Lee 
Kuan Yew and other government officials have invoked Asian values to emphasize group 
interests over individual interests, and to justify limitations on civil and political rights, including 
limits on free speech such that citizens are not allowed to attack the integrity of key institutions 
like the judiciary or the character of elected officials without attracting sanction in the form of 
contempt of court or libel proceedings.  Labor rights are also limited in the name of social 
stability and economic growth. Rejecting liberal neutrality, the government favors a more 
paternalistic approach where the state promotes a substantive normative agenda and actively 
regulates private morality and conduct.  The government has appealed to Confucianism to support 
its paternalist approach and to promote social harmony and consensus rather than adversarial 
litigation.  On the whole, the judiciary tends to follow the government’s lead.  Although the 
reason for that seems to be a genuine congruence of views on the part of most judges rather than 
overt political pressure on the courts, in some cases judges who have challenged the PAP have 
been reassigned.172
Despite the limitations on democracy, the use of the legal system to suppress opposition, 
and a nonliberal intepretation on many rights issues, Singapore’s legal system is regularly ranked 
as one of the best in the world. The World Comprehensiveness Yearbook consistently ranks 
Singapore first.173  It was ranked in the top 99th percentile on the World Bank Rule of Law Index 
in 1996, and in the 93rd percentile in 2002.  By way of broad comparison, the U.S. and the 
average OECD rankings were in the 91st to 92nd percentiles for 1996 and 2002.
Like Singapore, Hong Kong has a well-developed legal system that is largely the product 
of British colonialism.  Until the handover to the PRC in 1997, the system was widely considered 
to be an exemplar of rule of law, notwithstanding the lack of democracy and a restricted scope of 
individual rights under British rule.  After the handover, the legal system continues to score high 
on the World Bank’s Rule of Law Index, with only a slight drop from 90.4 in 1996 to 86.6 in 
2002.
With the change of government, however, has come a different value orientation.  Tung 
Chee-hwa has on occasion invoked Asian values, suggesting to some that Hong Kong might be 
evolving toward a more Singaporean model.  Signs of a possible shift include pressure on the 
media to toe the government’s line; limitations on free speech and assembly and in particular the 
requirement that demonstrators obtain prior approval from the authorities; consideration of a bill 
on religious sects, urged by Beijing, to control Falungong, along with the recent conviction of 
Falungong demonstrators; and the recent brouhaha over regulations required under Article 23 of 
171
 Thio, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law, supra note 65. Peerenboom, supra note 2. 
172
 Thio, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law, supra note 65 
173 Id.
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the Basic Law dealing with a variety of potential treats to national security from sedition to 
disclosure of state secrets, which resulted in some 500,000 people taking to the streets.174  The 
protesters, some of whom demanded faster democratization including election of the chief 
executive in 2007, were also upset by a downturn in the economy and the ineffective governance 
of Tung.
Singapore and even more clearly Hong Kong show that rule of law need not necessarily 
march in lock step with democracy.  Nor does democracy necessarily entail better protection of 
human rights.  To be sure, many studies using a variety of methods and definitions find that 
democracy reduces human rights violations.175 However, the studies tend to assume a linear 
relationship: marginal improvement in democratization leads to a similar improvement in 
protection of human rights. Yet many qualitative studies have found that democratization has not 
led to better protection of human rights in the countries studied.176
A number of quantitative studies support the disconcerting results of the qualitative 
studies by showing that the third wave has not led to a decrease in political repression, with some 
studies showing that political terror and violations of personal integrity rights actually increased 
in the 1980s.177 Other studies have found that there are non-linear effects to democratization: 
transitional or illiberal democracies increase repressive action. Fein described this phenomenon as 
“more murder in the middle” – as political space opens, the ruling regime is subject to greater 
threats to its power and so resorts to violence.178 More recent studies have also concluded that the 
level of democracy matters: below a certain level democratic regimes oppress as much as non-
democratic regimes.179
174 Albert Chen, Hong Kong’s Legal System in the New Constitutional Order, in Implementation 
OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Chen Jianfu, et al., eds., 2002); Report of the 
Joseph R. Crowley Program, One Country, Two Legal Systems: The Rule of Law; 
Democracy, and Rights in Post-Handover Hong Kong, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J., 1 (1999).; 
U.S. Department of State, United States Report on Hong Kong, available at
http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/pi/20010731.htm.
175 See generally Christian Davenport and David Armstrong, Democracy and the Violation of 
Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis of the Third Wave (2002), at 
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/011/011002ArmstrongD.htms.; Todd Landman, 
Norms and Rights: A Non-Recursive Model of Human Rights Protection, APSA 2003, supra
note 127. 
176
 Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 175; Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, supra note 14. 
For the experience of newly democratized states in Asia, see Peerenboom, supra note 4.  For 
Africa and a discussion on widespread human rights abuses even in democratic African states 
see GEORGE WILLIAM MUGWANYA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 53-106 (2003). See also, 
Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Lynchings and the Democratization of Terror in Postwar 
Guatemala: Implications for Human Rights, 24 Hum. Rts. Q 640-661 (2002) (political 
democracy co-exists with widespread tolerance for violation of individual rights, particularly 
of criminally accused; people may also vote back in former dictators, as in Guatemala).
177
 J James A. McCann & Mark Gibney, An Overview of Political Terror in the Developing 
World, 1980-1991, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 15, 23-24 (Stuart 
Nagel and David Louis Cingranelli, eds., 1996) (noting that political terror increased in the 
developing world in the 1980s and finding that democracy does not by itself ensure low 
levels of terror). See also David Reilly, supra note 127 (over the period from 1976-1996, the 
number of countries with the best score actually decreased, countries with the worst score 
increased, while the mean remained about the same).  See also Todd Landman, supra note 
175 (noting increase in violations of personal integrity and torture between 1985 and 1993).
178
 Helen Fein, More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the 
World, 1987, 17 HUM. RTS Q. 170 (1995).
179
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al, Thinking Inside the Box:  A Closer Look at Democracy and 
Human Rights, APSA 2003, supra note 127.  See also Davenport & Armstrong, supra note ?.  
See also Keith & Poe, supra note 110 (democracy has only a minor impact on personal 
integrity rights although transition from lowest level to highest level produces a more 
substantial impact). But see S.C. Zanger, A Global Analysis of the Effect of Regime Changes 
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Democracy consists of different elements or dimensions, and thus most studies use a 
composite index. The Polity IV measure increasingly favored by researchers is a 21-point scale 
made up of five components: competitiveness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of 
participation, executive constraints, openness of executive recruitment and regulation of 
participation. Other composite measures of democracy include civil liberties, freedom of press, 
minority protection and so on. Which elements matter the most for the protection of human 
rights?180 Is there a sequencing effect that would recommend increasing political participation 
before increasing constraints on executive, or vice versa? de Mesquita et al. found that political 
participation and limits on executive authority are more significant than other aspects, but that 
there is no human rights benefit at all until the very highest levels of political participation and 
executive constraints are achieved. However, these levels require moderate progress on each of 
the other subdimensions. In short, “there is no significant increase in human rights with an 
incremental increase in the level of democracy until we reach the point where executive 
constraints are greatest and where multiple parties compete regularly in elections and there has 
been at least one peaceful exchange of power between the parties… Put more starkly, human 
rights progress only reliably appears toward the end of the democratization process.”181 This 
finding is worrisome for human rights in that despite the much vaunted third wave of 
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, regimes that combined meaningful democratic elections 
with authoritarian features outnumbered liberal democracies in developing countries during the 
1990s.182
Moreover, even full democratization does not necessarily entail a liberal interpretation of 
human rights.  As discussed previously, many critics object to the liberal interpretation of human 
rights that emphasizes individual autonomy and choice at the expense of other values. 183
Conflicting views over how the oftentimes abstract principles set forth in rights documents are to 
be interpreted arise across a wide range of issues, including the rights of the criminally accused 
versus the need to protect members of society from crime, 184  the rights of women versus 
on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-1993, J. OF PEACE 33 (2000) (finding that democracy leads 
to improvement in human rights performance within the first year of holding elections).  
180 See de Mesquita et al., supra note 179 (noting one of the disadvantages of using composite 
measures of democracy is that it is not clear how democracy promotes human rights. The 
factors measured by studies of democracy are only loosely tied to theories about why 
democracy protects human rights). 
181
 de Mesquita et al., supra note 179.
182
 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Autocracy by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of 
Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era (2002), at 
http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/045/045008WayLucan.pdf.
183 See Tan, supra note 170.
184
 Although Japan has the lowest crime rate of any industrialized democracy, critics of the 
criminal justice system question whether the pretrial procedures afford adequate protections 
to suspects and charge that the system lacks transparency, police and prosecutors are 
unaccountable, and defense lawyers are impotent.  There is an ongoing active debate as to 
whether Japan is and should be moving away from its traditional criminal law system based 
on “paternalistic benevolence,” prosecutorial discretion, particularized justice, and 
rehabilitation, toward a more “American” model that combines greater protection for 
individual rights with a punitive emphasis on incarceration.  See, e.g., Susan Maslen, Japan 
and The Rule of Law, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 281 (1998).  See also Randall Peerenboom, 
Out of the Pan and into the Fire: Well-intentioned but Misguided Recommendations to 
Eliminate Administrative Detention in China, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (citing widespread 
support for China’s tough anti-crime campaigns, including 99% support for capital 
punishment, with some 22% of the population calling for more death sentences even though 
China executed more people in one three month period in 2001 than the rest of the world 
executed in three years). 
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traditional norms,185 and the scope of legitimate limitations on free speech in the name of national 
security or social stability.186  Regional variations even after controlling for wealth and regime 
type demonstrate that there are differences in values among the majorities in different 
countries, 187  and that such values play a significant role in how rights are interpreted and 
implemented.188
185
 Apodaca, supra note 117 (attributing regional variations in women’s rights in part to cultural 
differences).
186
 Even when Asians prefer democracy, they may prefer majoritarian or nonliberal variants to 
liberal democracy Nearly two-thirds of Koreans agreed with the statement that “If we have 
political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything”, 40% believed 
that “the government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed 
in society,” while 47% believe that “if people have too many different ways of thinking, 
society will be chaotic.”  See Chong-min Park and Doh Chull Shin, Do Asian Values Deter 
Popular Support for Democracy? The Case of South Korea, paper prepared by AAS 
Meetings 2004.    In contrast to South Koreans and Taiwanese, there is overwhelming support 
for democracy among Thais, with an astounding 90% satisfied with the way democracy 
works in Thailand and 85% maintaining that democracy is always preferable to 
authoritarianism.  Nevertheless, half of Thais still rank economic development as more 
important than democracy.  Moreover, Thais remain distrustful of political parties, while 75% 
view diversity of political and social views as threatening, and 45% are unwilling to tolerate 
minority viewpoints.   Nor is there a very deep commitment to rule of law and separation of 
powers.  A majority would accept government control over the judiciary or even parliament 
to promote the wellbeing of the nation.  Robert Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Impacts 
of Asian Values on Support for Democracy in Thailand, paper presented at AAS (2004).  A 
survey of academics, think tank experts, officials, businesspeople, journalists and religious 
and cultural leaders found significant differences between Asians and Americans.  The 
former chose an orderly society, harmony and accountability of public values, in descending 
order, as the three most important societal values.  In contrast, the Americans chose freedom 
of expression, personal freedom and the rights of the individual.  See Susan Sim, Human 
Rights: Bridging the Gulf, STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 21, 1995.  See also Bridget Welsh, Attitudes 
Toward Democracy in Malaysia: Challenges to the Regime?, 36:9 ASIAN SURVEY 882 (1996) (reporting that a survey of Malaysians in 1994 found that the majority were willing to 
limit democracy, particularly when social order was threatened, and that fears of instability 
and Asian values led to limited support for democracy; also noting that respondents were 
willing to sacrifice freedom of speech in the face of threats to social order).
187 See generally, Peter B. Smith et al., Cultural Values, Sources of Guidance, and Their
Relevance to Managerial Behavior - A 47-nation Study, 33(2) J. OF CROSS-CULTURAL 
PSYCHOL. 188 (2002) (summarizing various multiple country studies that find similarities on 
various dimensions of values within different regions). See also Geert Hofstede, supra note 
117. See also Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 44 (East Asian countries 
generally outperform the average country in their income category on social and economic 
rights, governance indicators, law and order measures, but score below the average on civil 
and political rights, with differences most notable with respect to free speech and freedom of 
the press).
188 See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251 (2nd ed. 2001). (Hofstede 
examined the affects of cultural values identified by his study for on human rights in 52 
countries as measured by Humana’s 1992 world human rights ratings.  The ratings were 
derived from responses to 40 questions based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
He found that GDP explained most of the variance (r =.71), and that cultural values were not 
significant. However, when he considered only wealthy countries, he found that 
individualism (as opposed to collectivism) was strongly correlated with higher human rights 
ratings (r=.73), more spending on health and education and less on military.  None of the 
other cultural values identified were significant.  Interestingly, while individualism has been 
shown to be strongly correlated with wealth in many studies (r=.84 for Hofstede), rich East 
Asian countries score lower on individualism and higher on collectivism relative to other 
countries at their income category). Relying on more specific rights rather than an aggregate 
score, David Cross, supra note 103, found cultural values were a significant determining 
factor even controlling for wealth and other factors.  See also Layna Mosley and S. Uno, 
Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Foreign Direct Investment and Human Rights(2002) at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/index.htm (finding strong regional relationship 
between regions and labor rights, and that the Asian and Pacific regions were not as 
protective of labor rights as Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, although they were 
more protective than the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America and on par with Sub-
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V. Rule of Law and War: After 2000 Years Not Quite Inter Armes, Silent Leges,189 But Not 
Much Better
Former UN Human Rights Commissioner de Mello eloquently captured the evils of war: 
We are living in a profoundly challenging time for human rights.  On this day, I would 
like us to think in particular of the countless number of civilians who are living in the 
midst of war and conflict and who continue to endure atrocities which should outrage the 
conscience of humanity.  Their basic rights, those enshrined in human rights and 
humanitarian law are denied…. [F]or millions of victims of armed conflict, war 
represents the daily reality.  Men and women are killed, maimed, raped, displaced, 
detained, tortured, and denied basic humanitarian assistance, and their property [is] 
destroyed because of war.  Children are abducted, forcibly recruited into arms, separated 
from their families, sexually-exploited, suffer hunger, disease and malnutrition, and are 
unable to go to school.  They are denied not only their present, but their future….  The 
best chance for preventing, limiting, solving and recovering from conflict and violence 
lies in the restoration and defence of the rule of law.  Armed conflict stands as a bloody 
monument to the failure of the rule of law.  We must break the cycle of violence.  Where 
armed repression strips people of their rights and dignity, let those responsible answer 
under the rule of law.190
War is undeniably a serious threat to individual freedom and rights.  However, is rule of law an 
antidote to war?  To what extent can rule of law prevent war, limit abuses during war and 
contribute to transitional justice while laying the foundation for a rights-respecting future polity?
Prevention of War
The shortcomings of relying on rule of law to prevent war are painfully obvious in light of recent 
history.  International and domestic wars are driven by ethnic hatred, greed, economic 
considerations, geopolitical concerns for stability and the struggle for power.  Law is for the most 
part powerless in the face of these concerns.191  The U.N. regime was largely an attempt to bring 
war and the use of force within an international legal framework.192  But it has proven incapable 
of preventing wars: the twentieth century was one of the bloodiest, and the twenty-first is not 
shaping up to be much better.193  The Cold War undermined whatever hope there might have been 
Saharan Africa); see also Apodaca, supra note 117  (finding that regional coefficients play a 
larger role than GNP in the achievement of women’s economic and social rights, although the 
regional identification of Asian and African explains less variation than the Middle East 
regional designation).
189
 “In times of war, the laws are silent.”  Attributed to Cicero, circa 50 B.C.
190
 de Mello, supra note 16 (with emphasis added).
191
 James Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures and Legal Systems in International 
Politics, 31 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 41 (2002).
192
 The U.N. Charter prohibits the use or the threat of the use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a state in way inconsistent with the Charter. Member 
States are supposed to resolve disputes peacefully. If they are unable to do so, they are to 
refer the matter to Security Council.  However, states are allowed to use force in self-defense 
without Security Council approval. 
193
 Since 1945, there have been 250 conflicts, resulting in 70 million to 170 million deaths. M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE XV (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) [hereinafter 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE] .  After the Cold War, between 1989 and 1993, there have been 90 
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that the Security Council would be able to play a moderating role during the early decades of the 
U.N.  The NATO bombings in Kosovo and the U.S. invasion of Iraq without Security Council 
approval have demonstrated further the limits of international law to prevent war in the post Cold 
War era.194 In the eyes of the vast majority of international law scholars, the NATO bombings 
and the U.S. invasion of Iraq were illegal and demonstrate just how far away we are from an 
international rule of law.195
To be sure, some have attempted to the actions of NATO and the U.S. were legal, albeit 
based on changing conception of laws of war,196 or as morally justified even if illegal based on 
humanitarian intervention to protect human rights or to promote democracy. 197  The hand-
wringing among international law scholars over the conflict between the illegality of NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo and their personal conviction in the morally compelling case for 
humanitarian intervention highlights the normative limitations of a thin rule of law and the need 
to weigh the values served by rule of law against other important social values, including the 
protection of human rights.  Former President and Judge of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia Antonio Cassese succinctly stated the choices:
Faced with such an enormous human-made tragedy and given the inaction of the Security 
Council…should one sit idly by and watch thousands of human beings…slaughtered or 
brutally persecuted?  Should one remain silent and inactive only because the existing 
armed conflicts involving 60 different governments and one-third of all UN Members. Most 
are now internal conflicts.  MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PEROGATIVES OF POWER: 
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 68 (2001).
194 See, e.g., Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers, Has US Power Destroyed the UN?, LONDON 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 29, 1999, at 30 (“The global situation has begun to resemble that of 
previous centuries, where military force was the preferred tool of the powerful, and the less 
powerful sought protection in alliances of convenience rather than international institutions or 
international law.”). See also David Whippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 
25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 129 (2001) (arguing that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is part of, 
and contributes to, a broader phenomenon that involves the loosening of the legal and 
political constraints on the use of force and thus is likely to lead states to interpret the UN 
Charter’s restrictions on the use of force less narrowly in the future).
195 Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN, NATO and International Law After Kosovo, 22.1 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 57-89 (2000) (challenging the legality of NATO intervention); MARK DRUMBL, SELF-
DEFENSE, PREEMPTION, FEAR: IRAQ AND BEYOND (Washington & Lee Public Law Research 
Paper No. 03-04 , 2003) (according to the President of the American Society of International 
Law 80% of international lawyers think the U.S invasion of Iraq was illegal).
196 See generally id. (noting that international law evolves as state practices change, and that there 
seems to be widespread support for the U.S. attack on Al Qaeda, substantial but somewhat 
less support for the attack on Afghanistan, and substantial opposition to the attack on Iraq); 
see also Thomas Franck, Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian intervention,
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 162, at 204, 226 (claiming NATO’s use of 
force in Kosovo was both lawful and unlawful: unlawful in that prohibition against the use of 
force without Security Council approval or in self-defense was not repealed by an evolving 
consensus over the practice of humanitarian intervention; lawful in that while technically 
illegal no undesirable consequences resulted from the intervention, and thus the illegality of 
the act was mitigated to the point of exoneration).
197 See Klinton Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating 
Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J. 
INT'L L. 403-449 (2000). See also, Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline in 
Crisis, 65 MOD. L. REV. 377, 380 (2002) (noting that a number of international law scholars 
consider the NATO campaign to be illegal but morally justified); cf. Allen Buchanan, 
Reforming the international law of humanitarian intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, supra note 162, at 130, 160-163 (arguing that in a system in which rule of 
law is imperfectly realized, humanitarian intervention or other acts may be justified even if 
they are illegal provided, inter alia, the intervention or acts promote reforms that bring the 
system more into line with the ideal rule of law).
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body of international law rules proves incapable of remedying such a situation?  Or, 
rather, should respect for the Rule of Law be sacrificed on the altar of compassion?198
The conflict could be resolved by “legalizing” humanitarian intervention.  One approach 
would be to recognize a customary international law right for a country or group of countries to 
intervene when certain standards are met.199  However, any such standards will be broad and 
subject to vastly different interpretations based on contested and complex facts.200  Ex ante and ex 
198
 Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Toward International Legitimation of 
Forcible Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 25, 25 (1999).  
199 See id. Cassese suggests that intervention is justified when there are gross breaches amounting 
to crimes against humanity involving the death of hundreds or thousands and the government 
has collapsed or is involved in the crimes.  If the government is alleged to have collapsed 
then it must be shown the government is not capable of stopping the violations. If the 
government is alleged to be involved then it must be shown that government has refused to 
cooperate with UN.  In addition, the Security Council must be blocked by the veto power 
from taking coercive action.  All peaceful avenues must be exhausted.  A group of states, not just a superpower or its allies, must intervene, and with the consent of the majority of other 
states.  Armed forces must only be used for the purpose of stopping atrocities and restoring 
respect for human rights. See also TOM FARER, A PARADIGM OF LEGITIMATE 
INTERVENTION, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT 316, 327 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) (intervention is justified only when (i) there is no plausible alternative for averting mass 
violations of fundamental rights; (ii) the violations will cause irreparable injury; (iii) the 
intervening party uses minimal necessary force to address violations and then withdraws 
immediately; (iv) intervention is calculated to cause less damage to the target society than 
inaction).  Others would add that the use of force be proportional and consistent with 
international humanitarian law, that the intervention be welcomed by the population in the 
target country, that there be a reasonable prospect of success and that intervention be 
motivated to a substantial degree by humanitarian concerns.  See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking 
humanitarian intervention: the case for incremental change, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, supra note 162, at 232, 233, 248-251 (arguing however against codifying the 
criteria for intervention in order to allow for the gradual emergence of normative consensus 
over time in light of practice and case-by-case decision-making).  Whatever the normative 
merits of these various lists of criteria, there is little chance that they will generate the 
consensus needed to be written into the UN Charter or some other generally applicable treaty 
or to give rise to the consistent practice among states with the requisite opinio juris to become 
customary international law.  The U.S. objects to stipulating the criteria for intervention in 
advance, preferring instead a more case-by-case approach, while Russia, China and India 
have opposed humanitarian intervention on more traditional sovereignty grounds.  Id. at 263-
264; WHEELER, supra note 162, at 280-281.  
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 The criteria suggested by Cassese, Farer and Stromseth would seem to prevent the U.S.-led 
coalition from relying on humanitarian intervention to justify the invasion of Iraq. However, 
application to Iraq also demonstrates that the standards are vague on key points and will give 
rise to disputes in future cases.  First, all peaceful means do not appear to have been 
exhausted, although there is some room for debate on that score.  Critics of the war argue that 
weapons inspectors should have been given more time to complete their investigation, and 
that Sadaam  Hussein was showing signs of flexibility.  Tony Blair has countered by arguing 
that Hussein has shown flexibility in the past as a matter of strategy, but that there was no 
realistic hope for significant progress without a U.N. resolution that gave Hussein an 
ultimatum, and France opposed such a resolution.  However, critics argue that the danger was 
the U.S. would take the U.N. resolution as authorizing immediate use of force without a 
further resolution from the U.N. should Hussein not be in full compliance with the resolution, 
as interpreted by the U.S.  Moreover, while the fear of an attack by weapons of mass 
destruction might have provided a degree of urgency had the allegations of WMD turned out 
to be grounded in fact rather than fantasy, there was no immediate need to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds.  Although the Hussein regime was guilty of gross rights violations in 
the past and arguably was likely to commit more violations in the future, there was no 
immediate humanitarian crisis at the time of intervention.  The U.S. and its allies had lived 
with Hussein for twenty years, and were prepared to continue to let him remain in power had 
he acquiesced on inspections.
  Third, the use of force was not for the limited purpose of addressing the humanitarian crisis but 
for regime change.  Supporters of the war would argue however that regime change was the 
only effective way to address the violations and provide Iraqi citizens the chance for a 
democratic future.  While in some cases, such as the crisis in the Sudan, it might be possible 
to intervene and put an end to a humanitarian crisis without regime change, in other situations 
regime change may be the only way to put an end to the violations, particularly when they are 
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post assessments are also likely to differ widely given the impossibility of answering the 
counterfactual question what would have happened if intervention had not occurred, assuming 
that some entity someday would be in a position to assess whether the intervention was legitimate 
humanitarian intervention or an illegal act of aggression.201  For now and the foreseeable future 
the lack of an authoritative entity to review and pass judgment on the decisions undermines the 
predictability and certainty that is central to rule of law and the requirement that laws be 
impartially applied.  Allowing states to determine for themselves when intervention is merited, 
subject only to the threat of possible censure and sanctions by the world community, suggests the 
possibility of anarchy rather than rule of law.  However, given the high costs of intervention, the 
risk to one’s own citizens, the possibility of getting bogged down in a major reconstruction effort 
with little chance of success and political pressure from the international community, a much 
more likely result is that only the strongest states will intervene.  Nevertheless, that result is also 
problematic from a rule of law perspective in that given limited resources and political will, 
strong states will intervene in an inconsistent and unprincipled way based on some mix of 
humanitarian concerns and self-interest.
the result of systematic and enduring state practices. See Mark Drumbl, supra note 195 (distinguishing between humanitarian intervention and democratic intervention). 
Fourth, while the U.S. was not without allies, even its allies presumably based their support 
primarily on the threat of mass destruction.  At minimum, it is safe to say that the majority of 
countries did not support invasion, much less regime change, on humanitarian grounds or to 
support democracy.  However, Bush and Blair argue that they were right and that Iraq is 
better off without Hussein, regardless of what others (including Iraqis) thought or think.  
More fundamentally, moral realists among others would argue that what is right cannot be 
determined by majority vote, while the most forward leaning rights activists might go so far 
as to argue that there is a deontic moral duty to rescue people subject to serious rights 
violations or to ensure that people are able to exercise their right to democracy and self-
determination.  Cf. Fernando R. Teson, The liberal case for humanitarian intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 162, at 93, 94, 95, n. 5 (arguing that there is a 
duty to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy if we can do so at a reasonable cost to ourselves, 
and claiming that intervention to restore democracy may be justified on the existence of 
regional norms).  Further, over time, opinions may change.  Thus, supporters would argue 
that it is too early even for consequentialists to draw any final judgments about whether the 
intervention was successful or merited, particularly given that views are likely to be heavily 
influenced in the short term by the inevitably messy process of rebuilding Iraq.  
Finally, critics of the war will note that the invasion was clearly not only out of concern for the 
rights of Iraqis.  However, supporters will counter that the fact that states intervene partially 
out of self-interest does not undermine the morality or legitimacy of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.  To be sure, third parties assessing the situation may discount the 
humanitarian concerns when there are significant economic or geopolitical issues at stake 
depending on their political views.  Many critics of the war find the increasing emphasis on 
humanitarian justifications in light of the failure to find WMD disingenuous at best given that 
Hussein’s regime was tolerated and even supported by Western powers for years and other 
dictators and tyrants of lesser geopolitical and economic importance continue to be tolerated.  
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 A 1999 poll in Greece found that 99.5% opposed the way, 85% believed NATO’s motivations 
were strategic rather than humanitarian, while 69% favored charging Clinton with war 
crimes.  Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our 
Case Against NATO and the Lessons to be Learned from It, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 95, 101 (2001). Whether intervention in Kosovo should be considered a success remains contested in 
light of the large outflows of refugees, the acceleration of ethnic cleansing and the deaths of 
Kosovar Albanians after bombing commenced, the deaths of civilians caused by NATO 
bombing, questions about the compatibility of the aerial campaign with the laws of war, 
reprisals against Serbs in the wake of the bombing, ongoing ethnic conflicts even today, the 
continued occupational presence of 20,000 foreign troops, daily assaults and murders and 
other problems in establishing law and order, rule of law, democracy and good governance.  
See Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law at 
www.osce.org/Kosovo/reports/justice/criminal_justice4_eng.pdf.  For a highly critical 
appraisal, see Marjorie Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS 
OF KOSOVO: THE DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121, 124 (2003).  For a more 
ambivalent appraisal, see WHEELER, supra note 162, at 275-284 (arguing that “the jury is still 
out on the long-term humanitarian consequences of the Kosovo intervention”).
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An alternative would be to require U.N. approval, perhaps amending the U.N. Charter to 
require less than unanimity on the part of the Security Council permanent members or a 
supermajority of the entire Security Council or some combination thereof. However, there would 
still be a significant danger that U.N. decisions to intervene would be heavily politicized and that 
the standards for intervention would be stretched as necessary to reach what appear to some to be 
morally compelling cases.202 Moreover, there would still be moral and political pressure on states 
to act outside the U.N. framework and intervene on humanitarian grounds when the U.N. fails to 
act, which is likely to be often given the large number of compelling cases for humanitarian 
intervention based on purely on moral concerns about horrific human suffering, the limited 
resources of the U.N. and political barriers even with a lower approval threshold for intervention.  
Accordingly, decisions to intervene on humanitarian grounds are likely to remain largely outside 
the framework of rule of law.203
The refusal to include crimes of aggression within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and, at least for the time being, the International 
Criminal Court, further demonstrates the extent to which war falls outside the parameters of rule 
of law.  In establishing the ICTY, the powers that be did not want to undermine the possibility of 
reaching a settlement with Milosevic, with whom they were negotiating at the time, by allowing 
or forcing the ICTY to decide who the aggressor was and which parties were responsible for the 
conflict.204   Nor do the U.S. and many other countries want the ICC determining who the 
aggressor is and which parties are responsible to what extent for future conflicts.205
Prevention or Mitigation of Abuses During War
202
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Lady Doth Protest Too Much, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159-75 (2002) (noting a general turn to ethics among international lawyers since the end of the Cold War 
that often involves "a shallow and dangerous moralisation, which, if generalized, transforms 
international law into an uncritical instrument for the foreign policy choices of those whom 
power and privilege has put into decision-making positions."). Humanitarian intervention 
raises the issue of whose moral compass should be determinative.  One year after the 
invasion, less than one-third of Iraqis felt there was any moral justification for the war, while 
39% felt there was no moral justification and an additional 13% felt the moral justification 
was less than adequate.  Almost half of Iraqis felt the invasion did more harm than good for 
the country as a whole, while only one-felt the opposite.  More people reported suffering 
from lack of electricity, clean water, medicine, food and safety after the invasion than under 
Hussein, although they enjoyed greater freedom of speech and religious practice and more 
than half felt that personally their family was better off now than before.  Accordingly, 
despite the hardships and lack of moral justification, some 60% of Iraqis believed the 
invasion was worth it personally. See Key findings: Nationwide survey of 3,500 Iraqis, USA 
TODAY, April 30, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-04-28-
gallup-iraq-findings.htm.
203 See Glennon, supra note 193 at 2 (“There is today, no coherent international law concerning 
intervention by states… The received rules of international law neither describe accurately 
what nations do, nor predict reliably what they will do, nor prescribe intelligently what they 
should do concerning intervention.  With respect to interventionism by individual states, legal 
restraint is illusory; it is…’a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense.’”).
204
 Paul R. Williams, The Role of Justice in Peace Negotiations, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, 
supra note 193, at 115-133.
205
 The drafters of the ICC could not decide on definition of crime of aggression.  The U.S. 
wanted decisions about aggression left to the Security Council.  The U.S. also opposed 
including a definition of aggression in the U.N. Charter. See Majorie M. Whiteman, DIG. OF 
INT’L L. §22, at 740. Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-defense, Inherence, and 
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 540, 
556-557 (2002) (“Under many of the definitions proposed over the years, wholly reasonable 
and justifiable actions undertaken by states in their own defense, such as the use of force by 
the United States in Afghanistan, could qualify as aggression.”).
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While determinations of crimes of aggression (jus ad bellum) remain largely outside an 
international rule of law framework, issues of how war is to be conducted (jus in bello) have 
increasingly become subject to international law.  The Geneva and Hague Conventions have been 
supplemented by a number of other conventions and an expanding body of customary 
international law that set limits on how war may be waged.
Such rules are not wholly without affect, although their effectiveness should not be 
overstated.  Some rules limiting certain weapons such as chemical weapons have generally been 
followed, rules regarding treatment of POWs have had a more mixed record of compliance, while 
rules protecting civilians have been more frequently ignored.206  There is some evidence that rule 
of law does reduce physical integrity violations, some of which would fall within the realm 
covered by international humanitarian law.207 Nevertheless, many of the countries with the worst 
human rights records are failed states, torn by ethnic conflict, and wholly lacking in the political 
will or institutional capacity to implement rule of law. Moreover, historically even countries 
known for rule of law have reacted to international war and domestic instability by cutting back 
on civil and political liberties and violating the laws of war.208
There are, from both thin and thick rule of law perspectives, a number of problems with 
this body of law and its implementation. There is something fundamentally odd if not 
206
 There are many different explanations as to why the rules are followed or not followed.  For a 
useful discussion of the strengths and limits of leading theories in explaining compliance and 
noncompliance with the laws of war, see William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of 
Compliance with the Laws of War, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=555894 (discussing realism, enforcement 
theory, liberalism, rational choice, institutionalism (managerialism, reputational theory, 
transnational legal process), and normativism (legitimacy theory, constructivism, 
organizational culture theory).  See also Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation 
of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 Harv. Int’l L.J. 49, 50 (1994) (arguing 
that laws are generally followed because they in fact impose no real restraints on military 
necessity; far from serving a humanitarian purpose by imposing meaningful limits on war, the 
laws have served to legitimate increasingly destructive methods of combat and facilitated 
rather than restrained wartime violence). 
207
 Clair Apodaca, supra note 104 (finding that rule of law can reduce the devastating effects of 
international or civil conflicts on human rights to a limited extent). Apodoca states: “For each 
unit increase in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi’s rule of law index, the PTS decreases by 
nearly 4/10 of a point (on a 5 point scale). The rule of law does decrease a government’s use 
of non-judicial execution, torture, forced disappearance, and arbitrary imprisonment. Where 
the rule of law and accountability prevail, citizens have the ability to oust potential abusive 
leaders or to seek judicial remedy for abuses.  Furthermore, with a high level in the rule of 
law, nongovernmental and international human rights organizations can flourish, thereby 
deterring leaders from undertaking repressive actions.  Finally, the rule of law promotes 
peaceful resolution of conflicts through bargaining, compromise and elections.”
208 See Keith, supra note 102; Keith & Poe, supra note 110; Diane Wood, The Rule of Law in 
Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 460 (2003) (noting that Lincoln suspended habeas 
corpus during Civil War, and Congress approved the suspension; 2200 people were 
prosecuted under Espionage and Sedition Acts, with more than 1000 convicted during WWI; 
the right of habeas corpus was suspended and martial law imposed in Hawaii after Pearl 
Harbor; during the McCarthy era, the Supreme Court in Am. Communications Ass’n. v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 3832, 288-89 (1950) permitted regulations requiring labor unions to sign an 
oath swearing they were not members of Communist Party and did not believe in the 
overthrow of the United States, and in Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) rejected “any 
principle of government helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which 
principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy”).  See also Tom Bingham, 
Personal Freedom and the Dilemma of Democracies, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 841 (2003) (England suspended habeas corpus fifteen times between 1688 and 1848, including for those 
charged with treason; in 1914, the U.K. detained 30,000 enemy aliens based on prerogative 
power requiring no legislation, and again detained some 30,000 during WWII; the legislation 
was also used against Irish and was not contested in parliament or by the public; in British 
India the emergency power of detention was a regular part of the legal system; in 1954 the 
U.K. used emergency powers to derogate civil and political rights in Malaya, Singapore, 
Kenya, and British Guiana). 
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oxymoronic about humanitarian laws of war.  One goes to war to defend one’s way of life and all 
that one holds most dear, and to do so by killing others.209  However, one is only supposed to kill 
others in a civil way.  But why is it more humane, for example, to drop cluster bombs from 
15,000 feet than to use chemical weapons?   And even allowing that there is something terribly 
wrong about relying on civilians as human shields, what is particularly noble or humane about 
sacrificing one’s own life by fighting an invading force with advanced weaponry in the open or in 
conventional ways?  Why should the weaker side agree to fight by rules made by the stronger 
side, especially when the stronger side routinely violates the rules when doing so is to its 
advantage, and then claims that the rules have changed based on acceptance of its behavior by its 
allies? The U.S. treatment of prisoners in Iraq is only the most recent in a long list of violations of 
the law of war by Western states.  The Allied fire-bombing of German cities, the refusal of 
British and U.S. navies to rescue Germans left stranded in the water after their ships were hit, and 
French executions of German soldiers in reprisal for killings of French insurgents all violated the 
existing laws of war.210  In Vietnam, apart from using Agent Orange and napalm-bombing, the 
U.S. systematically tortured and abused POWs and civilians.211  Meanwhile, defenders of the U.S. 
war on terror now argue that the laws of war have changed both with respect to jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello based on the “new” threat from terrorism and international approval or tolerance of 
U.S. actions.212
An evolution in the political rationale behind the laws of war has also led to 
inconsistencies in the nature of humanitarian law.  The earlier Hague rules sought to establish 
some ground rules between roughly equal states involving battles between lawful combatants.  As 
such, they only applied to “civilized” (Christian) peoples: the British did not apply the laws of 
war to conflicts with Zulus.213  In contrast, the additional protocols of the Geneva Conventions 
209
 Walzer offers  a number of arguments against the theory of total war and the realist view that 
law and morality are silent or powerless when it comes to war.  As he notes, not all wars 
involve a battle for one’s way of life.  Not all ways of lives are worth dying for, and even if 
they are, not all struggles to maintain one’s way of life need to be resolved through war.  
Moreover, most if not all people talk about war in moral terms and recognize some limits to 
war.  However, he also acknowledges the possibility that even innocents might have to be 
killed to save the world or one’s way of life in some circumstances.  See MICHAEL WALZER, 
JUST AND UNJUST WARS 253, 323 (2000). As for the fact that most people at least in times of 
peace advocate moral limits to war, hardened realists point out that many of the same people 
change their views when confronted with actual threats.  More importantly from the 
perspective of rule of law, there is a large gap between moral views about war as codified in 
existing laws and actual practice.  This has always been the case, and remains so today.  See
Jochnick & Normand, supra note 206, at 55 (“The history of war, however, reveals that the 
development of a more elaborate legal regime has proceeded apace with the increasing 
savagery and destructiveness of modern war.”).
210 See generally, id. See also A.J. COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR (1997).  Despite morally
righteous denunciations of bombardments of civilians and pre-war promises to avoid such 
atrocities, Britian, France, Germany and the U.S. all eventually engaged in terror bombing of 
civilian populations in cities for the purpose of undermining morale.  Jochnick & Normand, 
supra note 206, at 85-89.  Nevertheless, no one was prosecuted for such bombing at 
Nuremburg because according to the Chief Procesutor for the U.S., the aerial bombardment 
of cities and factors had become a recognized part of modern warfare and justified by military 
necessity.  Indeed, the Nuremburg Tribunal only ruled out wanton killing for the sheer 
enjoyment of killing or for revenge.   Id. at 92-93.
211 TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBURG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 123-153(1970).  
See also Edward Herman, Genocide As Collateral Damage, But With Sincere Regrets, Nov. 
9, 2001, available at http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/Content/2001-11/09herman.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2004); Edward Herman, Lessons of the Vietnam War: Parts 1 and 2, 
available at http://www.nnn.se/levande/lessons1.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2004).
212 See infra section VI.
213
 Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to the ICC 
Debate, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 169, 175 (2003).
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sought to address asymmetrical power by extending protection to “people’s fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes.”214  The change has resulted 
in considerable confusion, and highly politicized interpretations, of who is entitled to what 
protections under humanitarian laws of war.  At one extreme, the Bush administration has tried to 
deny virtually all rights to unlawful combatants, while human rights groups and most 
international law scholars argue that even unlawful combatants who violate the laws of war are 
entitled to certain protections.215
To be sure, many people find it hard to accept that unlawful combatants who engage in 
war crimes or who kill American occupational forces sent to liberate Iraq should benefit from the 
protections of the humanitarian laws of war.  One might think that the torture of Iraqis detainees 
in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere would have demonstrated once and for all the need to ensure that 
even unlawful combatants and insurgents battling occupational forces be afforded certain 
protections. On the other hand, despite all of the moral indignation over the horrific images, the 
fact remains that torture remains a common weapon of governments faced with extreme security 
challenges.216  Moreover, government officials, citizens and academics are increasingly arguing 
that torture and other physical integrity violations are justified.  For instance, Amnesty 
International has claimed massive human rights violations in Nepal by both the military and 
Maoist guerrillas, including the killing and kidnapping of civilians, torture of prisoners, and 
destruction of property.217  In defense of the government’s suspension of constitutional freedoms 
and harsh actions, Nepal’s Prime Minister declared: “You can’t make an omelette without 
breaking eggs.  We don’t want human rights abuses but we are fighting terrorists and we have to 
be tough.”218   Ultimately, how much protection is provided depends on the severity of the 
threat.219
Deep conflicts over the nature, purpose and justifiability of humanitarian laws of war 
give rise to different thick conceptions of a humanitarian rule of law. Should unlawful combatants 
be entitled to protections and if so which ones?  Should torture be allowed in some circumstances, 
and if so, under what circumstances?220  Should the executive be able to derogate from civil and 
214
  Protocol I, art. 1.
215
 Laura Dickinson, supra note 19; Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: 
Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military 
Commissions: Postscript Concerning The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 677 (2002).
216 See Todd Landman, supra note 175 (noting that according to Amnesty International the 
majority of countries continue to engage in torture, with 57% of states committing acts of 
torture against citizens in 2002 as compared to 58% in 1990). See also David Reilly, supra 
note 127. 
217
 Daniel Lak, Kingdom on the Brink of Catastrophe, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 12, 2002, 
at 7.
218 See id.
219
 As Alexander Hamilton noted, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of 
national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. 
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the continual effort and alarm 
attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to 
resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and 
political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become willing to run the risk of being less 
free." THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
220 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING 
TO THE CHALLENGE (2002).  See also OREN GROSS, THE PROHIBITION ON TORTURE AND 
THE LIMITS OF LAW, IN TORTURE (Stanford Levinson ed., 2004) (arguing against passing 
laws that carve out exceptions for torture in times of crisis.  Rather, in truly exceptional 
circumstances government officials might have to engage in civil disobedience: they might 
have to step outside the legal framework, authorize torture, and then accept the legal 
ramifications of their actions.  Such ramifications might be expulsion from office or criminal 
52 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
political rights in times of emergency, and if so should the decision be subject to legislative or 
judicial review?  As discussed above, these issues cannot be resolved by appealing to the 
requirements of a thin rule of law.  Rather they will turn on differences in normative and political 
beliefs that underlie different thick conceptions of rule of law. 
The laws of war are equally problematic from a thin rule of law perspective. A thin rule 
of law requires that rules be reasonably clear.  However, international humanitarian law is 
remarkably unclear in many crucial areas.  Frequently, it consists of nothing more than general 
principles, often with an idealistic and - considering the context - surreal quality.  Consider for 
instance the principles of proportionality and military necessity. Even the most basic issue of 
proportional to what remains unclear.  Are U.S. actions in the war on terror supposed to be 
proportional to past terrorist acts or possible future threats?  Is proportionality to be justified 
based on the ability to deter future terrorist acts?  If so, then a use of force wholly 
disproportionate to the original attacks might be justified as necessary to strike sufficient fear into 
would- be terrorists. 
A group of renowned scholars found that NATO had committed “relatively minor” 
breaches of international humanitarian law that were reasonable interpretations of the concept of 
“military necessity” in Kosovo.221  But was it really necessary or justifiable to take out basic 
civilian structures including bridges, telecommunications facilities and power stations?222 Even if 
necessary, NATO’s decision to bomb from higher than 15,000 feet up hardly seems to meet the 
proportionality requirement given that there were no casualties among NATO forces but more 
than 500 Serbian and Kosovar civilians were killed and an additional 6000 wounded.223  The 
Independent International Commission admitted that some of NATO’s decisions to attack dual 
use targets were “questionable under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I,” but then let NATO 
off the hook by pointing out in effect that breaches were the norm in practice and thus apparently 
sanctions, but could also be that prosecutors exercise discretion and decide not to prosecute, 
“runaway juries” acquit or the authorities issue a pardon. Gross claims that “[g]oing 
completely outside the rule of law in appropriate cases preserves, rather than undermines, the 
rule of law in a way that bending the law for catastrophes does not.”  In contrast, allowing 
torture as a matter of law in certain circumstances may lead to abuse in times of crisis 
because the provisions may be stretched to reach circumstances not originally intended).  
Overextending narrow exceptions for torture would constitute a violation of thin rule of law 
criteria.  However, civil disobedience, runaway juries and the possibility of politically 
motivated decisions not to prosecute or to issue pardons are also problematic from a thin rule 
of law perspective.  In the end, the values of a thin rule of law may be less important than 
substantive concerns about which approach is likely to result in the right amount of torture 
and security.  Prohibiting laws that carve out exceptions may be preferable because they lead
to a more justifiable amount of torture even though the prohibition may do more violence to 
rule of law principles.  A thin rule of law does not guarantee just outcomes, and the values 
served by a thin the rule of law may at times need to give way to other socially important 
values such as avoiding excessive torture. 
221
 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 288-89, 183-84 (2000). 
Both the Kosovo Report and a report by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee concluded that the intervention by NATO itself breached international law but 
was morally justified.
222 See Henry Shue and David Whippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities Performing 
Indispensable Civil Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 559 (2002). 
223 See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 1, at 
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm. (rejecting the duress defense in the 
Erdomevic case, the majority reasoned that soldiers in essence assumed the risk and should 
be held to a higher standard than civilians.  Thus poor Erdemovic, about to be killed unless he 
killed others, was required to sacrifice his life rather than kill civilians.  However, whereas 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber expected Erdemovic to be a superhero, U.S. soldiers are allowed 
to avert any risk to themselves by bombing from 15,000 feet, in the process killing many 
more innocent civilians than did Erdemovic). 
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justified or at least excusable: “State practice in wartime since World War II has consistently 
selected targets on the basis of an open-ended approach to ‘military necessity,’ rather than by 
observing the customary and conventional norm that disallows deliberate attacks on non-military 
targets.”224   The Commission noted the “NATO campaign was more careful, in relation to 
targeting, than was any previous occasion of major warfare conducted from the air.” 225
Apparently violations of law that are less flagrant than the normal exceedingly egregious type are 
to be considered “minor breaches,” regardless of the number of lives lost.  The curious result 
from a rule of law perspective is that rather than the simple determination of legality or illegality, 
there is a gray area of semi-illegal, at least for the victors.226
In the end, broad principles such as proportionality and military necessity provide 
precious little guidance in deciding the legality of dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, napalming Vietnam or carpet-bombing Cambodia, and are easily manipulated to justify 
whatever conclusion happens to satisfy one’s political position. 
It is true that laws are often unclear.  But the vagueness of humanitarian law is 
particularly problematic given the decentralized nature of international law.  A wide variety of 
bodies are charged with interpreting these laws and their domestic counterparts, including the 
I.C.J., U.N. bodies, international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and 
domestic courts claiming universal jurisdiction over serious crimes such as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. These bodies do not share a common method or culture of legal 
interpretation.  Some of them are heavily politicized.  They may issue final judgments that the 
states and individuals affected have no further legal channels to challenge.227  Given the highly 
political and emotionally charged nature of the issues involved, these exceedingly vague concepts 
are likely to result in outcomes determined more by power politics and contested normative views 
than legal considerations in many cases.
The dangers are most evident in trials in domestic courts under principles of universal 
jurisdiction. 228   Rights organizations initially praised Belgium for adopting a universal 
jurisdiction law that allowed Belgium courts to try persons accused of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in absentia even when there was no link between Belgium and alleged 
perpetrator of the crime, the victims of the crime or the criminal act.  The law was used to bring a 
wide range of cases against then President Saddam Hussein, the late Congolese ruler Laurant 
Kabila and his foreign minister, the Rwandan president and former Iranian president, Israeli 
224
 Kosovo report, supra note 221.  
225 See id.
226
 The approach of the Commission contrasts dramatically with the moral absolutism and deontic 
approach of the ICTY and ICTR in dealing with less reputable defendants where even a 
single act of torture or rape or murder may constitute a violation of the laws of war or an 
international crime.  But then the whole notion of proportionality fits more comfortably with 
a utilitarian or consequentialist approach than a deontological approach that places seemingly 
infinite value on a single life in treating some individual rights as trumps.
227
 On the other hand, domestic courts in third countries would not have to accept the results of 
decisions not to prosecute by a country involved in a conflict.  The Kahan Commission found 
that Sharon was not criminally responsible for the massacres at the refugee camps on Sabra 
and Shatila after a lengthy investigation, and yet the Belgium courts refused to dismiss the 
case.  The ICC also has the authority to disregard domestic decisions not to prosecute.  See 
infra note 281.
228
 Application of international war crimes law or its counterpart in domestic legislation by 
domestic courts trying their own citizens, military personnel or government officials for war 
crimes also presents problems of bias and excessive politicisation. See, e.g. Vivian Grosswald 
Curran, Politicizing the Crime against Humanity: The French Example, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 677 (2003) (discussing the role of politics and ideology in France’s treatment of crimes 
committed by the Vichy government and in Algeria).  On the problems of domestic courts 
applying the laws of war in the context of transitional justice, see infra notes 334-347.
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Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Yassar Arafat, Fidel Castro, former Guatemalan generals, oil 
companies accused of collaborating with military rulers in Burma, and the BBC for allegedly 
seeking to assassinate a British citizen.229  The experiment ended when actions were brought 
against former President George H.W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf for acts in the 1991 Gulf War and against 
General Tommy Franks and other U.S. military officers in regard to the present Iraqi war.230
Under pressure from the U.S., including the threat to relocate NATO headquarters, Belgium 
amended the law to provide jurisdiction only where the alleged perpetrator or the victim was a 
Belgian national or resident, and to funnel all suits through the federal prosecutor whose decision 
whether to prosecute will be final.231
The expansion of crimes of universal jurisdiction including crimes against humanity and 
war crimes raises the possibility of victims of U.S. military actions holding U.S. officials or 
military personnel criminally accountable for violations of vague humanitarian laws of war in 
heavily politicized domestic courts, or of Palestinians pursuing Israeli officials for crimes against 
humanity or war crimes in the courts of sympathetic countries that have in the past themselves 
been at war with Israel.  Whatever one thinks of the substantive merits of such claims, such cases 
highlight the thin rule of law requirement that laws be applied impartially and call attention to the 
important albeit sometimes faint line between law and politics.232
The vagueness and undeveloped state of international laws of war highlight another thin 
rule of law concern that has plagued the international rights movement since Nuremberg: the 
retroactivity of laws.  The requirement that laws generally be prospective enhances predictability 
and fairness. Although the predictability of law is often considered especially valuable for 
business people, the prospectivity of law is equally if not more important in the criminal context, 
as captured in the notion of no crime without penalty (nullum crimen sine lege).  The arguments 
against retroactive criminal laws take on even greater weight in the context of international law, 
where the specter of victor’s justice is so often close at hand.
Recognizing this, the Report of the Secretary General that provided the foundation for the 
establishment of the ICTY declared that the tribunal would only follow clear international 
laws.233  Yet the rules followed by the ICTY were far from clear.  Several of the tribunal’s 
decisions were based at least in part on customary international law (CIL).  However, the very 
notion of what constitutes CIL is now much contested.  According to the influential Restatement 
3rd of Foreign Relations Law, customary international law results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation. 234   In recent years, these 
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 Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its Global Reach, WASHINGTON POST 
FOREIGN SERVICE, Sept. 30, 2003, at A1.
230
 Malvina Halberstam, Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Law: Vindication of International 
Justice or the Pursuit of Politics?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2003).
231 See id., at 261, 264.
232
 Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 337, 338 (2001) (“there is the real risk of prosecutions that are politically 
motivated; that are carried out without due process; that apply law that exceeds what is 
universally accepted as established international law; or that are undertaken without sufficient 
political control to avoid dire consequences on the international plane.”).
233 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant To Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), Presented May 3, 1993, (S/25704), para. 34:  “In the view of the Secretary-
General, the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the 
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond 
any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States 
to specific conventions does not arise. This would appear to be particularly important in the 
context of an international tribunal prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.” 
234
 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., § 102.
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requirements have been significantly watered down.  No longer is the practice of the state 
primarily determined by reference to the state’s actual behavior.  Rather, state practice may now 
be based on verbal statements and symbolic or legal acts such as the ratification of treaties or 
voting in favor of a particular resolution or declaration.235  Thus, official government statements 
condemning torture are evidence of state practice, even though the states that issue such 
statements may in fact continue to engage in torture.236  Similarly, the test for a general and 
consistent practice is now much less stringent, as evidenced by the ICTY cases in which the 
tribunal noted extensive differences in state practice and yet somehow managed to extract a clear 
rule of international law.237
In Erdemovic, which raised the issue of duress as a defense, the Appeals Chamber noted 
that states varied widely on the issue.238  In general, civil law countries tend to treat duress as a 
complete defense, whereas in some common law countries duress may be a complete defense, in 
others it may be a complete defense except with respect to first-degree murder, rape and some 
other crimes, and in still others duress is only a mitigating factor.239  Yet the Appeals Chamber 
then opted for an unfavorable interpretation from the defendant’s perspective, holding duress was 
not a complete defense but only a mitigating factor.240
In reaching their decision, some judges drew on particular philosophical justifications 
that implicate different thick conceptions of rule of law, specifically rejecting a utilitarian 
approach.241 They also drew on contested policy considerations, including the desire to “facilitate 
235
 Reading some of the more forward-leaning claims about what constitutes customary 
international law found in the reports of human rights organizations and law reviews would 
lead one to believe that the noble intentions expressed in the writings of legal scholars and 
activists alone would be sufficient to create a new customary international law: simply 
repeating that some aspirational goal is a right would make it so by transforming it into 
customary international law.  But cf. United States v. Ramzi Yousef et al. 98-101 et. Seq., 
slip. Op. at 6627 (2nd Cir., April 4, 2003). (“Some contemporary international law scholars 
assert that they themselves are an authentic source of customary international law, perhaps 
even more relevant than the practices and acts of States…. This notion that professors of 
international law enjoy a special competence to prescribe the nature of customary 
international law wholly unmoored from legitimating territorial or national responsibilities, 
the interests and practices of States, or (in countries such as ours) the processes of democratic 
consent – may not be unique, but it [is] certainly without merit.”).
236 See Todd Landman, supra note 175 (noting more than half of countries continue to commit 
torture today).
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 It is not always clear whether the tribunal is engaging in statutory interpretation and using state 
practice and CIL as references for interpretation purposes or whether the tribunal is basing its 
holding directly on CIL.  However, disputes over statutory interpretation of treaty law, 
including the ICTY statute and rules, raise similar issues about retroactivity and whether 
rulings based on contested interpretations meet the requirement of applying only clear 
international law.  
238
 Appeals Chamber Judgment, Prosecutor v. Drazin Erdemovic, IT-96-22, Judgment, 7 October 
1997, para. 19; Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, paras. 48-50, 
59-66, 72.
239 Id.
240
 Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, 17 July 
1998, art. 22, which would require that the court in the case of ambiguity, the definition of a 
crime “shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted.”
241
 McDonald and Vohrah state in their opinion: 
[A]s we have confined the scope of our inquiry to the question whether duress affords a 
complete defense to a soldier charged with killing innocent persons, we are of the view 
that soldiers or combatants are expected to exercise fortitude and a greater degree of 
resistance to a threat than civilians, at least when it is their own lives which are being 
threatened. Soldiers, by the very nature of their occupation, must have envisaged the 
possibility of violent death in pursuance of the cause for which they fight. The relevant 
question must therefore be framed in terms of what may be expected from the ordinary 
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the development and effectiveness of international humanitarian law and to promote its aims and 
application by recognizing the normative effect which criminal law should have upon those 
subject to them.”242  However, it is not clear, particularly given the judges opposition to utilitarian 
reasoning and the requirement to apply only clear international law at the time, why the interests 
of the individual defendant in this case should be sacrificed to produce a better law for future 
cases.  In dissenting, Cassese rejected such considerations: “[T]he majority of the Appeals 
Chamber has embarked upon a detailed investigation of ‘practical policy considerations’ and has 
concluded by upholding ‘policy considerations’ substantially based on English law. I submit that 
this examination is extraneous to the task of our Tribunal.”243
The fact that judges on the same ICTY panel often disagreed about state practices or 
whether a particular rule constituted CIL is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of clear and 
consistent practice to constitute CIL and the ICTY’s mandate to only follow clear international 
law.244  Indeed, as in Erdemovic, the opinions of the tribunal often document at great length the 
lack of any clear practice among states.  In some cases, the tribunal attempted to avoid the 
problem by relying on general principles of law rather than CIL.245  The Trial Chamber in 
Furundzija noted that states define rape in different ways, and in particular that they differ over 
whether forced oral sex constitutes rape or the lesser offense of sexual assault.246  Nevertheless, 
the Chamber then found that forced oral sex does constitute rape based on general principles of 
international law.  But appealing to even less determinate general principles of international law 
cannot meet the ICTY mandate to apply only clear international law.  The panel attempted to 
soldier in the situation of the Appellant. What is to be expected of such an ordinary 
soldier is not, by our approach, analyzed in terms of a utilitarian approach involving the 
weighing up of harms. Rather, it is based on the proposition that it is unacceptable to 
allow a trained fighter, whose job necessarily entails the occupational hazard of dying, to 
avail himself of a complete defense to a crime in which he killed one or more innocent 
persons.  
Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 84. 
242 Id., para. 75.
243
 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 11.
244
 Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International 
Crimes, 151 U PENN L. REV. 1, 89 (2002) (noting ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed the trial 
panel’s ruling in full in only one out of seven cases).  For instance, the Appeals Chamber 
overruled the tribunal of first instance in Tadic on the issue of the proper test for determining 
when there is state control over subordinate armed forces or militias. The Appeals Chamber 
rejected the Trial Chamber’s “effective control” test established by the International Court of 
Justice in Nicaragua case in favor a somewhat less stringent “overall control” standard.  The 
Appeals Chamber justified the deviation from existing international standards on policy 
grounds: “To the extent that [the overall control standard] provides for greater protection of 
civilian victims of armed conflicts, this different and less rigorous standard is wholly 
consistent with the fundamental purpose of Geneva Convention IV, which is to ensure 
‘protection of civilians to the maximum extent possible.’”  Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v.  
Zlatko Aleskovski, IT-95-14/1, Judgment 24 March 2000, para. 146.  The Aleskovski Trial 
Chamber however applied a “specific instruction” standard that was closer to the “effective 
control” standard than the “overall control” standard.  The Appeals Chamber overruled, 
citing, ironically, rule of law considerations: “It is necessary to stress that the normal rule is 
that previous decisions are to be followed, and departure from them is the exception.” Id. at 
para. 109.  However, the Appeals Chamber took care to leave itself adequate room to forego 
the rule of law principles of certainty and predictability to achieve other values: “in the 
interests of certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous 
decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.”  Id. at para. 107.
245 See the Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, paras. 56-57. 
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 Trial Chamber Judgment, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 10 December 
1998, paras. 180, 182.
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justify its decision by arguing that forced oral sex constitutes an offense to human dignity.247
While this is surely true, not all offenses to human dignity, or even all sexual offenses to human 
dignity, constitute rape in many legal systems much less violations of general principles of 
international law.  Many serious offenses to human dignity are not illegal, and surely do not rise 
to the level of violations of general principles of international law.  Ignoring the pleas of a 
starving child as you enter Starbucks to buy a double mocha latte is a serious affront to human 
dignity.  But that type of day-to-day indifference to the plight of others is not illegal.248 Human 
dignity is a vague notion.249 General principles of international law cannot just boil down to 
whatever the tribunal believes constitutes a serious offense to human dignity.
Some of the other previously unsettled issues that were resolved by the tribunals include 
the U.N.’s authority to create a tribunal under Chapter 7 when the conflict is not international; 
whether crimes against humanity may be based on persecution; whether state involvement is 
necessary for crimes against humanity; and whether common article 3 is part of customary 
international law.250 Apparently unaware of the requirement that only clear international law be 
applied, many rights advocates have praised the ICTY for developing and advancing international 
humanitarian law without attempting to address the issues of retroactivity and the consistency of 
these practices with the ICTY statute or the requirements of a thin rule of law.  Similar issues 
arise with respect to other international tribunals as well as domestic courts that base their 
decision on CIL or treaties interpreted in a purposive and evolutionary fashion.  To be sure, all 
law whether international or domestic evolves, and international as well as domestic courts may 
adopt a purposive approach.251  Nor is every retroactive application of law illegal or morally 
247 Id. at para. 183. The tribunal attempts to counter charges of retroactivity by arguing that under 
the rules of the ICTY the punishment is the same for rape or the lesser offense of sexual 
assault when the latter constitutes a war crime. The tribunal notes that the stigma attached to 
being convicted of rape as opposed to sexual assault may be greater, but dismisses this 
concern as a “product of questionable attitudes.” Id. at para. 184. However, the tribunal then 
nonchalantly adds that in any event, “any such concern is amply outweighed by the 
fundamental principle of protecting human dignity, a principle which favours broadening the 
definition of rape.”  Id. But in allowing that the definition of rape is being broadened, even if 
for good moral reasons, the tribunal concedes that the law is being created on the spot and 
applied retroactively, and thus that it is acting beyond the scope of its authority as set forth in 
the statute. Whether or not one agrees with the reasoning and the normative judgment of the 
tribunal, the tribunal’s holding remains difficult to reconcile with the ICTY mandate to apply 
only clear international law existing at the time the offenses occurred.
248
 Clearly there are ways of distinguishing forced oral sex from refusing to aid a starving child, 
which may justify the former being prohibited as general principle of international law and 
the latter not.  The point however is that what distinguishes them and justifies one being a 
general principle and the other not so treated is not whether the act affronts human dignity.
249 See Jeremy Rabkin, What Can We Learn about Human Dignity from International Law, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145 (2003) (arguing that the “contemporary ideas about the role of 
international law are grounded on a very misplaced notion of what human dignity is”).
250 See Terree Bowers, Keynote: Process and Function of the International Criminal Court, 8 J. 
OF INT’L L. & AFF. 3 (2004) (describing and evolution of law at the ICTY and ICTR, and 
noting that the tribunals have been making daily and weekly decisions that constitute “an 
indigenous body of law that is very active and developing”).
251
 One might argue that the inability to agree on an accepted philosophical justification for rights 
and the need to apply international laws in contexts where parties may hold different 
philosophical and normative views suggests that courts applying international should not base 
interpretations on contested philosophical or normative views.  Rather they should attempt to 
interpret the laws in a way that would create an overlapping consensus.  While perhaps good 
advice in general, there is no overlapping consensus on many issues because of differences in 
deep commitments.  In some cases, the only justification for a decision will be a normatively 
contested one.  
Nevertheless, concerns for retroactive punishment might justify adopting an interpretation that is 
most favorable to the defendant, as contemplated in the Rome Statute for the ICC.  Now that 
the ICC has been established, judges and others unhappy with the current state of law could 
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blameworthy.252 However, the ICTY was expressly required to apply only clear international law.  
More generally, international law differs in that CIL is supposed to be based on clear and 
consistent general state practices, and also in the potential for abuse when non-elected 
international bodies or domestic courts with a political axe to grind are charged with making the 
decisions in often highly politicized contexts.
The elements of a thin rule of law are to a large extent tied to notions of procedural rather 
than substantive justice.  However, the ICTY and ICTR developed many of their procedural rules 
on the fly, as it were.253 The tribunals were given greater leeway to invent procedural rules as 
needed.  Article 15 of the ICTY Statute provides that “[t]he judges of the International Tribunal 
shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the 
proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of witnesses and other 
appropriate matters.”254   While providing a sounder legal basis for rulemaking by the tribunal, 
the provision nevertheless fails to satisfy the basic rule of law requirement that rules should be 
prospective.  Critics of the provision have objected that the tribunal is both making the rules and 
applying them, and then where necessary amending them, violating principles of separation of 
powers, undermining predictability and certainty, and creating the possibility of partiality and 
arbitrariness.255
A number of procedural justice issues arose along the way that highlighted the thin rule 
of law value of a fair trial. The lengthy detention before trial led to concerns about arbitrary 
detention and violations of the right to a speedy trial.256  Some defendants were in custody for 
push for amendments in the way crimes and defenses are defined in the Rome Statute, rather 
than attempting to rewrite humanitarian rule of law through retroactive judicial 
decisionmaking.  To be sure, the cumbersome treaty process and the absence of an effective 
international legislature make judicial activism more tempting for judges seeking to develop 
international humanitarian law in accordance with their normative preferences and views 
about the merits on policy issues.
On the general issue of treaty interpretation and the conflicting views of classicists or textualists 
and those who favor a purposive or evolutionary approach, compare Franck, supra note 196 (arguing for a dynamic, evolutionary approach), with Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, 
Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of 
international law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 162, at 177 (raising a 
number of objections to the purposive approach and to the changing criteria for establishing 
customary international law).
252
 Thin theories of rule of law also give rise to normative issues of the kind that tend to separate 
advocates of different thick conceptions of rule of law. However, thin theories reduce the 
range of issues where such substantive values will be relevant and hence the scope of possible 
conflict. For instance, in what circumstances laws may be imposed retroactively will turn in 
part on one’s deeper normative commitments. Stephen Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive 
Legislation, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 425 (1982).  Thus, one can debate whether the tribunals were justified in any particular instance in putting normative considerations ahead of concerns for 
the niceties of a thin rule of law.
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 For the rules and their various updates and amendments, see Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm. 
254 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 
1993, by Resolution 827, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm.
255 See Scott Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 111 (1998); John 
Laughland, The Anomalies of the International Criminal Tribunal are Legion This is not 
Victor’s Justice in the Former Yugoslavia – in Fact it is No Justice at All ", LONDON TIMES 
June 27, 1999, at 24 (ICTY is a “rogue court with rigged rules”); Megan Fairlie, Rulemaking from the Bench: A Place for Minimalism at the ICTY, 39 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 257 (2004).
256
 The Rwandan government threatened not to cooperate with the ICTR when the Appeals 
Chamber ordered the release of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza on the ground that prolonged 
detention violated his rights.  In reaching its decision, the Appeals Chamber dramatically 
declared in typical morally righteous language: “Nothing less than the integrity of the 
Tribunal is at stake in this case.  Loss of public confidence in the Tribunal as a court of 
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months before they obtained access to lawyer.257  Defendants have also been unable to secure the 
attendance of defense witnesses.258 In some cases, the witnesses may be reluctant to testify out of 
safety concerns. In other cases, potentially key witnesses such as former government leaders may 
be prevented from giving testimony based on national security exemptions.259   To be sure, 
international tribunals operate under difficult conditions, and raise many complicated issues of 
law that take time to research.  Trials are often located far from the place where the conflict 
occurred and witnesses reside, need to rely on the cooperation of sometimes hostile states to 
provide witnesses and are hard-pressed to provide effective witness protection programs to 
prevent retaliation against witnesses.  Moreover, both the ICTY and ICTR were underfunded, and 
lacked the resources to pursue all of the cases in an expeditious way.  Nevertheless, the utility of 
the international tribunals as a model for demonstrating the value of rule of law to countries 
around the world is surely diminished when they fall far short of rule of law standards required of 
domestic legal systems.
While these sorts of procedural issues raise questions about the fairness of the 
proceedings, they pale in comparison to the more fundamental criticism that the proceedings are 
simply victor’s justice. Although the ICTY and ICTR are not as obviously the political tool of the 
states that created them as was the case in Nuremburg and for the Tokyo trials, the reality is that 
the tribunals are still supported by, and thus accountable to, the states that must approve their 
establishment and cooperate with them if they are to be successful.260  Critics initially questioned 
to what extent Western powers were committed to tribunals given the lack of adequate funding, 
claiming that tribunals were just a way of placating the pangs of conscience among citizens in 
valuing human rights of all individuals – including those charged with unthinkable crimes –
would be among the most serious consequences of allow [the defendant] to stand trial in the 
face of such violations of his rights.”  Dec., The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, No. ICTR-97-
19, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 3, 1999, ¶ 113.
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte promised the Rwandan government that she would do 
everything in her power to convince the appeals chamber to change its decision.  Eventually, 
AC reversed its decision, citing new facts provided by the prosecutor. Jacob Katz Cogan, 
International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L 
L.111, 135 (2002) (noting that while the judges denied being coerced into changing their 
decision, the Rwandan government threats likely played a role). Robert Kushen and Kenneth 
Harris, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501 (1996). 
257 See Sherrir L. Russel-Brown, Poisoned Chalice?: The Rights of Criminal Defendants Under 
International Law, During The Pretrial Phase, 8 UCLA J.INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 127 (2003) (noting ICTR defendant was arrested without a warrant based for being in home of 
another person detained based on “reasonable suspicion” even though the prosecutor did not 
appear to have any such information at the time of detention; defendant was detained for 
three months without being charged; he was informed of his charges in a language he did not 
understand; and he was not provided a lawyer for five months.). 
258 See Appeals Chamber Judgment, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, Judgment 15 July 1999, 
para 52 (noting that the principle of equality of arms must be given a more liberal 
interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to proceedings before domestic courts, 
the Appeals Chamber dismissed Tadic’s arguments that the inability to call witnesses 
deprived him of the right to a fair trial).
259 See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 54bis. Claiming to have been illegally 
kidnapped by bounty hunters, Stevan Todorovic filed a motion for judicial assistance to 
obtain documents and testimony from the multinational stabilization force in Bosnia, NATO 
and other states operating in Bosnia.  The Trial Chamber issued a subpoena to U.S. General 
Eric Shinseki to testify in regard to the arrest.   The Prosecutor, and several states including 
the U.S., Denmark, Canada and the U.K. filed a request for review of the decision.   The U.S. 
asserted that Shinseki’s testimony would prejudice compelling operation security concerns 
and warned ominously that the decision would affect U.S. cooperation with the tribunal.  See
Cogan, supra note 156, at 124.
260 See, e.g., RICHARD MINEAR, VICTOR’S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971).
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Western states.261  Once established, however, the prosecutors were under pressure to indict 
quickly, which led to the indictment of several “small fry” when prosecutors at the ICTY could 
not get their hands on the “big fish”.  Prosecutors were also under pressure to avoid the 
perception of bias and victor’s justice by indicting parties from both sides of the conflict.262  As a 
result, some Muslims were arrested after critics complained about the failure to indict any 
Muslims in the first fifty indictments.263 On the other hand, Bosnian Croats argue that they are 
over-represented as perpetrators and under-represented as victims, 264  while Serbs almost 
universally see the tribunal as anti-Serbian.265 In Rwanda, many Hutus, who contain to protest 
their innocence, claim that too few Tutsis have been convicted;266 in Sierra Leone, the RUF 
complains, with considerable merit, that it is being unfairly singled out even though the 
Kamajors, Civil Defense Forces and the Nigerian peacekeeping forces all committed war 
crimes.267
Although the judges may have no stake in the outcome of the ethnic conflicts per se, 
many of the judges who heard the cases had a long commitment to the development of 
international law and the advancement of human rights, and saw it as their responsibility to 
decide cases consistent with the promotion of human rights and dignity.268 They were also likely 
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the hearing of that case a Director of Amnesty International Charity Limited, with Appeals 
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 21 July 2000, where the Appeals 
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United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, which allegedly had a role in affirming 
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international humanitarian law and human rights law."  Accordingly, the Chamber found it 
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to be influenced by the general sense of outrage created by media reports that tended to simplify 
the events and dehumanize one side.269  Few judges are likely to have spent much time under the 
wartime conditions that military commanders must operate under.  Looked at from afar, war is 
ugly, and morally reprehensible.  It is hard to fathom many of the actions that occur in war, or 
how seemingly decent people could carry out such acts.270  Furthermore, surely all judges were 
aware that a steady string of acquittals on narrow technical grounds would have undermined 
support among the general public and the states responsible for funding the tribunals.  It is even 
less conceivable that the judges would have found the ICTY was improperly established, 
notwithstanding legitimate concerns about the authority of the U.N. to establish such a tribunal.271
Most damaging to the credibility and legitimacy of the ICTY and supportive of the claims 
of victor’s justice and political bias is the failure to prosecute NATO for alleged violations of the 
laws of war.  Carla del Ponte, prosecutor for the ICTY, ultimately decided not to pursue claims 
relating to the justifiability of the bombing campaign as a whole or specific incidents or even to 
conduct an in-depth investigation, reasoning that “either the law is not sufficiently clear or 
investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate 
charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offences.”272
In contrast, Amnesty International issued a detailed report that concluded that NATO was guilty 
of war crimes.273 In one instance, a NATO pilot dropped not one but two bombs on a passenger 
train crossing a bridge, killing ten people and injuring fifteen more. Even assuming the pilot, 
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 The danger is that judges far removed from the heat of the battle will second-guess 
commanders who must make instantaneous decisions based on imperfect information under 
extreme conditions of duress or impose unreasonable obligations on soldiers.  The majority’s 
view that a soldier such as Erdemovic, with a wife and nine-month old son waiting at home, 
is expected to give up his life because a soldier assumes such risks illustrates the dangers of 
arm-chair judgments.  Soldiers might assume certain risks, but being threatened at gunpoint if 
one does not shoot innocent civilians is not one of them.  How many civilians or soldiers 
would give up their own life in such circumstances, knowing that doing so will serve no 
constructive purpose as the other soldiers will kill the civilians anyway?  To expect soldiers 
to be superheroes is unreasonable.  On the hand, there is a danger given the vague of laws 
that judges will be too deferential.  Adopting a good faith standard rather than a reasonable 
person standard, the Nuremberg Tribunal acquitted a Gernam commander for ordering troops 
to kill starving civilians fleeing a besieged city on the grounds that office believed the 
decision was militarily necessary.   Jochnick & Normand, supra note 206, at 94.
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focusing on the target, did not see the train approaching until too late, and that the smoke 
prevented the pilot from noticing that the train had continued forward into the second target zone, 
it would seem that pilot acted recklessly in not verifying that the second target zone was clear 
before firing.  After all, there was no immediate need to take out the bridge. Unless the pilot and 
NATO commanders were justified in believing that destroying the bridge at that particular 
moment was of such military importance as to justify the number of civilian casualties likely to 
be caused by continuing the attack, the attack should have been called off in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention.274 Moreover, evidence would not have been an insurmountable problem, as 
suggested by del Ponte, because there was a cockpit video, which NATO subsequently admitted 
speeding up almost five times in an apparent attempt to explain away the incident as an 
unfortunate accident resulting from the need to make a quick decision under adverse 
conditions.275 The ICTY’s decision not to prosecute or even investigate numerous alleged crimes 
led to characterizations of the tribunal as a hoax and a propaganda arm for NATO, and to 
dismissals of the report as an amateur whitewash and a fraud.276
While the ICC will be an improvement on the ICTY and ICTR in many ways, it will still 
be subject to many of the same concerns and limitations.  The crime of aggression remains 
undefined. Many of the crimes remain vague, which is one of the reasons why the U.S. has 
opposed the ICC.277  Although the court, like the ICTY, is required to apply only laws in place at 
the time of the crime,278 the court may apply statutory law, rules of law and jurisprudential 
principles from previous cases, customary international law and general principles of law.279
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Statute], art. 22 provides: “1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute 
unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.  2.  The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not 
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 Rome Statute, id., art. 21 provides “1. The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, 
Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where 
appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict; (c) Failing that, general 
principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world 
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction 
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international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 2. The Court may 
apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.”
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Thus, what appear on their face to be relatively unobjectionable provisions are likely to be 
expanded over time in a controversial and retroactive manner, as in Erdemovic.280
 In addition, the decision-making processes, and the operation of the court more 
generally, are likely to remain highly politicized.  The complementarity principle allows domestic 
systems the first opportunity to try alleged criminals, although the ICC will be able to try cases if 
the domestic trials are deemed a sham.281  The ICC may not hesitate to declare the trials of 
military officers in the military or even civilian courts in authoritarian regimes a sham.  However, 
it remains to be seen whether the ICC will someday declare the trials of U.S. or English soldiers 
in American or English military courts a sham, or to prosecute senior officials from Western 
countries under the same broad theories of command responsibility or aiding and abetting applied 
to dictators should the domestic system fail to prosecute.
With relatively weak powers of enforcement, the ICC will also be dependent on the 
cooperation of other countries for extradition of defendants, assistance with collection of 
evidence and access to witnesses.282  The U.S. has already attempted to undermine the court by 
refusing to cooperate with the court and threatening other states that do cooperate with the court 
in prosecuting Americans.  In 2002, President Bush signed the American Servicemembers' 
Protection Act, which prohibits U.S. state or federal agencies from cooperating with the ICC, 
prohibits military assistance to most countries that ratify the ICC, restricts transfer of law 
enforcement and military information to states that become parties to the ICC, bars U.S. 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions unless American soldiers are given immunity, and, 
miraculously, authorizes the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to free U.S. 
citizens held by or on behalf of the ICC.283   The Act conjures up absurd images of U.S. soldiers 
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 Michael A. Newton, Should the United States Join the International Criminal Court, 9 
U.C..DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL. 35 (2002) (noting that many of the Elements of Crime are 
unclear and will need to be interpreted, and that there have already been attempts to interpret 
some elements in a more expansive way than was originally intended). 
281 See Rome Statute, supra note 278, art. 17(2): 2. In order to determine unwillingness [to 
investigate or prosecute] in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the 
following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the 
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There 
has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are 
not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.  Article 20(3) adds: “No person who has been tried by another court for 
conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the 
same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose of shielding 
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with 
the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner 
which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”
The ICC will not have jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers who tortured Iraqis as neither Iraq nor the 
U.S. has ratified the Rome Treaty.  However, the U.K. has ratified the Treaty.  Moreover, 
some day U.S. soldiers in all likelihood will commit alleged crimes in some country that is a 
member of the ICC.
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parachuting into The Hague to free comrades accused of war crimes.  The U.S. has also required 
other countries to sign bilateral agreements that they will not extradite any US citizen sought for 
war crimes or crimes against humanity by ICC, at pains of losing trade benefits, economic aid or 
military assistance.284  Whether the court will be able to function and acquire legitimacy without 
U.S. support remains to be seen.
In sum, the laws of war present numerous problems from a rule of law perspective.  The 
laws are vague and easily manipulated to serve political ends. They may even legitimate the use 
of force by providing superpowers the legal fig leaf needed to cover their acts of naked 
aggression.285  The selective establishment of war tribunals and singling out of the leaders of a 
few countries calls into question the generality of the regime and highlights one of the central 
pretenses of international law: the equality of all states large or small.  The rapid development of 
laws of war resulting from the alleged need to revise rules regarding pre-emptive strikes in the 
face of new threats and terrorism, the recent jurisprudence and case law of the ICTR and ICTY 
and the creation of the ICC, the expansion of customary international law and its implications for 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions have all diminished, for better or worse, stability in this 
area of law, and increased the likelihood of retroactive application of the newly minted laws. 
While future development of this body of law may address some of the issues related to 
vagueness, stability and retroactivity, political factors are likely to continue to undermine the key 
rule of law principle of impartial application and implementation, particularly in the principles of 
universal jurisdiction becomes more widely accepted.  Although the establishment of the ICC 
may obviate the need for universal jurisdiction to some extent, the effectiveness of the ICC is 
likely to be undermined without U.S. support.  In any event, the ICC is unlikely to challenge 
strong states on which it must rely for financial support and enforcement.  The failure to indict 
officials from the strong states while relying on an increasingly moralistic body of law to impose 
punishments on a steady parade of officials from failed states or states defeated militarily by the 
U.S. and NATO will undermine significantly the legitimacy of the ICC and tarnish its claims to 
the mantle of rule of law.  Nor is it likely that a more developed body of law or even more 
rigorous and impartial implementation by the ICC, other international bodies or domestic courts 
will present much of a deterrent to initiating war or to the commission of atrocities in the waging 
of war.  The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the ICTY and ICTR and the establishment of the ICC 
have not resulted in any noticeable decrease in acts of aggression or wartime atrocities.286
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Rule of law requires that the gap between law on the books and actual practice be 
reasonably narrow. The gap between actual practice and human rights law in general, and laws of 
war in particular, is remarkably wide, and is likely to remain so.  Similar failings in domestic 
systems - including weak institutions and enforcement powers, vague and changing laws applied 
retroactively, heavily politicized decisionmaking, external influence on the decisionmakers 
including the threat to withhold resources and refuse cooperation in an attempt to undermine the 
independence of the court and tribunal, a widespread sense among those subject to the system that 
the system is biased and illegitimate  – would result in screaming howls of protest from the 
international rights community and assertions that the system does not even merit the label of a 
“legal system” much less the honorific title of “rule of law.”287
VI. Rule of Law, Transitional Justice, Nation Building and the Establishment of Rights-
Respecting Regimes:  The Limits of Law, Political Will and Knowledge
Rule of law is central to efforts to hold former leaders accountable and establish a rights 
respecting regime.  However, transitional justice and nation-building create special challenges 
from a rule of law perspective. As we have seen in Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the former Soviet Republics and now Haiti (again), regime change is the 
relatively easy part.  The difficult task is the post-regime construction of a new state capable of 
good governance, implementing rule of law and democracy, and respecting human rights.
The success in rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II may have produced a 
false sense of confidence in our ability to create liberal democracies.  Germany and Japan were 
militarily defeated states, with homogenous populations, and a public that broadly supported the 
imposed political reform goals of constitutionalism, democracy and rule of law.  In contrast to 
Germany and Japan, most of the states today are weak or failed states, often torn by ethnic 
conflict.  In some cases, as in Somalia and Iraq, significant segments of the population remain 
armed and loyal to militia groups headed by local warlords, often organized along ethnic lines.  
Neighboring countries may also have a stake in the outcome and continue to support militia 
groups competing for power.  In addition, many of the states today are beginning from a much 
lower level of economic and institutional development. They lack the educational and 
technological bases of Germany and Japan.
Nor is there a broad social consensus on the goals of constitutionalism, democracy and 
human rights, much less on more specific issues such as the proper form of power sharing or the 
rights of women and laborers.288 Nevertheless, the international community all too often seeks to 
impose with missionary zeal an overly narrow liberal democratic thick conception of rule of law 
that emphasizes, in addition to the basic requirements of a thin rule of law, general elections, 
neoliberal economic policies and a liberal interpretation across a range of specific human rights 
issues.289
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Some attribute the limited success of efforts to rebuild legal systems and ensure rule of 
law largely to cultural differences that complicate the task of legal transplants.290 Imposition of 
too narrow a thick conception of rule of law does lead to conflict about the purposes of legal 
reforms and the nature of the legal system in the new polity, and may undermine efforts to carry 
out more technical reforms required to establish a thin rule of law.  However, the main reasons 
for the limited success in establishing a legal system that meets the requirements of a thin rule of 
law tend to be institutional and material in nature.  Notwithstanding legitimate concerns about 
imperialism and the lack of consensus on thick conceptions of rule of law, there is widespread 
support among virtually all groups in all countries for a thin rule of law.  Culture has not proven 
an insurmountable barrier to establishing legal systems that meet the requirements of a thin rule 
of law in East Asian states with a Confucian heritage such as Japan, South Korea or Singapore or 
in Islamic countries such as Malaysia.  As we have seen, rule of law is largely a function of 
wealth.  The demand for a thin rule of law is often led by the commercial sector, especially 
multinational companies used to playing by such rules and unable to rely on social networks and 
corporatist connections to government officials as substitutes for rule of law.  Granted, there may 
little demand for rule of law from the commercial sector in some failed states because the level of 
economic development is low, the economy is primarily based on rural agriculture and there is 
little foreign investment.   
However, rule of law is not only valued by businesspeople.  People in failed repressive 
states where dictatorial leaders ruled by whim appreciate the advantages of an administrative law 
system that reins in the government and prevents arbitrary actions.  The average citizen also has 
an interest in a system able to handle minor civil disputes or to decide divorce issues in a fair and 
efficient manner.  To be sure, the demand on the formal legal system for even these services 
varies from place to place.  There may be traditional village mechanisms for resolving minor civil 
disputes.  Sharia-based religious tribunals may have jurisdiction over personal law matters such 
as marriage disputes and inheritance.  Nevertheless, a formal legal system is often necessary or 
useful as a backstop should informal mechanisms of dispute resolution fail, and a thin rule of law 
is capable of accommodating Sharia based personal law systems and other forms of legal 
pluralism. 
 Given differences in demand and other circumstances, the pace at which the legal system 
meets the requirements of rule of law will differ from country to country, by regions within 
countries with urban areas ahead of rural areas, and by area of law.  Commercial law is usually 
the sector that develops most rapidly.  In part this reflects the high priority assigned to economic 
development by most governments and their desire to attract foreign investment. Governments in 
nonliberal authoritarian states such as Vietnam or China or Islamic states that are wary about the 
broader liberal democratic agenda may nonetheless support legal system reforms in the 
places, promoting the rule of law has become a fundamentally imperialist enterprise, in which 
foreign administrators backed by large armies govern societies that have been pronounced 
unready to take on the task of governing themselves.”). Cf.Garth, supra note 162 at  395-96 (noting that the changing policies exported to other countries under the banner of law and 
development and rule of law are a hegemonic process that reflect the salient issues of the time 
in developed countries; in short, we export our palace wars); Paul W. Kahn, American 
Hegemony and International Law: Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human 
Rights and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 18 (2000) ("The project of a 
global order of law founded on universal rights will be seen as a Western project, a kind of 
cultural imperialism doing work for a more traditional political imperialism.  Nor is this view 
completely wrong.  To the degree that we believe in the values for which the United States 
stands - values of democracy, law, and markets - we should support these assertions of 
power.  But we should not think that framing the issue as one of international law somehow 
eliminates politics or delegitimates opposing claims… This is our world, and speaking the 
language of law is not going to make it any different.").
290
 Brooks, supra note 289; see also PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: 
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  (1999).
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commercial sector.  It also reflects to some extent the priorities of international agencies such as 
the World Bank and IMF.  However, in other largely rural agrarian states where the demand from 
commercial sector is weak, other aspects of the legal system such as the administrative law 
regime may develop faster.  Conversely, some failed states may have little capacity to develop an 
administrative law regime.  Germany and Japan were starting from a much higher state of 
institutional development than East Timor and Somalia. In comparison to East Timor and 
Somalia, the new regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq have inherited more functional administrative 
systems.291
The pace and nature of criminal law reform will also differ from place to place.  Because 
the criminal law system was often a tool of repression for the previous authoritarian regime, 
criminal law reform is high on the rule of law agenda of the international community, particularly 
the human rights community and agencies with a broader agenda of promoting human rights.  
Accordingly, one of the first orders of business is to rewrite the criminal law usually in a way that 
incorporates the most liberal, forward-leaning ideas of the human rights community. Thus the 
criminal law will include generous protections for the rights of the accused and increasingly be 
based on an adversarial system with short detention periods, early entrance by and a large role for 
lawyers, emphasis on exclusion of tainted evidence and so on.  Although citizens in the target 
country generally appreciate the need to reform the former repressive system, they are fearful of 
the rise in crime that typically follows in the wake of regime change and more generally 
accompanies modernization.  Time and again the general public has grown weary of the liberal 
criminal laws and demanded law and order from the government.  Government officials usually 
respond with a war on crime and a retreat from the liberal laws favored by the international rights 
community in favor of increasingly harsher laws that shifts the balance away from the rights of 
the accused toward the interests of society in maintaining order.  In Hungary, for instance, polls 
showed two-thirds of Hungarians were willing to sacrifice personal freedoms for greater public 
safety.  Accordingly, laws were passed to restrict civil liberties to those who obeyed the law, to 
crack down on white collar crime, to toughen the penalties for recidivists, and to allow more 
discretion to judges in sentencing, which resulted in heavier punishments.292  Bulgaria, where 
more than one-quarter of the population was willing to sacrifice democracy in favor of a strong 
leader who promised to fight corruption, adopted similar measures and, in addition, reinstated 
capital punishment and abolished pretrial discovery for criminal suspects where their guilt was 
clear.293  Should government leaders refuse to placate the public, they are likely to be voted out of 
office and replaced by others such as Vladimar Putin with fewer qualms about crackdown on 
criminals.294
The development of criminal law will also be shaped by different social narratives in 
each country about crime and punishment. In Afghanistan, people particularly in rural areas have 
291 See William H. Spencer, Establishing Rule of Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 445, 447 (2002); JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: 
FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ xxiv (2003).  
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for years settled disputes through village mediation or self-help remedies in which the family of
the victim sought revenge unless blood money was paid or some other arrangement agreed on by 
the parties.295  Such cultural practices challenge the state’s monopoly on violence. However, 
village mediation and blood feuds have their own shortcomings, particularly as society becomes 
more urbanized.  Over time, the state may be able to exert more control over violence and 
criminal punishment.  Alternatively, or in addition, the criminal law in Afghanistan may have 
different contours than elsewhere.  The formal law may develop in ways that take into account 
cultural practices, for example by providing broader defenses for blood feuds.  Or actual practice 
may diverge from the law on the books.  If the gap becomes too large, the legitimacy of the legal 
system may be undermined.  By insisting too strenuously on a particular conception of criminal 
justice, the international rights community may undermine efforts to establish rule of law and a 
legal system that enjoys the support of the populace.296
Thus, there will be differences in thick conceptions of law that affect how institutions 
function, the rate of progress of different areas of law and ultimately the type of rule of law that 
prevails.  Culture will be one factor in determining the path of development.  In some cases, 
cultural differences will lead to significant variations in the nature of the legal system as a whole, 
for example when the conflict is between liberal democrats and adherents of conservative Islam 
or nonliberal authoritarian or communitarian regimes.  However, in many cases there will be 
broad support in the target country for liberal democracy, or at least some form of democracy.  
Rather than conflict at the grand level of the nature of the regime, disputes between international 
and local actors and within the local populace will more often be over more specific issues.  The 
disputes will reflect differences in cultural values and in other contingent circumstances between 
stable developed countries and oftentimes unstable developing countries or between ethnically 
homogenous states and ethnically diverse ones.  Countries with rising crime rates may be tougher 
on crime.  Ethnic violence or demands for secession may result in broad national security laws 
that provide the executive wide-ranging authority to declare states of emergency and derogate 
from rights to ensure stability. 
Although participants in the new law and development movement claim that they have 
learned their lessons from earlier law and development movement and now appreciate the need to 
be more sensitive to context and to empower locals rather than providing top-down, one-size-fits-
all solutions, all too often international actors engaged in rule of law rescue efforts lack the local 
knowledge to tailor solutions to local circumstances or simply are normatively committed to a 
competing agenda, whether it be democracy, neoliberal economic policies, or liberal human 
rights.  To be successful, the international community must be more tolerant of diversity, 
particularly on the types of contested issues that divide the human rights community more 
generally.  At minimum, there is a need to recognize that forcing through controversial issues 
about women’s rights or the rights of the accused in the face of local opposition has serious costs, 
and to consider possible alternative means to the same ends that may be more acceptable to the 
local population.
In light of the difficulties in obtaining consensus on a thick conception of rule of law, 
some international agencies have focused more on the institutional changes required to implement 
a thin rule of law.  Critics complain that the narrow focus on institution building and technical 
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aspects of thin rule of law ignores the normatively important issues of democracy and rights.  
However, this is often an advantage. Although in failed states international actors may have a 
freer hand in imposing democracy and a liberal rights agenda, in nonliberal but thriving 
developing states such as China or Vietnam government leaders may resist the broader liberal 
democratic thick rule of law agenda.297   By couching their proposals in terms of technical 
assistance, international actors may be allowed to participate in the legal reforms.
Human rights organizations often accuse international agencies and actors that cooperate 
with such states of being apologists for authoritarian regimes or for contributing to a stronger 
regime better able to withstand demands for political reforms. It is true that the instrumental 
aspects of legal reforms may enhance the efficiency of authoritarian governments.  In the absence 
of democracy and pluralist institutions for public participation in the lawmaking, interpretation 
and implementation processes, law may come to serve the interests of the state and the ruling 
elite. However, the choice facing reformers is not authoritarianism or democracy, but 
authoritarianism with rule of law or without it.  Authoritarianism is not the result of legal reforms 
to implement rule of law.  On the contrary, the ruling regime would be even more authoritarian in 
the absence of legal reforms.  Where legal rules are applied with principled consistency to both 
the state and its citizens, as required by a thin rule of law, they generally restrain rather than 
expand the arbitrary exercise of state power.298
Critics suggest that the limited success of achieving rule of law in non-liberal democratic 
states calls into question whether narrow technical changes are possible without broader political 
reforms. Such doubts have in turn led reformers to adopt a more holistic approach to reform that 
emphasizes the full set of operating principles of a Western liberal democracy, including 
transparency, a free press, channels for participation and interest representation.299  Apart from 
297
 Significantly, when the U.S. and China agreed on a project aimed at improving China's legal 
system during the 1997 Jiang-Clinton summit, the Chinese side rejected the label "rule of 
law" in favor of "legal cooperation." Presumably PRC representatives rejected "rule of law" 
because of its vagueness and the potentially broad implications for political reform.  Clearly, 
the government did not want to be perceived as endorsing a liberal democratic conception of 
rule of law.  Nevertheless, even though the PRC government's statist socialist rule of law 
differs from a liberal democratic conception of rule of law, both sides were able to find 
common ground when it came to many concrete programs aimed at strengthening the legal 
system.  For instance, they agreed to judicial exchange and training programs aimed at 
improving the quality of PRC judges; programs to assist in the development of a legal aid 
system; exchanges to strengthen the securities regulatory system and the administrative law 
system; seminars on electronic commerce, corporate law and the enforcement of arbitral 
award and court judgments; as well as a symposium to discuss the legal aspects of protecting 
human rights, including issues such as China's legal responsibilities under international rights 
agreements, the rights of criminal defendants and the legal protection of religious freedom.
298
 Even the critics of the earlier law and development movement found value in rule of law as a 
weapon against authoritarianism.  Gardner, for instance, objected to the original law and 
development movement on the ground that its "legal instrumentalism proved vulnerable 
because it lacked, indeed rejected, any carefully developed philosophical or ethical 
perspective and because it offered a vision of law inadequately differentiated from state and 
power, and thus was unable to discriminate between 'ends' externally defined." Yet he also 
noted that the ideology of rule of law was useful in limiting the arbitrary acts of the 
government.  JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN 
AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980).
299
  As noted, the World Bank and IMF are prevented by their charters from directly intervening 
in political affairs.  Accordingly, they have traditionally avoided direct consideration of 
human rights issues and favored a thin conception of rule of law and good governance.  
However, the failure of structural adjustment programs to produce development together with 
the equity issue of rising income disparity even when there has been growth has resulted in an 
expansive interpretation of good governance and a more holistic approach to reform.   
Similarly, in the face of widespread criticism that its structural adjustment policies caused 
increased hardships for many of the least well off, the IMF has now begun to consider ways 
to mediate the negative affects of its policies.  Historically, Scandinavian, Dutch and German 
donors have tended to emphasize not just efficient markets and governance but human rights 
70 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
assuming support for controversial liberal values and institutions, the holistic approach overlooks 
the limited capacity of governments in failed states.  By attempting to change too much at once, 
this approach runs the risk of undermining the long term possibilities for reform.  As noted, rule 
of law does not necessarily coincide with democracy, much less liberal democracy.  A more 
incremental, context-specific approach that accomodates nondemocratic forms of government, 
nontransparent corportist arrangements between government and businesses or a different role for 
civil society and the press than in liberal socities may be preferable in some instances.300
Even setting aside substantive differences in normative views that lead to different thick 
conceptions of rule of law, creating the institutions necessary to ensure a thin rule of law is no 
easy task. In the wake of regime change, the legal system is often weak or non-existent.  To gain 
some feel for the enormity of the challenge, there were no East Timorese lawyers with experience 
as judges or prosecutors because none had been appointed to such positions under Indonesian 
rule.  The exodus of prison guards and the burning of prisons forced the U.N.'s International 
Force for East Timor to rely on U.N. civil police officers to run overcrowded makeshift detention 
centers, and to release individuals accused of serious crimes to make room for those charged with 
grave violations of humanitarian law.301  Similar institutional problems exist in Kosovo, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone.  Building prisons, training police, prosecutors, lawyers and judges, creating an 
administrative law system and a functional legislature, raising legal consciousness and expanding 
access to justice through the creation of legal aid centers cannot be accomplished overnight.  Nor 
can the international community afford to focus on judicial reforms while refusing to get involved 
in the “dirty work” of working with police and prison guards.302
The diversity of experiences in nation-building in recent years demonstrates that there is 
no single approach to reconstruction or any recipe capable of guaranteeing success.  However, 
nation-building at minimum requires time, money, manpower and local knowledge.  A Rand 
study found that “while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure.”303
The report pointed out that no effort at “forced democratization” has succeeded in less than five 
years, although it also noted that democratization without ongoing long-term support from 
Western powers is not likely to succeed.304
Unfortunately, the U.N., the international rights community and state powers generally 
lack the political will, resources, know-how and local knowledge to succeed in reconstructing 
failed states and creating functional legal systems capable of implementing rule of law.  
American altruism reached its limits in Somalia when U.S. soldiers were killed, well before the 
heavy lifting started.  Nor was the U.S. willing to risk American lives by engaging in a ground 
attack in Kosovo, preferring the safety of high altitude aerial raids. The U.N. has withdrawn 
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peacekeeping forces and other personnel when some peacekeepers have been killed or U.N. 
offices attacked in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor and Iraq. Americans and the international 
community now appear to lack the political will to stay the course in Iraq as well, especially since 
many saw the war as an illegal act of aggression in the first place.  U.S. citizens were balking at 
the huge price tag for the rebuilding of Iraq even before congressional reports criticized the Bush 
administration for overstating the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the rush to war.  
Appalled by the deaths of U.S. soldiers and the beheading of civilians, the majority of American 
citizens now feel the war was a mistake.305  Despite all of the talk of U.S. determination to see the 
war or terrorism through to the end and to transform Iraq into a shining beachhead of democracy 
in the sea of Mid East Islamic states, the Bush regime is desperately trying to extract itself as 
quickly as possible from the mess.  While ethnic conflicts threaten to undermine democracy, rule 
of law and human rights in Iraq as well as geopolitical stability in the region, Bush appears more 
concerned that the increasingly hostile public opinion will undermine his chances for reelection.  
Opposition to the war in Iraq has already led to the downfall of the government in Spain and the 
withdrawal of troops by Spain, the Philippines and others despite intensive U.S. efforts to hold 
the line.
Reconstruction efforts are also failing or encountering difficulties in other countries 
because of lack of funds and political will.  With the economy sputtering, the opium-trade 
growing and security breaking down outside Kabul as warlords contend for power and U.S. and 
Pakistani forces battle the Taliban and other insurgents, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was 
forced to make the rounds of foreign capital appealing for additional funding and support in June 
2004.306  Having fallen off the international radar screen as new crises have arisen in Liberia,
Sudan and elsewhere, the former Yugoslavian republics, Haiti, Somalia, East Timor and Sierra 
Leone continue to struggle to maintain law and order, overcome ethnic conflicts and stimulate 
economic growth while at the same time creating the institutional infrastructure for rule of law, 
democracy and human rights.307
Emblematic of the difficulty maintaining international support for post-regime change 
reconstruction efforts, the prosecution of war crimes in the FYR, Rwanda and elsewhere is being 
undermined by the failure of states to make good on their financial promises.  The ICTR and 
ICTY are in financial trouble because member states have failed to pay their dues, with ICTR 
having only received one quarter of its budget for 2004 and 2005.308  The President of the ICTY 
has warned that the tribunal’s ability to complete the remaining cases by the 2010 deadline is 
being hindered by the failure of member states to pay up as well as the failure to extradite some 
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of those indicted.  The lack of funding has resulted in a recruitment freeze and staffing shortages.  
The Sierra Leone court was supposed to be funded through voluntary donations from states and 
nongovernmental organizations rather than by the U.N.  However, when the contributions failed 
to materialize, the budget had to be slashed from $30 million for first year and $84 for next two 
years to $16.8 for the first year and $57 million for the next three years.  As a result, the court was 
forced to reduce the number of staff, establish only one trial chamber instead of two and 
prosecute just 20 defendants.309  The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, meant 
to complement the special court, was postponed because only $1.2 million of an expected $10 
million budget was pledged.310
Even assuming adequate resources, steadfast political will and a willing local populace, 
the lack of know-how and local knowledge often undermines efforts to rebuild states and 
implement rule of law.311  The U.N. was ill prepared to assume responsibilities for running 
Kosovo and East Timor.312  In his article How Not to Run a Country: Lessons from Kosovo and 
East Timor, de Mello described the U.N. approach as benevolent despotism.313  In some cases, the 
errors may be avoidable.  For instance, the U.N. administrators decided to retain Serbian laws to 
avoid a legal vacuum.  The decision, taken without adequate consultation with local authorities or 
public debate, angered the populace who saw Serbian law as a symbol of their repression.314
In other cases, the problems may be virtually insurmountable.  International agencies 
often lack the necessary linguistic skills to effectively train police, lawyers and judges, much less 
adequate knowledge of local laws and the legal culture to provide effective training.  Even if they 
have the necessary local knowledge and legal skills, there may not be time to devise a coherent 
reform plan tailored to local circumstances.  The highly bureaucratic U.N. machinery takes time 
to get up and running.  Decision-making in the context of multilateral consortiums is equally 
slow, and may be hindered by differences among donors. As a result, there is a tendency to pull a 
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standard menu of lowest common denominator reforms off the shelf and thus to impose one-size-
fits-all-solutions, with laws for developing countries modeled on those from developed countries 
and lawyers and judges trained in much the same way as their counterparts are trained in 
countries with advanced legal systems.315
More fundamentally, the international community lacks the ability to overcome deeply 
seated ethnic animosity.  Ethnic conflicts continue to exist in Rwanda, East Timor and 
Afghanistan.  In Kosovo, which has received more than twenty-five times the funding and fifty 
times as many troops as Afghanistan,316 ethnic violence in March 2004 left 19 deaths and almost 
1000 wounded, displaced 4100, and resulted in the destruction of over 500 houses and 27 
churches and monasteries. 317   Serbian police officers refused to work with Albanian police 
officers accused of participating in or passively watching the ethnic violence. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the constitution resulting from the Dayton Peace Agreement 
was intended to accommodate the interests of the main ethnic groups or “constituent peoples” –
the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.  The constitution created a federalist structure organized along 
ethnic lines with a weak centralized government and two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.  Each of the three groups is represented equally in all of 
the major central organs, and retains a veto over legislation that would be destructive of the 
legitimate vital interests of their ethnic group.  The complicated constitutional balancing act has 
not prevented ethnic violence. 
In Iraq, the U.S. brokered constitution creates an uneasy balance among Shiites and 
Sunnis. Already Kurds have threatened to withdraw support for the interim regime over what they 
believe to be inadequate autonomy and protection of their interests. 
Consociational constitutions that emphasize group rights run the danger of discounting 
the rights of individuals.318  When the democratic process threatens the rights of individuals, 
international trustees may attempt to impose solutions more protective of individual rights.319  To 
be sure, how to balance protection of individual rights with claims of self-determination and 
minority or group rights is one of the general fault lines that divides the human rights regime.  
While there may be no perfect solutions, solutions imposed by international trustees are likely to 
lack legitimacy, alienate the local populace and diminish the good will and cooperation needed to 
succeed in the complicated task of nation-building.
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as security, lack experience in governing or perhaps be bogged down in struggles for power 
among different factions jockeying for position in upcoming elections. 
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Ongoing civil war, terrorist attacks on government officials, the killing of police and 
suicide bombings prevent the government from functioning and render rule of law impossible. 
The first order of business in nation-building is therefore to ensure security. However, the need to 
restore law and order frequently contributes to physical integrity violations and other human 
rights abuses as the government resorts to force and violence to quell dissent and ensure stability.  
During this period, states of emergency and derogation of some rights may be necessary.  Courts 
may be prevented from reviewing declarations of states of emergency by law, or simply too weak 
to challenge executive decisions.  Even if they have the authority, they may not want to oppose 
decisions widely supported by the populace worried about the breakdown in law and order and 
the rise of organized and violent crime that often accompanies regime change.
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice
As order is being restored, the new regime will face transitional justices issues that add to the 
difficulties of nation-building and present challenges for rule of law and the protection of human 
rights.  The literature on transitional justice is vast, and many of the normative, legal and practical 
issues are beyond the scope of this article.320  Rather, I focus on some of the concerns that arise 
about transitional justice from a rule of law perspective. 
A first worry is that rule of law principles may not be applicable to moments of 
constitutional crisis. In the extreme, revolutions and coups may give rise to a new regime that 
simply replaces the previous constitution and legal regime with a new one, without any regard to 
the existing legal mechanisms for constitutional change.  In other cases, the courts may be asked 
to decide on the constitutionality of revolutions, coups or changes to the constitution that are
pushed through by an authoritarian leader without following proper procedures for amending the 
constitution. For instance, in the Philippines, the court had to decide on the legality of President 
Marcos’ amendment of the constitution, which was ratified by a show of people’s assemblies, a 
procedure not in conformity with the constitution at the time.  A few years later, the court again 
had to decide a similar issue when Cory Aquino became president and replaced the Marcos era 
constitution with her Freedom Constitution, again without complying with the rules in place at 
the time.  A strict interpretation of the laws would most likely have resulted in a constitutional 
crisis.  In the first case, Marcos may very well have replaced the judges, as happened in Malaysia 
in 1986 when the court dared to oppose Mahathir.  In the Aquino case, the court would have 
incurred the wrath of the people, compromising its legitimacy and authority and undermining its 
efforts to emerge as a political force in the new regime.  In both cases, what the court did do was 
simply bow to political reality and find the constitutional amendments constitutional even though 
they clearly did not comply with the stipulated procedures for constitutional amendment.321 To be 
sure, that these acts, especially by Marcos, could be challenged in court, suggests that rule of law 
is a powerful motivating ideal, one which even dictators cannot dismiss without tarnishing their 
legitimacy.   However, they also show the limits of law.
Second, the requirements of transitional justice and a thin rule of law are often at odds.  
Holding former leaders accountable may require setting aside laws that legitimated their actions 
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ignoring amnesty agreements entered into as a condition for relinquishing power.322  To secure a 
ceasefire in the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lome Agreement called for power 
sharing between the Revolutionary United Front and the Kababah government, and provided an 
immediate and absolute pardon to RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who had been captured and 
sentenced to death for his role in the civil war.323 The Agreement also granted complete amnesty 
to all combatants up to time of signing of agreement.  The U.S., U.K. and the other states 
supported the agreement.  In response to criticisms by human rights organizations that the 
agreement sheltered war criminals, the U.N. representative who signed it accused human rights 
groups of being sanctimonious for not acknowledging that without the agreement the war would 
have continued, resulting in more civilian deaths.324  By the time the Sierra Leone special court 
was established several years later, the political winds had shifted in favor of a policy of “no 
impunity.” As a result, the agreement between the government and Sierra Leone to establish the 
special court prevents anyone from relying on the "absolute and free pardon" of the 1999 Lome 
Peace Agreement with respect to such crimes.325
Domestic courts in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Honduras have also restricted the 
scope of amnesties by holding them inapplicable to serious human rights violations and by 
requiring a case-by-case determination of their validity.326  In some cases, government leaders 
may grant themselves amnesties.  In other cases, some form of amnesty will be a condition for 
ceasefire or for stepping down and clearing the way for a transition to democracy.  For the 
international community to simply disregard amnesties, particularly of the second type, is 
difficult to square with thin rule of law principles.  Of course setting aside amnesties in some 
circumstances may be justified regardless of the cost to rule of law.  Those who advocate 
prohibiting or ignoring amnesties sometimes claim that authoritarian leaders would have 
relinquished power anyway or been forced from power: “leaders leave kicking and screaming 
because their time was up.”327  However, it is striking that virtually every transition in last several 
decades has involved some form of amnesty.328  Moreover, should the practice of setting aside 
amnesties become widespread, authoritarian leaders will take note and adjust accordingly, 
clinging to power rather than putting their faith in some non-enforceable guarantee that they will 
not be prosecuted and end up in prison for the rest of their lives or perhaps executed.  Nor will 
they risk travel to other countries where they might be extradited, although as the example of 
Milosevic demonstrates, no place may be safe if superpowers are committed and use their 
economic leverage to buy extradition.  Most problematically, overriding an amnesty negotiated to 
secure the departure of an authoritarian leader and facilitate transition to a more democratic order 
deprives citizens of the state in question of the right to determine their own future.  The 
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international community claims for itself the right to override domestic agreements and to impose 
the costs for the decision on the citizens of that state, including perhaps plunging the nation back 
into a state of brutish civil war characterized by unspeakable violence and massive human rights 
violations.329
Third, the insistence on no impunity raises questions about the purpose or purposes of 
punishment for which appeal to rule of law provides little guidance.  Advocates of punishment for 
anyone who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity often appeal to a variety of 
rationales, including retribution, deterrence, vengeance, facilitation of truth-finding and 
reconciliation, and an educative function in clarifying the norms for society and distinguishing the 
new regime from the previous regime.  Critics have taken issue with each of these 
justifications.330   In particular, the notion that criminal punishment will serve as much of a 
deterrent in such cases is not credible given the nature of the crime, the psychology of mass 
violence and the low likelihood of ever being punished. Indeed, the best way to ensure that one is 
not prosecuted for war crimes is to make sure that one wins the war, as victors continue to be 
judged less harshly or generally to remain beyond the reach of law.  But that may only exacerbate 
the tendency to do what it takes to win the war, leading to more human rights abuses.
Fourth, issues of fairness and selective application of the laws arise when only a few 
individuals, often not high level government officials or the worst offenders, are prosecuted even 
though large numbers of people are involved in genocide, ethnic violence or the perpetuation of 
authoritarian regimes.  Whatever the substantive merits of a policy of “no impunity”, the reality is 
that relatively few people are ever prosecuted either in domestic or international courts for their 
participation in mass societal violence, war crimes or abuses under authoritarian regimes.331
Fifth, the choice of forum raises important procedural and substantive justice issues. 
Apart from already discussed concerns about victor’s justice and a variety of thin rule of law 
shortcomings, trials in far away international courts decrease the legitimacy of the process in the 
eyes of many local citizens, fail to provide the requisite sense of vengeance and justice, and 
undermine the authority of the domestic legal system.  Rwandans objected to the ICTR because 
they wanted capital punishment and harsh punishments, and resented their oppressors being sent 
to prisons that by local standards are relatively cushy. 332
On the other hand, trials in domestic courts frequently fall even farther short of minimal 
rule of law requirements.  Shortcomings include lack of access to habeas review of the detention 
decision, long pretrial detentions, lack of qualified interpreters, lack of adequate time to prepare 
defense and in many cases lack of qualified public defenders, lack of access to prosecution 
evidence, inability to secure attendance of witnesses and allow for cross-examination, serious 
329
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doubts about the partiality of defense counsel, prosecutors and judges, trials in absentia,333 and 
poor prison conditions.334
War crimes prosecutions in the first fourteen months of UNMIK administration in local 
Kosovo courts involved several instances of overcharging, including for genocide.  An OSCE 
report concluded that the genocide charges were “in light of the trial evidence, inflated, not 
grounded by serious legal consideration and solid analysis.”335  Other problems included vague 
and overly broad pleadings, the failure to secure Serbian defense witnesses in part due to safety 
concerns in transporting Serbians to Kosovo courts, problems with the credibility of witnesses 
many of whom were the victims of crimes or may have been influenced by media reports, the 
absence of appropriate findings on the nature of the defendant’s criminal liability particularly in 
relation to joint criminal activity and command responsibility charges, the failure to distinguish 
factual from legal issues, the failure to cite legal authority for holdings, and incorrect findings on 
lesser included offenses.336  The March 2004 ethnic riots put further pressure on an already weak 
and overloaded legal system, exacerbating concerns about access to the courts by minorities, bias 
on the part of Kosovo Albanian judges against Serbs, judicial independence and political pressure 
on the courts, lengthy and inappropriate pretrial detention and prison overcrowding.337
In Rwanda, after the regime change there were only five judges and fifty lawyers, few of 
whom had any criminal law experienced.338  With the domestic courts disposing of cases at a rate 
of only 300 a year and a pool of over 127,000 cases as of January 1998, it would have taken over 
400 years to work through the backlog.339   The government attempted to introduce a plea-
bargaining system but the system did not work as planned in part because leaders of the genocide 
threatened anyone who would confess and implicate others, and everyone was housed in the same 
jails.340  In the end, many persons were tried in Gacaca “courts” originally meant to handle minor 
civil disputes among members of the local community.341  The courts were given jurisdiction over 
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intentional and unintentional homicides, assaults and property crimes.342 Trials before these courts 
fell far short of international standards of due process.  Judges were local leaders with only a few 
months of legal training, and defendants did not even have the benefit of legal counsel.
Even when trials are held, there is often at best a slim possibility of obtaining a just 
verdict343.  In Kosovo, local courts with a majority of local judges reached a guilty verdict in eight 
of nine war crimes cases, dropping the prosecution in just one case.  In contrast, panels with a 
majority of international judges acquitted in seven cases, found two defendants guilty and two 
more guilty but on lesser charges.344  The Supreme Court with a majority of international judges 
reversed eight out of eleven verdicts.345  Problems with bias in Croatian, Serbian and Montenegro 
courts are so severe that the ICTY refuses to transfer cases involving even mid to lower level 
defendants to them for fear that they could not obtain a trial that meets the basic requirements of 
fairness and rule of law.346
With trials in domestic courts raising the specter of kangaroo justice, and prosecutions in 
far off criminal tribunals suffering from legitimacy and other concerns, a middle path has been to 
use hybrid or mixed courts in which international judges sit with domestic judges in local courts.  
Hybrid courts have their advantages, but do not resolve all rule of law concerns.  Mixed panels 
may encounter problems resulting from a clash of legal cultures or systems given the different 
background of the judges.  The lack of adequate translators may also compromise justice. More 
fundamentally, the legitimacy of such courts depends in large part on whether foreign or domestic 
judges make up the majority on the panels.  To avoid bias, the U.N. created the Kosovo War and 
Ethnic Crimes Court with both locals and international judges, only to scrap the court shortly 
thereafter and rely on international judges in district courts.347  Simply providing for international 
judges to sit on district courts did not solve the problems however as there were not enough 
international judges for all courts, thus leaving some courts with all Kosovo Albanian judges.  
Moreover, each panel consisted of two professional judges and three lay-judges, with each judge 
having a single vote, and thus the presence of one international judge was not enough to ensure 
impartiality.  Faced with different results in similar cases, UNMIK passed regulations providing 
defendants the right to petition for international prosecutors and a majority of international 
judges.348  While the international community is likely to feel more assured when the cases are 
heard by a majority of foreign judges, local citizens may feel just the opposite.
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Whether the high cost of international and mixed panels is justified has also been 
questioned given the shortage of resources available for the creation of the domestic legal system 
and the establishment of basic social services in failed states.  The ICTR budget for 2004 and 
2005 alone was $212 million.349  As of July 2004, the ICTR had completed just twenty-two 
prosecutions.350  The ICTY has enjoyed a larger budget,351 but has still managed to complete just 
seventeen trials involving thirty-five defendants, with seventeen more defendants pleading 
guilty.352  Part of the budgets goes to salaries for foreigners that are astronomically high by local 
standards, adding to the tension between the international rule of law relief workers and the local 
populace.
Such shortcomings suggest that in some circumstances a legal approach centered on 
individual prosecutions may not be the best approach, and that greater or least equal emphasis 
should be placed on finding a political solution and social healing and reconciliation.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of truth and reconciliation commissions need not be rehearsed 
here.353  However, one concern from the narrow perspective of rule of law is the relationship 
between truth commissions and criminal courts. The trend is to confer greater powers on truth 
commissions including the right to issue subpoenas and to conduct searches and seize evidence.  
While such powers may facilitate the investigation and documenting of war crimes, they also 
raise issues of self-incrimination and the right to lawyer.  Similarly, truth commissions have 
offered immunity to those who come forward and confess their crimes.  Building on experiences 
elsewhere, the East Timor Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides immunity to 
individuals but not groups, provided such acts do not constitute "serious crimes." Individuals 
must give a full description of relevant acts, assume responsibility for them and accept the act of 
reconciliation proposed by the TRC panel, which may be reparations, a public apology and/or 
other acts of contrition.  However, the East Timor special court has jurisdiction over serious 
crimes and is not bound by the view of the TRC as to what constitutes a serious crime.354  In light 
of the potential for self-incrimination, truth and reconciliation commissions have begun to 
function more like courts, with more attention paid to due process rights, including the right to be
349
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informed of and respond to allegations, to cross-examine witnesses and to be represented by a 
lawyer.355
Finally, courts emerging out of an authoritarian past may be eager to secure legitimacy 
and authority within the new regime by taking an activist approach on a wide range of issues, 
including many social and economic issues for which the judges do not necessarily possess the 
necessary expertise.  The result may be overreaching, ideologically-driven decisions that have 
negative social, economic and political consequences.  In Eastern Europe, courts decided cases 
based on neo-liberal economic dogma that did not always fit the times and conditions. 356
Conversely, in the Philippines, a recurring complaint is that the courts interfere too much in 
“economic decision-making” by second-guessing government policy-makers.357  In their effort to 
gain authority with the new polity, the courts may pander to the public, resulting in inconsistent 
and unprincipled decisions as the court seeks to keep up with rapidly changing public opinion.358
More generally, the expanding role of the courts in transitional states raises questions 
about the preferred form of constitutional review and whether relying too heavily on the judiciary 
may hinder the development of political processes needed to consolidate and sustain democracy.  
Courts are increasingly being called on to decide controversial issues that plunge the judiciary 
into the middle of political disputes.  In Russia, the judiciary faced the issue of Chechnya’s claim 
to independence; in Egypt, courts have decided cases involving Sharia principles that determine 
the nature of public life; in South Africa, courts have decided on the legality of amnesty 
provisions and even the constitutionality of the constitution.359
Whatever the long term impact on the development of democratic institutions, these 
decisions by the highest court are driven more by policy considerations than law.  They highlight 
the differences in social, economic, political and normative beliefs that support competing thick 
conceptions of rule of law in a society.  As a result, parties on all sides of the issue will invoke 
“rule of law” to support their preferred outcome and to criticize the courts if the court’s decision 
does not comport with their preferences, leading to doubts about the meaning and value of rule of 
law. 
In summary, efforts by the U.N. and other development agencies to stimulate economic 
growth, establish democracy and implement rule of law have not been particularly successful in 
poor but stable countries.  The likelihood of success in failed states or states with ongoing ethnic 
conflicts, particularly in which some of the parties may remain heavily armed and continue to 
receive military and financial support from other countries, is even slimmer.
Nevertheless, the international community cannot simply give in to despair and do 
nothing.  We have learned some lessons from since the old law and development movement 
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began in the 1960s and from recent efforts at nation-building.360  But we should not delude
ourselves as to the difficulty of nation-building or the likelihood of success.  We need to realize 
the limits of our political will, resources and knowledge, and make sure that we do not make 
matters worse by trying to do good. 
The recent experience with a diverse range of transitional experiences demonstrates that 
there is no single solution, and no perfect solution.  Accordingly, we should be wary of the 
growing trend to press for univocal solutions by codifying hard and fast rules against amnesties or
head of state liability, by empowering courts to set aside the judgments of truth and reconciliation 
commissions and by promoting a narrow liberal democratic version of rule of law. While singular 
solutions with courts as the final backdrop may seem to serve the rule of law values of 
predictability and certainty, the rules will give way to practical concerns, political considerations 
and the need to adopt a more pragmatic approach to facilitate a transfer of power and ultimately 
rule of law.  Transitional states are characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability.  The legal 
system must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate unexpected twists and turns on the road to 
rule of law.  Tough choices between imperfect alternatives will have to be made, and deviations 
from both rule of law and current human rights standards will be necessary. An overly restrictive 
legal regime will only undermine respect for rule of law as the laws are set aside to further other 
important social goals or to accommodate reality, while an overly restrictive political agenda that 
insists on liberal democracy may thwart efforts to establish even a thin rule of law.
VII. Rule of Law and Terrorism
Terrorism, perhaps even more so than conventional war, remains largely outside the 
framework of rule of law.  Just as it has proven impossible to define aggression, so has it proven 
impossible to come up with a generally accepted definition of terrorism, and for much the same 
reasons.361  The international community has repeatedly failed to reach agreement on a general 
definition of terrorism because of the inability to define legitimate struggles for power.  Nelson 
Mandela was once identified by the State Department as a terrorist before he won the Nobel Prize 
and became the president of South Africa; fellow Nobel Prize winner Yasir Arafat is a hero to 
some and terrorist to others.362  Although not all terrorists are freedom fighters or likely to win a 
Nobel Prize, there is some truth to the assertion that one person’s freedom fighter is another 
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person’s terrorist.  As a result, while there are treaties that outlaw specific acts, there is no general 
anti-terrorism treaty.  The lack of a general definition allows for a politicized use of the rhetoric 
and law of terrorism, partial compliance with U.N. resolutions aimed at countering terrorism, and 
inconsistencies in practice – all of which are inimical to rule of law. 
Terrorism is also largely beyond rule of law in the practical sense that law is powerless to 
prevent terrorism.  To be sure, international and domestic laws may provide a basis for punishing 
terrorists, holding states that promote terrorism liable or make terrorism more difficult by 
hindering the flow of funds to support terrorists and authorizing wire-tapping and intelligence 
gathering techniques.  However, no law can deter suicide bombers.
Addressing terrorism requires a broader approach than recourse to law or even military 
force.  The starting point must be greater efforts at understanding terrorists.  All too often people 
confuse attempts to explain why terrorists resort to violence against innocent civilians with 
justification or apology for terrorism.  Hypernationalism under the guise of patriotism hindered 
discussion of U.S. foreign policies and actions that might explain why the U.S. was attacked.  To 
be sure, many people find it hard to believe that others might not share our values, see modernity 
as a threat rather than a blessing, or take issue with attempts to impose liberal democracy and a 
liberal interpretation of human rights on them.  It is much easier to dismiss suicide bombers as 
deluded religious fanatics.  But dismissing suicide bombers as religious fanatics or irrational fails 
to appreciate that many Americans and Europeans were willing to embark on missions that would 
almost inevitably result in their death during WWII to fight for a cause they believed in: their way 
of life.  Indeed, self-sacrifice in the name of the higher good has been celebrated throughout 
history.  To be sure, the methods and causes differ.  But the willingness to give one’s life in the 
name of something that one believes in is the same.  Demonizing groups as terrorists provides 
victims psychological comfort and captures the reprehensible nature of killing innocent civilians 
for political purposes.  However, it does not address the justness of the overall cause, take into 
account that civilian lives are often lost on both sides of a conflict, or help address the root causes 
of terrorism.
Terrorism is largely a function of failed states, wide disparities in power and wealth, and 
fundamental ideological differences.  When people are deprived of economic, political, legal and 
military channels to press their claims to a deeply held way of life, terrorism is regrettably likely 
to appeal to some as the only option, especially since it is sometimes effective.363  As John F. 
Kennedy said in 1961, “Those who make peaceful evolution impossible, make violent revolution 
inevitable."364  Today, Islamic fundamentalists believe, reasonably enough, that their way of life 
is being threatened by globalization and the forces of modernity, and an international legal, 
political and military order whose endorsement of secular liberal democracy is largely 
incompatible with their preferred way of life.  It matters little whether the threat is in the form of 
carrots - foreign aid and assistance aimed at “consciousness-raising,” the promotion of liberal 
democratic values and the building of institutions, including legal institutions, necessary to 
implement democracy and protect rights – or sticks, including censure, sanctions and regime-
changing humanitarian intervention in extreme cases.  The U.S. is held directly responsible 
because of particular policies in the Mid-East and indirectly responsible as the symbol of an 
encroaching, otherwise faceless, modernity.  Attacks on other states that have joined the U.S. in 
the war in Iraq and the beheading of citizens from such states demonstrate however that objection 
is not just to U.S. foreign policy but the broader set of forces that are threatening the ability of the 
terrorists to pursue their chosen way of life.
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Filipino hostage.  Philippines to Start Withdrawing Iraq Force to Save Hostage, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, July 16, 2004, 2004 WL 86379582.
364
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Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship? 83
A more holistic approach that addresses the root causes of terrorism is needed.  
Addressing economic imbalances may alleviate some of the appeal of terrorism.  However, 
terrorism is not always only or primarily motivated by concerns about economic injustice.  In the 
case of Islamic fundamentalism, it is about a way of life that is radically at odds with the way of 
life envisioned under the current human rights regime.  In the end, the international community 
must decide what the limits of tolerance are, what lifeforms fall outside the margin of 
appreciation, and how imperialistic we will be in imposing a particular conception of the good on 
others who do not share that view.  Dressing up these contested normative judgments in the garb 
of allegedly universal human rights or pointing out that terrorism violates humanitarian laws will 
do nothing to persuade terrorists committed to different norms and goals that the international 
legal regime is legitimate or to dissuade them from relying on terrorism in the face of 
asymmetrical military, economic and political power. On the other hand, the highly instrumental 
use of law as a tool to draw politically motivated and normatively contested distinctions as to 
who is and who is not a terrorist and the blatant manipulation of the legal system to serve the 
interests of powerful states further delegitimates  international law in the eyes of the terrorists.
The attacks on the U.S. have led to a series of actions and assertions that have challenged 
the international legal framework and rule of law both internationally and domestically.  While 
terrorism had previously been treated as a crime, after 9-11 President Bush escalated the rhetoric 
by declaring a war on terrorism, with significant legal consequences for those detained.365
Similarly, while prior to 9-11 the dominant view was that terrorist acts by private organizations 
did not constitute an armed attack, there is now wide acceptance that armed conflict need not be 
limited to states.366  Bush’s simplistic assertion that states are either with the U.S. or against the 
U.S. followed by the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq have also raised the issue of the proper 
standard for holding states liable for terrorists within their territory.  Even if the Bush regime’s 
theory of “harboring” terrorists as a justification for an armed is not accepted, there is likely to be 
some shift from the prior standard of effective control.367 While a lower standard still may not 
justify regime change and occupation, it might legitimate more targeted use of force within a 
country calculated to undermine a state’s efforts to support terrorists or justify sanctions or 
365
 Jordan J. Paust, There is No Need to Revise the Laws of War in Light of September 11th,  an 
American Society of International  Law Task Force on Terrorism Paper (Nov. 2002), 
available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/paust.pdf (“Contrary to the assertion of President 
Bush, the United States simply could not be at war with bin Laden and al Qaeda as such, nor 
would it be in the overall interest of the United States for the status of war to apply merely to 
conflicts between the United States and al Qaeda.”).  See also Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism 
and Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135 (2004) (arguing for a criminal 
approach).
366
 Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHIC. J. INTL. L. 83 (2003) (noting the Security Council did not find an armed attack after 1998 bombings of U.S. 
embassies in Africa); Cf. Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 533, 534-35 (2002) (suggesting that 
there was authority for the position that non-state actors could carry out an armed attack prior 
to 9-11 but that the authority for that position is now clearer). 
367
 In Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the International Court of Justice held that the U.S. was 
not liable for the attacks by Contras, which could not be attributed to the U.S. absence of 
showing of effective control over their actions.  The “financing, organizing, training, 
supplying, and equipping of the Contras, the selection of its military and paramilitary targets, 
and the planning of the whole is operation” did not constitute “effective control.” Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), para 115.  The Appeals Chamber in Tadic lowered the standard 
from effective control to overall control, although the still the state must still do more than 
finance or support the the private actor.  See Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 258, at 
para 137 (“The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, 
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84 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
damage claims.368 U.N. Resolution 1368 called on all states to work together to bring justice to 
the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks on the U.S., and affirmed the 
right of self-defense.  Resolution 1373 imposed a number of binding obligations on states, and 
prohibited active and passive support for terrorism.  Accordingly, some commentators have 
argued that whereas prior to 9-11 terrorism was generally not considered a universal crime, these 
resolutions suggest “a sea change in opinio juris” on the issue, and demonstrate that a state’s 
obligation to try or extradite terrorists (the principle of aut dedere, aut judicare) is now part of 
customary international law.369
Even before 9-11, military responses such as the U.S. bombings of Libya in response to a 
bombing of a nightclub in Berlin and the missile attacks of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 in 
response to the bombings of U.S. embassies, while nominally justified on the basis of self-
defense, smacked of retaliation, calling into question the ban on reprisals.370  After 9-11 the 
distinction between reprisals and self-defense has been all but obliterated for terrorists. The 
concept of self-defense has not only been stretched backward to legitimate reprisals; it has also 
been pushed forward to permit countries to strike out at vague potential threats barely visible on 
the distant horizon, threats that just might – but then again might not – materialize one day.  To 
be sure, the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq may take some wind out of 
the sails of the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense in the short term.  At minimum, it is likely to 
result in a higher standard of evidentiary proof to demonstrate that there is in fact a threat, a more 
transparent review process, and a more public debate of the evidence, even allowing that security 
concerns will limit the amount of information made available to the broad public.  Nevertheless, 
it is much too early to write off pre-emptive self-defense.  Many level-headed commentators have 
long argued that the previous standard requiring an imminent attack is no longer viable in this age 
of more powerful weapons, rogue states and terrorists.371
The rules regarding jus in bello also appear to be changing, although there seems to be 
considerably more opposition to changes in this area than regarding jus ad bellum.372 The rights 
of unlawful combatants, the use of military tribunals, and the right of states to declare a state of 
368 See Paust, supra note 366, at 557 (arguing that U.S. use of military force against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan could not be justified on a theory of harbouring or supporting terrorists but that 
state responsibility for terrorists may lead to political, diplomatic, economic and judicial 
sanctions).
369
 Sadat, supra note 365, at 141.
370 See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 281 (1963) (“The provisions of the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-resort 
to the use of force are universally regarded as prohibiting reprisals which involve the use of 
force.”).   But see Jack M. Beard, America’s War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense 
Under International Law, 25 HARV. J. INT’L L. 559, 561-565 (2002) (pointing out while 
foreign reaction to the bombing in Libya was generally negative, in part because of concerns 
about retaliation, reaction was mixed regarding the bombing in Afghanistan and Sudan, and 
foreign criticism was muted regarding the 1993 missile attack on Baghdad in response to the 
assassination attempt of former President Bush).  He also notes that there is considerable 
debate about the ability to draw a distinction between reprisal and self-defense and the justifiability of retaliation as a means of deterring future attacks.  Id. at 584.
371 See W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’ L L. 82 (2003); W. Michael Reisman, Aftershocks: Reflections on the Implications of Sept. 11, 6 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 81 (2003); see also Glennon, supra note 205.  Daniel 
Webster’s statement in the Caroline case is often cited as the pre-September 11 standard for 
self-defense based on an imminent attack: “the necessity of that self-defense is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”   See Paust, 
supra note 366 at 535, n. 6.
372
 Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad bellum and jus in bello after September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002). 
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emergency and derogate from civil and political rights are all being contested.373 The passage of 
anti-terrorist laws such as the Patriot Act has also raised constitutional and domestic law issues 
regarding separation of powers, the rights of foreigners, and the extent to which civil and political 
liberties can and should be restricted in the name of fighting terrorism.374  Other issues now in 
play include collective punishment, torture, hostage taking, riot control with live ammunition, and 
assassinations.375
Supporters argue that such changes facilitate the struggle against terrorism and peace 
among nations, and that terrorism requires suspension of normal rules.376  When asked about long 
detentions of suspected terrorists without being charged or brought before judge, U.S. Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo: “Does it make sense to ever release them if you think they 
are going to continue to be dangerous even though you can’t convict them of a crime?”377 Vice 
President Cheney, sounding more like one of the dictators long criticized by the U.S. than one of 
the leaders of the “Free World,” stated: “These people are criminals illegally entering into the 
United States, killing our citizens.  They do not deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that 
would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process.”378
Detractors argue that many of the changes are detrimental to U.S. interests, rule of law 
and geopolitical stability. Treating terrorism as war could legitimate some attacks by non-state 
actors on the U.S. such as the 9-11 bombings of the Pentagon or the attack on the U.S. Cole.379
Broad rules against harboring and supporting terrorists will impede states, including the U.S., 
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 Paust, supra note 215; Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law and the War on 
Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 58, 66-67 (2002).
374 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. 107-056 (expanding the 
government’s authority to issue wiretaps and intercept and monitor written, oral and 
electronic communication). National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 55,  062-66 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. pts. 500-01) (permitting 
the monitoring of attorney-client communications between inmates in its custody and their 
lawyers).  See also David Klinger and Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, Who Should Deal with 
Foreign Terrorists on U.S. Soil?: Socio-legal Consequences of September 11 and the 
Ongoing Threat of Terrorist Attacks in America, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 815 (2002) (arguing for the deployment of U.S. military in domestic law enforcement actions and that 
“Foreign individuals or groups (and U.S. citizens aiding and abetting them) who commit acts 
of war on U.S. soil should not be viewed as people who need to be apprehended under the 
aegis of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, which properly requires substantial 
restraint on law enforcement officials seizing citizens”; rather, such people should be treated 
as enemy soldiers under laws of war, whereby the military should have the right to make 
“informed decisions” that the people they are dealing with are foreign terrorists (or U.S. 
aiders) and attack using reasonable force, including tanks and missiles to blow planes out of 
the sky). 
375 See generally, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: HOW 
CHANGES TO U.S. LAW AND SECURITY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (2003), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/imbalance/powers.pdf; Tom J. Farer, Beyond 
the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium, 96 AM. J. INTL’L L. 359, 364 (2002).
376 See Dickinson, supra note 19 (noting justifications for military tribunals include that (i) trials 
take too long and cost too much, and are a nuisance or danger when fighting terrorism; (ii) 
civilian judges and witnesses would be at risk;  (iii) there is no need to protect the rights of 
terrorists; (iv) normal rules do not fit the circumstances – soldiers in the field can hardly be 
expected to read Bin Laden his Miranda rights; it is not possible to maintain the chain of 
custody for evidence out in the field; and state secrets are involved; (v) witnesses will use 
public trials to  grandstand for political purposes.
377 See, e.g., Warren Richey, How Long Can Guantanamo Prisoners Be Held?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, April 9, 2002, at 1, 4.
378 See Ta Kung Pao Accuses US of Violating Human Rights with Proposed Military Tribunals, 
FBIS-CHI-2001-1126, Nov. 26, 2001.  
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from supporting groups such as the Contras and the Northern Alliance, which may frustrate 
global democracy promotion and antiterrorism efforts.380  U.S. soldiers will be more vulnerable if 
the U.S. fails to provide Taliban or Iraqi soldiers POW status or allows “torture light”. The use of 
military tribunals will legitimate the use of such tribunals by other countries, prevent extradition 
of prisoners to the U.S. and create rifts in the united front against terrorism.  The reliance on force 
will lead to excessive military responses and undermine non-military efforts to deal with 
terrorism.  The broad rhetoric of war on terrorism will be used as an excuse by Russia, China and 
other countries to justify a harsh crackdown on separatist groups, and thus contribute to 
widespread human rights violations.  Doctrines of pre-emptive self-defense and unilateral actions 
without Security Council will undermine the U.N., and result in "unrestrained use of violence by
client regimes acting in the name of counterterrorism….Once the frame of order is broken, we 
can reasonably anticipate increasingly norm-less violence, pitiless blows followed by monstrous 
retaliation in a descending spiral of hardly imaginable depths."381  Conversely, upholding existing 
norms regarding due process and civil liberties even during a time of crisis will demonstrate 
commitment to rule of law, serve an educative function in isolating terrorists and distinguish their 
unjust means from our just and venerable methods, while promoting the development of laws and 
norms regarding terrorism.382
The controversies over the various changes in the law and the actions taken to combat 
terrorism demonstrate the conceptual and practical limits of rule of law.  Surely it is worrisome 
when both sides appeal to rule of law to justify their actions.  To be sure, rule of law is not just an 
empty slogan whose invocation can rationalize any measure to combat terrorism.  At minimum, 
rule of law requires fair trials and that the rules be applied equally to all.  The rules for trials in 
military tribunals fall far short of the minimal requirements necessary to ensure a fair trial and 
thus of the minimal requirements of rule of law.383  However, appeal to rule of law will not 
resolve many, indeed most, of the issues regarding what the laws for dealing with terrorists 
should be.384  Nor obviously will invoking the mantra of rule of law resolve debates about 
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382 See generally Dickinson, supra note 19, at 1435-67 (offering a number of strategic reasons for 
upholding legal process values to counter the sceptical arguments of realists and others that 
legal niceties must be jettisoned in periods of national emergency). See also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648  (2004) (O’Connor, J.: “Striking the proper constitutional 
balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it 
is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear 
or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and 
uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and 
it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which 
we fight abroad.”).
383 See Dickinson, supra note 19, at 1412-35; Paust, supra note 215. 
384
 The Supreme Court terrorist decisions confirmed and demonstrated that due process depends 
on the circumstances.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 385, at 2646 (citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), the process due in any given instance is subject to a balancing 
test that weighs "the private interest that will be affected by the official action" against the 
Government's asserted interest, "including the function involved" and the burdens the 
Government would face in providing greater process, and that considers "the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation" of the private interest if the process were reduced and the "probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards.").
The Rasul decision confirmed noncitizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the right to file 
habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts to challenge the legality of their detention, while 
the Court in Hamdi held that a U.S. citizen captured abroad and detained in the U.S. as an 
“enemy combatant” has the right to “receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, 
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”  Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi, supra note 385, at 2648. 
However, the Court did not specify in Hamdi what procedures would satisfy the requirement 
for a “fair opportunity” to rebut the classification as an enemy combatant, rejected the district 
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whether rule of law, including the right to fair trials, should be set aside in times of emergency.  
Significantly, while both sides invoke rule of law rhetoric, at the end of the day most issues turn 
on other considerations such as:  Which laws will best serve U.S. interests? Will the proposed 
changes be effective in countering terrorism or will they lead to more terrorism?  Is there an 
absolute right not to be tortured or a deontic obligation on states to not torture regardless of the 
consequences? Should self-avowed terrorists who openly pledge to continue the righteous war 
against Satanic western powers be released for lack of evidence to convict for a crime?
Whatever the outcome on these issues, the response to terrorism once again demonstrates 
the role of power politics in the international order, and how international rule of law on matters 
of high politics remains a distant aspiration.  There can be little doubt that the U.S. has 
manipulated both the rhetoric of war on terrorism and the rhetoric of rule of law to serve its own 
interests.  At minimum, the reaction to terrorism demonstrates the point made by critics of 
universalism and an increasingly juridified and rigid international legal system that rights are 
dependent on a variety of contingent circumstances.  Less charitably, the rush to pass anti-
terrorism legislation even in Western liberal democracies demonstrates once again the hypocrisy 
in the attempts to export democracy, rule of law and human rights while failing to live up to such 
standards at home.  Terrorism had existed long before 9-11, and yet Western powers including 
the U.S. were content to treat it as a crime rather than an occasion for a global war with no 
foreseeable endpoint.385  Prior to September 11, the U.S. State Department and Western rights 
organizations regularly criticized countries for cracking down on terrorists, insurgents and others 
who threatened the social order, firmly opposed the use of military courts, and ever so self-
righteously denounced derogation of civil and political rights and deviations from The Rule of 
Law.  In 2000, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright preached perseverance in the face of 
terrorism, rising crime and a breakdown in social order in Uzbekistan:
court’s position that meaningful review required extensive discovery of military intelligence 
and procedural protections similar to those in criminal trials as unduly burdensome in light of 
military operations, and opened the door to hearsay evidence and a presumption in the 
government’s favor.  The court also suggested that an “appropriately authorized and properly 
constituted military tribunal” might satisfy the requirement of a hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker, and acknowledged the authority of Congress to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus as provided in the Constitution in times of rebellion or invasion. 
As for how long enemy combatants could be detained without trial, the Court declined to state 
how long is too long.  Rather, the Court stated that indefinite detention for interrogation was 
not permissible, but that enemy combatants could be detained for the duration of the conflict.  
As U.S. troops were still stationed in Afghanistan, the Court found the conflict to be ongoing 
and thus Hamdi’s two-year plus detention to be legal.  The Court raised but sidestepped the 
issue of how long a person could be detained in an unconventional war on terror that may last 
for generations and has no clear ending point.
The Court also held that Hamdi had the right to counsel and to meet with counsel in private, 
although the Court did not specify when the right to counsel would attach or address other 
possible limitations on counsel such as the requirement that counsel have security clearance, 
as currently provided in the Military Authorization Act.  See Dickinson, supra note 19.  Nor 
did the court decide who could be considered an enemy combatant, other to accept that the 
term would reach someone who, as alleged to be the case for Hamdi, was "part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" and "engaged in an armed 
conflict against the United States." 
385
 "The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration… 
American will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who 
harbor terrorists - because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization."  Military Force 
Authorization Bill, S. J. Res. 23 (Sept. 18, 2001). The bill authorized the President to use all 
necessary force against any organization or state found to have been involved in the planning 
of or having committed terrorist acts in the U.S., or any state providing a safe haven to 
terrorist organizations.
88 LAW REVIEW [Vol. ___
[T]he United States will not support any and all measures taken in the name of fighting 
drugs and terrorism or restoring stability.  One of the most dangerous temptations for a 
government facing violent threats is to respond in heavy-handed ways that violate the 
rights of innocent citizens.  Terrorism is a criminal act and should be treated accordingly 
– and that means applying the rule of law fairly and consistently.  We have found, 
through experience around the world, that the best way to defeat terrorist threats is to 
increase law enforcement capabilities while at the same time promoting democracy and 
human rights.386
These sagely words of caution and moral exhortation were delivered just one year before the U.S. 
declared a war on terrorism, arrested up to 5000 suspected terrorists many of whom have ended 
up being detained incommunicado for years without access to a lawyer or even the chance to 
notify their families, and authorized the use of military tribunals where defendants without the 
right to a lawyer of their choice or even to know the charges against them would be tried in 
closed proceedings before military personnel with the normal rules of evidence suspended and no 
right of appeal whatsoever of a guilty verdict that could be based on a lower standard of proof 
than the usual “beyond a reasonable doubt.”387
In criticizing other countries for derogating from human rights in the face of terrorism 
and insurgent groups vowing to topple the government, Western governments prior to September 
11 often claimed that the life of the nation was not at stake.388  The restrictions were perceived as 
required to keep the ruling regime in power but not constituting a threat to the state as such.  Yet 
surely the threats faced by many countries are more serious than the threats currently faced by the 
U.S.  After all, it stretches credulity to suggest that isolated acts of terrorism, deplorable as they 
may be, could bring the U.S., with the strongest military in history, to its knees – although the 
terrorists may succeed in a causing a major change in the nature of the state if the government’s 
repressive policies to combat terrorism erode the very liberties they are supposed to protect.  In 
contrast, many states, weakened by ethnic strife, economic crisis and insurgent movements whose 
express purpose is to overthrow the government, do confront challenges that could result in the 
collapse of the state.  Ironically, before September 11, some Asian states that had been criticized 
by the U.S. for excessive reliance on draconian national security laws had amended or repealed 
the laws or limited their use, often as a result of a transition to democracy.  However, the U.S. is 
now pressuring these same states to reinstate, or to apply more aggressively, national security 
laws, often dangling the bait of a bilateral trade agreement, despite protests by citizens in these 
countries that such laws will turn back the clock on democratization, empower the military and 
lead to violations of civil liberties.389
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prisoners may continue to be detained even if the military tribunals acquitted them). See also 
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 26 (2003) (noting that of the estimated 5000 people arrested by 
May 2003, not one had been charged with involvement in the attacks on Sept. 11 and only a 
handful have been charged with terrorist-related crimes)
388
 ICCPR, art. 4.  Principle 39 of the Siracusa Principles interprets "threat to the life of the 
nation" to mean that a danger (i) is present or imminent; (ii) is exceptional; (iii) concerns the 
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Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship? 89
Apparently, rights are a luxury. When stable, Euro-America can afford to preach to 
developing countries struggling with terrorists about the value of civil and political rights and the 
importance of rule of law.  But when faced with threats, much cherished rights go out the 
window.390  If there is anything universal, it would seem to be disregard for rights whenever there 
are real or perceived threats to stability and social order.391
VIII. U.S. Exceptionalism and Rule of Law
A final reason for the recent popularity of rule of law lies in its utility in challenging U.S. 
exceptionalism, which threatens the universality of the human rights movement and the 
legitimacy of the international legal order based on the principle of the legal equality of all states.    
The U.S. has not ratified CEDAW, ICSECR, or the Covenant on the Rights of Child.  
Indeed, the U.S. is the only state other than Somalia to not ratify the Covenant on the Rights of 
the Child.  When the U.S. ratified the ICCPR, it attached a reservation that would prevent it from 
having any domestic affect.  Similarly, when the U.S. finally ratified the 1948 Genocide 
Convention in 1988, it attached a reservation to address opponents’ fears that Convention would 
be used to press claims of genocide against Native and African Americans. 392   Although 
apologists for the U.S. often claim that U.S. laws are more protective of individual rights than 
international rights instruments, the U.S. is at odds with the international human movement on a 
range of issues such as the death penalty (including for juveniles) and hate speech.393 The U.S. 
had the dubious distinction of being the major opponent to an 18-year old age limit on child 
solders, insisting on an exception to allow 16-year old volunteers.  The U.S., which maintains the 
largest stockpile of antipersonnel mines in the world and exported over 5.6 million mines to 
thirty-eight countries between 1960 and 1992, also continues to oppose the land mine ban.  The 
U.S. has also withdrawn support for the Kyoto protocol, rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty in 1999, and refused to support the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and Draft 
Protocol on the grounds that it did not protect important bio-defense and industrial information 
and would not be effective in detecting cheating.394
Crispin & Jeremy Wagstaff, The Terror War's Next Offensive, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW, Aug.  28, 2003, at 12-16.
390
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Court had a chance to take a stronger stand in Hamdi but ended up issuing a pragmatic 
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In the last twenty-five years, the U.S. has been involved in some forty military actions, 
including wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, regime-changing invasions in Grenada, Panama 
and Haiti, military assistance to rebel groups in Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and missile 
attacks on Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and Sudan.395  Under Bush, the U.S. no longer intervenes only 
for self-defense or balance of power.  Rather, the U.S. now is engaged in the messianic mission to 
liberate and save the world from evil.396  Little wonder the U.S. has opposed any attempt to define 
aggression and actively sought to undermine the ICC, as discussed previously.
Rule of law may seem like the answer to U.S. exceptionalism.  After all, all states are 
supposed to play by the same rules and be treated equally.  There is no doubt that rule of law 
provides a rhetorical basis for challenging U.S. exceptionalism, and in some instances the U.S. 
may modify its behavior to placate international or domestic critics.397  However, the preceding 
discussion of the U.S.-led war on terrorism should caution against placing too much faith in the 
ability of rule of law to deter the U.S. or any other superpower when significant interests are at 
stake.  Appealing to rule of law has had and is unlikely to continue to have limited impact on U.S. 
actions.  Bush and other government officials have repeatedly made clear that the U.S. will not be 
bound by the views of the Security Council or other nations when it comes to protecting U.S. 
interests.398
Carl Schmitt argued that at the heart of rule of law is the power to make decisions and 
decide what the law will be in times of emergency.399 It is the power to determine when the 
normal rules apply and when they don’t, and to define who is the enemy, the aggressor or a 
terrorist, and then to legitimate these discretionary and essentially political decisions by cloaking 
them in the language of law.  Now, the U.S. and other western powers are able to impose their 
way of life on the rest, and to make it appear natural, inevitable and legitimate by writing their 
395 See Zoltan Grossman, a Partial List of U.S. Military Interventions from 1890 to 2004, at
http://www.uwec.edu/grossmzc/interventions.html.
396
 Hurst Hannum, Bellum Americanum, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 29 (Wntr-Spring 2003) (Pax Americana has become bellum Americanum, with the desire to keep peace taking a back 
seat to the desire to accomplish good through the use of force and war.).  President George 
W. Bush, Remarks at the Graduating Class of 2002 at the United States Military Academy, 
May 23, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-
3.html (visited Aug. 12, 2005) (“Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s 
defense.  We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors human liberty… 
Building this just peace is America’s opportunity and America’s duty.”); see also The White 
House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (visited Aug. 12, 2004): 
In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United 
States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all 
people everywhere.  No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from 
them….. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity; the 
rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; 
equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private 
property.
Suffice it to say that not everyone shares “the American” conception - as if there were one unified 
American view - or more particularly the Bush’s regime’s conception of justice, liberty or 
rule of law, or of what constitutes proper restrictions on free speech, or how the principle of 
religious and ethnic tolerance is to be squared with the need to preserve order in the face of 
ethnic violence and secession movements.
397 See John E. Noyes, American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders, and General International 
Law, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 293 (2004).
398 World Reacts Cautiously to Bush’s Speech, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, June 29, 2003 (President 
Bush stated that “[t]he course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of other 
nations.”). President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040120-7.html (“America will 
never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.”).
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normative preferences into human rights instruments and the laws of war, and changing or setting 
aside those laws when doing so suits their needs.  However, the excessively self-interested and 
narrowly parochial way in which U.S. flaunts its power while at the same time promoting the 
allegedly universal values of secular liberalism, democracy, free markets and rule of law 
undermines their normative appeal and the moral authority of the U.S. as a role model.
The failure of international rule of law to restrain U.S. power or at least to cabin it within 
an institutionalized context of normal politics demonstrates the limits of rule of law, and that 
while the enduring value of rule of law lies in ensuring predictability and certainty during normal 
times, ultimately the value of rule of law depends on the rules and who is determining them. We 
would be living in a very different world if for example Confucian communitarians rather than 
Western liberals ruled the world, as seemed to be a possibility for a moment when Japan and the 
Asian Tigers were ascending economically and might yet be the case if China continues its march 
toward becoming a world power.  The relationship between rule of law and human rights is 
therefore in the end a contingent one: the international legal system and rule of law rhetoric will 
serve whatever norms the dominant powers codify in law as rights. 
Conclusion 
We should not place too high of hopes on rule of law as a means of promoting human rights.  
Rule of law, whether thick or thin or both, provides no guarantee that rights will be taken 
seriously in practice. Thin theories are normatively thin, and thick conceptions of rule of law may 
be at odds with international human rights norms and standards, sometimes radically and 
sometimes to a lesser degree. Non-democratic countries such as Islamic theocracies or soft-
authoritarian socialist states such as Vietnam or China constitute profound challenges to the 
human rights regime, as do nonliberal states such as Singapore and Malaysia that have well 
developed legal systems that comply with the requirements of a thin rule of law. But even liberal 
democracies such as the U.S. have refused to bring domestic rights policies into compliance with 
international standards on issues from hate speech to the death penalty.
Rule of law will not settle many of the currently contested issues regarding the proper 
interpretation and justification of rights.  Indeed, rule of law provides little guidance on many of 
the most contested issues.  Rule of law is also consistent with a wide-range of institutions, the 
choice and development of which are to a large extent path-dependent. 
As a practical matter, the legal institutions in many countries are so weak that compliance 
with the requirements of even a thin rule of law is difficult if not impossible. Divided by civil 
war, too weak to pursue prudent economic policies and politically unstable, failed or failing states 
are responsible for many of the most egregious, systematic and widespread violations of human 
rights. But rule of law requires political stability and a state with the capacity to establish and 
operate a functional legal system.
While the theoretical differences in thick conceptions of rule of law are likely to attract 
the most attention from academics, the weakness of many legal systems frustrates the 
implementation of human rights even when there are no conceptual or normative issues at stake. 
Many legal systems in developing countries are plagued by incompetent judges, judicial 
corruption, high court fees and long delays. The average citizen may be as concerned, if not more 
concerned, about these types of thin rule of law problems than with broader concerns about 
political philosophies or even many rights issues.
There is a danger in promising too much in the name of rule of law, lest the extravagant 
promises result in disillusionment, which is likely to happen if rule of law is conflated with 
justice and all things goods and wonderful including all of the rights set out in international rights 
instruments.  We should be wary of attempts to hide contested normative views about human 
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rights under the seemingly more neutral façade of rule of law.  We should take care to distinguish 
between thin and thick and not overly rely on rhetorical value of rule in pressing particular thick 
conception.  We should not hold out unrealistic hopes that rule of law will somehow magically 
settle deeply contested rights issues or resolve many of the interpretive and institutional issues 
that impede implementation of human rights or put an end to war, poverty, political stability and 
the other factors that are the main causes of human rights violation in the world.
But we should not be unduly dismissive of rule of law either.  Efforts to implement rule 
of law are likely to improve the quality of life for most people and to further the goals of the 
international human rights movement both directly and indirectly. Even a thin rule of law entails 
limits on the state and the ruling elite who are also bound by the law, provides a legal basis for 
citizens to challenge government arbitrariness, and serves to protect the rights and interests of the 
non-elite. A functional legal system, with a reasonably independent judiciary, is no doubt useful 
and most likely necessary if human rights are to be fully implemented. Rule of law is necessary if 
not sufficient for sustained economic growth, which in turn accounts for much of the variation in 
rights performance and quality of life.  It is indeed striking that while critics in many developed 
countries have the luxury of belittling the concept of rule of law, those who have had the 
misfortune to suffer its absence appreciate its virtues and count among its biggest supporters.
